Transparent Node Providers

Following Enzo’s and my announcement regarding the acquisition of nodes from DFINITY and our intention to become node providers, we have observed numerous questions and speculations from community members on the forums. While formal transparency guidelines are still pending, we want to proactively address these concerns to dispel speculation and garner support for our resubmitted node provider proposals.

First, some background on us. We left the DFINITY foundation with one clear objective: make DeFi happen on ICP. We operate under a few key principles, to build products users love, to ship fast, get feedback and iterate. We first built a stablecoin backed by Bitcoin and ICP, which we eventually sunset. Next we built WaterNeuron, the first and only liquid staking protocol on the IC, which now boasts 2.3M ICP TVL, holding 68% of all ICP in DeFi. Now we are also building Yusan, the IC’s first borrow/lend protocol, which is the next big missing piece in ICP DeFi. We will also release OneSec, IC’s first multi-chain bridge/swap aggregator.

We start this post with that short overview on us since a select few in the community have made ad hominem attacks on us, and our motivations, all of which are completely unfounded. We have spent the past few years of our lives dedicated to building applications on the Internet Computer.

Like many in the community, we aspired to become ICP Node Providers, attracted by the potential for stable, recurring revenue and strong returns. In October 2024, DFINITY announced a silent auction for surplus nodes, following the introduction of a new rule capping each provider’s ownership at 42 nodes. We saw this as a unique opportunity, not only to become node operators but also to secure the capital needed to fund our broader development efforts on the Internet Computer. The biggest hurdle, then, was raising enough capital to submit a compelling offer. As we searched for potential backers, we realized that the only people with both the expertise and confidence to invest in this opportunity were the existing node providers themselves.

Node providers needed to be “independent”, but no clear definition of independence existed. In our minds, independence means full control and ownership of both the legal entity, the nodes, and the data center access. As engineers ourselves we wanted to manage the servers independently ourselves, contributing back to the community in the process. Where the money came was less relevant, as long as the financing didn’t come with strings attached or any ownership claims in case of default.

We connected with David Fisher, an existing ICP investor and node provider, who agreed to finance the loans. David has been incredibly supportive with both his time and money in the ICP ecosystem since he met Dom back in 2017 in Palo Alto. To maintain our independence, David agreed he would put up the money, but would not be the legal owner or retain any managerial rights.

A couple key dates are listed below.

October 2024:
DFINITY announced a silent auction for their extra nodes, after the new rule limiting the ownership of each provider to 42 nodes. In the announcement, it is stated that “You will be permitted to onboard them under the terms of NNS proposal 132553.”

November 15th, 2024:
BlueAnt LLC won 42 nodes:

  • financed with a loan provided by David
  • Enzo is the sole Ultimate Beneficial Owner (100% UBO)
  • Public disclosure

Zarety LLC won 42 nodes:

  • Financed with a loan provided by David
  • Léo is the sole Ultimate Beneficial Owner (100% UBO)
  • Public disclosure

January 24th, 2025:
DFINITY Stiftung handed over the nodes to Zarety LLC. These nodes were moved from Atlanta, USA, and Boston, USA, to the Isle of Man to further increase ICP’s geographical decentralization.

February 12th, 2025:
DFINITY Stiftung handed over the nodes to BlueAnt LLC. These nodes were moved from Marseille, France, and Atlanta, USA, to the Isle of Man to further increase ICP’s geographical decentralization.

March 2025:
A conversation started to discuss a new set of rules and guidelines on what it means to have independent node providers, which was not as clearly defined beforehand. With these new rules that will be voted on, the previous loan financing will become a problem, as David is also a node provider with Rivonia Holdings LLC. In parallel, a hunt began in earnest to find bad actors who had lied about their identity. It is our understanding that several fake identities were discovered, denting the reputation and security of the network.

That said, the hunt which had good intentions, also took an ugly turn, and became a witch hunt. People started being accused of nefarious activity and intent. We were accused specifically of colluding with David to attack the network. Given the environment of fear and intimidation that took over, we did not feel compelled to disclose our source of funding. We had nothing to hide, but no one else was required to disclose their funding so why should we? We had operated within the rules of the game.

April 14th, 2025:
Zarety LLC submitted a proposal to join the network without disclosing that David has provided a loan.

BlueAnt LLC submitted a proposal to join the network without disclosing that David has provided a loan.

DFINITY decided to reject our application to become a Node Provider. Dfinity felt that since we collaborated closely with the team in Zurich, we had an extra obligation to be transparent to the community. Our relationship with Dfinity is quite literally the most important thing to us, and in that spirit, we are writing this forum post to you today.

As we understand it, it seems unlikely that node providers financing other node providers will be permitted by the community. While we disagree that an unsecured loan removes independence, we of course respect the decision of the community - if that is indeed what is decided.

May 2025:
As a result, we have endeavored to re-organize the node provider entities along the following lines. This plan has been discussed with Dfinity who is supportive and believes it will likely be compliant under the new rules.

Following discussions with the DFINITY Foundation, we agreed that the current setup will not be compliant with the forthcoming independence rules. Therefore, we would like to outline the desired outcome:

  • BlueAnt LLC, owned by Enzo, will be sold to Sisyphus AG, a Swiss-based entity we use to develop protocols on the IC, where David is a minority investor (less than 25%).
  • Zarety LLC, owned by Léo, will be sold to David so he owns it outright.
  • Rivonia Holdings LLC sells its 42 US-based nodes to a third-party. David is in what is hopefully the final stages of negotiation with an institutional investor to take over the nodes.

The reorganization must happen all at once. Steps 1 and 2 cannot proceed without Step 3, as compliance with the 42-node ownership limit depends on it. We propose, after consultation with DFINITY, for Blue Ant LLC and Zarety LLC to be accepted as node providers with the current setup, with Enzo and Leo as their respective legal owners. David will work diligently to finalize the sale of Rivonia Holdings to this institutional investor as soon as possible, ideally before mid June, although this is not entirely in his control.

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Where is the transparency in this process? @dfisher is also an investor in Coinbase, which raises legitimate concerns about a potential conflict of interest—especially if any decisions being made could benefit Coinbase directly or indirectly.

Thanks Leo for the comprehensive post on the nodes.

Now, some color on me. I am an investor that is blown away by the ambitiousness of the IC, the technical powerhouse that is Dfinity, and Dom’s rugged determination. Its truly a special project I feel we are a part of. I’ve backed many, many projects on the IC, some of which have worked out, and some of which have not.

I do commend the efforts to get rid of the scams, and improve the security of the network. That said, like others, I have been accused of attacking the network. Hopefully the post above clears up the nodes.

And @Phasma, on Coinbase, I am happy to reassure you that the entire thing is fake. Alas, I wish I invested in the seed round of Coinbase. Instead, 9Yards invested a small amout into a company called Tagomi that got bought by Coinbase (in kind share purchase) at the $8BN valuation. Candidly, whoever chose to make up that story, you could have used some more imagination!

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Do initial public offerings not count?

Isnt this an advertisement for you?

It would be one thing to say that you are an investor and can provide connections that would be beneficial to the protocol.

It is entirely another thing to deny they exist, why you deny this I cant understand, its on your own website and advertising campaigns.

This is concerning.

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Wow, this is insane. Borovan lies and attacks legitimate independent node providers who actually care about ICP. And the reason is because they took loans from D. Fisher. Now when they are in constant attack from Borovan, they are forced to sell all nodes, and buyer is D. Fisher (42 (full control)+42 (25%)). Good job brainless Adam.
So who is Adam (Borovan), he is a whale who hold about 8% voting power in NNS. He hold very huge % in most of SNS projects.
What has Adam done: taken forcefully over SNS projects, made fake proposals where claims 1 thing but code is compleatly different, he made cycle draining attacks on some SNS projects, has been attacking many people in forum, he has drained project developement funds for his own benefit. On one post he said he dont scam people like BoomDAO does (he DID NOT say he dont scam people). He has destroyed trust in SNS, and driven away node providers and app developers. He has NOT pumped ICP or helped in any way to pump it, only constantly sold.

Now when D. Fisher will get more nodes under his belt, what can be result. What if D. Fisher was singled handedly the one who pumped, helped to pump ICP from 2.8 usd to almost 20 usd. What if Fisher is the one who we must work together to save ICP, He has funds and connections to make ICP great.

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He explained how Coinbase got into the investment portfolio lol.

Cb bought a company they invested in and they got shares of cb.

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Yes I understand that.

What difference does that make?

The financial connection and the relationships are there. Why pretend otherwise?

Why not say: “My company has significant investments we acquired in coinbase which would be beneficial to the protocol?”

Thats whats concerning to me.

I’ll say this.

Just because one of his investments got bought doesn’t mean he has any special connections to Coinbase.

What it does show is he is good at identifying good products and investing in them. We could all learn to be better at that.

Let’s create a new thread to discuss David’s investments and sales as it is not the topic of this thread.

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Wait, isn’t there a huge difference between SEED investments and IPO? Seeds tend to be family members, friends, and angel investors and founders themselves. IPOs are open to the public who are qualified to invest.

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Thank you for posting this.

While some maybe unfamiliar with IPO and traditional markets , this is a great start!

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Also in the public disclosure post David Fischer hasn’t been mentioned.

So David has financed Waterneuron team members to acquire 84 nodes.

Yes. I understand the distinction, between private sales and public. I feel like we are just muddying the waters here.

Here’s my perspective.

I’m just a normal guy, with significant portions of my life savings bet on this horse. I want this horse to win.

I have no animosity for for either side of this conversation. I just want my savings to not go to 0.

I see two of the major investors of this project having a disagreement. One of them is making a claim that the other has a conflict of interest with another investment. (By having a significant investment in coinbase).

If both parties were being honest the response I would expect from the other would sound something like this:

“Yes, I have a significant investment in coinbase, and here is a list of reasons why that will be good for the ICP community. I can leverage my connections and influence to open these doors and it will be beneficial to everyone.”

But that is NOT what he said. instead he said this:

can you see why to me, this is concerning and appears to be deliberately misleading?

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He openly states his belief in ICP and the powerhouse this is.

If there is no connection then there is no connection. Vc firms and investors buy stocks they believe in. They typically do not have any sway into the direction those companies move in as its up to the board to make those choices, not the investors.

I see you falling for the narrative that david invested into coinbase and that means he wants icp to fail. When in reality he is one of the few investors with capital who even cares to fund icp startups and be a node provider to help secure the network.

ICP is meant to compete with cloud providers, not other cryptos. Projects on all chains are supposed to transition into using ICP instead of AWS. One great way to do this is to build killer dapps on ICP and on other chains.

As icp will be burned no matter what chain the front facing dapp is used on. We seem to be stuck on this “build only on icp” narrative when that is not the end goal for ICP. If projects on other chains begin to use ICP as a cloud we all win.

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I agree.

That’s why I don’t understand he cant just say that. Why can’t he just be honest? Why can’t he say “I’m invested in coinbase, that is good for ICP.”

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Can you provide the name(s) of who at DFINITY think that this would be compliant with new rules that are being formulated? I’ve been involved with, and following the discussion around this closely, and I don’t believe the proposal is/will be compliant. Or at least not in a way that one couldn’t pick endless holes in.

Compliance rests on an expectation that David would not be considered a UBO due to having less that a 25% share, and simultaneously rests on an assumption that this is sufficient to avoid being ‘clustered’ with the nodes he owns outright. In the same way that a single node provider should not own more than 42 nodes, a single ‘cluster’ should not contain 42 nodes either.

What makes the number 25 magical in this respect? Why would 24.9% make someone no longer a UBO? How many 24.9% non-UBO shares should a node provider be allowed to have in other node providers’ affairs (2, 3, 4 ..)? How many arbitrary numbers and levels of indirection need introducing to shoehorn the reality of interdependence into a token gesture of independence?


So can I ask why you’ve jumped the gun and submitted proposals (136497, 136504) that assumes this will happen, and that also are arguably not aligned with the direction that the Node Provider Independence discussion has taken? There should have been time for discussion after this announcement and before the proposal was submitted.

You guys are talented devs, I love what you’re doing for the IC, I harbour no ill will. But that doesn’t change my thoughts about this (which is a super important topic, and one that the IC needs to get right).

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I think there is a bit of confusion here. 9Yards are investors in Coinbase. We invested a small amount of money into a company called Tagomi which was bought by Coinbase, so now have a small number of Coinbase shares. Its not much. What I was saying was fake news and weird was some grand elaborate conspiracy about Coinbase being against ICP.

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Thank you for clarifying David.

That makes much more sense. Thank you for taking the time to answer.

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Hello Leo and all parties involved. Some of the questions below may need Dfinity’s participation. The purpose of this is to create transparency which separates partial ambiguity from credence. I fully support builders and decentralization. These comments and inquiries are constructed with that in mind.

Benefits

  1. Geographical Decentralization: 84 nodes moved to Isle of Man, reducing US/EU reliance.

  2. Ecosystem Commitment: Enzo/Léo’s DeFi projects (2.3M ICP TVL) fund further ICP innovation.

  3. Transparency: Discloses loans, proposes reorganization to address collusion concerns.

  4. Independence Compliance: Limits David’s influence (Sisyphus <25%, Rivonia sale), aligns with 42-node cap.

  5. Economic Incentives: Node revenue (~$84,000/month utilizing an average of $2k per node less EBITDAE) boosts DeFi development.

  6. Statement of Self Declaration: This helps identify the lead and coincides with UBO statement.

Concerns

  1. Ownership Concerns: David’s loans and ownership (Zarety, Sisyphus) risk indirect control.

  2. Uncertain Timeline: Rivonia’s sale by June 2025 is not guaranteed, risking non-compliance.

  3. Legal Ambiguity: Delaware LLCs with Isle of Man nodes lack clear jurisdiction and recourse.

  4. Trust Erosion: Past non-disclosure (April 2025) and “witch hunt” damage community confidence.

  5. Dependence on David: Financial ties centralize influence, undermining decentralization.

Questions on Ownership

  1. What safeguards prevent David’s influence via loans or Sisyphus stake? Can loan/Sisyphus governance docs be shared?

  2. How will Enzo/Léo avoid coordination with David (Zarety owner)? Are there operational firewalls?

  3. If Rivonia’s sale fails, will BlueAnt/Zarety relinquish nodes to prevent David’s 126-node control?

  4. I am assuming Dfinity has a self-declaration document from Zarety given the approved sale of nodes. Could Zarety post an IC wiki link of self-declaration like Blue Ant has?

Questions on Legal Structure

  1. Why Delaware LLCs for Isle of Man nodes? What legal frameworks govern operations? Could you all provide a copy of good standing for the LLC’s involved?

  2. Are LLC agreements auditable (e.g., GitHub)? Can LLC operating agreements be shared or summary thereof?

  3. How does Sisyphus AG’s Swiss jurisdiction affect BlueAnt? Any regulatory conflicts?

Questions on Accountability

  1. How are disputes resolved across Delaware/Isle of Man? Is there arbitration?

  2. Can NNS revoke BlueAnt/Zarety’s status for rule violations? What thresholds apply?

Decentralization-Focused Questions

  1. What prevents David from swaying NNS via financial influence?

  2. How does the proposal prevent future consolidation by Sisyphus or David?

  3. Could DFINITY or the proposers estimate how the Nakamoto Coefficient for node providers might change post-reorganization?

  4. How are David’s financial ties (loans, Sisyphus stake) structured to prevent collusion impacting the Nakamoto Coefficient?

  5. Could DFINITY share tools to monitor node provider collusion (e.g., voting patterns) to strengthen confidence in the Nakamoto Coefficient?

:infinity: :cloud:

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:police_car_light: Why This is a Serious Problem

  1. Vested Interest in Disguise:

    • Loans from Fisher, a powerful and established node provider, create financial leverage, even if legal ownership is retained by Léo or Enzo.
    • This could be used to coordinate governance votes, technical influence, or economic capture.
  2. False Impression of Independence:

    • Claiming 100% beneficial ownership while being funded by the same source as other entities masks underlying centralization.
    • Community relies on financial and operational independence to preserve decentralization and Sybil resistance.
  3. Lack of Full Disclosure:

    • If Fisher’s role was not clearly disclosed in WaterNeuron-related node bids or SNS filings, that’s a transparency violation.
    • In DeFi and governance systems, lack of full economic disclosure is as dangerous as fake identities.
  4. Potential Governance Capture:

    • Fisher now has influence—direct or indirect—across multiple entities that control node infrastructure, and possibly SNS governance proposals.
    • WaterNeuron already had controversy for replicating NNS votes—this adds more reason to be wary.

Summary (for community reference):

WaterNeuron’s node operators, Enzo and Léo, received financing from David Fisher—an active and influential node provider, a venture capitalist

While they each claim to be 100% UBO of their respective entities (BlueAnt LLC and others), the financial link presents a covert consolidation of power. With nodes and network security at stake, and history of controversial SNS governance behavior, this connection must be viewed as a risk to decentralization and clear conflict of interest

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