Can DFINITY do something?

[WebTreeSoftwareSolut]

I tried to avoid any dramatic zoom in on 9 yards capital. But you made it obvious.

p.s. all my nfidw tokens are locked for the max duration. cuz i’m dumb.

[Thyassa]

Exactly what we have been advocating. People need to lead by example. If the creators of an sns bail a few months after fund raise and no longer post updates, they NEED to be repurposed. Otherwise the sns showcase becomes an embarrasment

We need more people to.be dedicated to their projects. We have plans to give away the daos we have salvaged. Sorry but we have zero intention of controlling this.many projects. We are just temporarily holdiing them until the appropriate owners come along…

[wpb]

@borovan

Wenzel, Enzo, Leo and David have 51%

I have a small fraction of a percent. CodeGov triggers 5% on Vote for NNS proposals and less on everything else. All of it is people choosing to follow the CodeGov neuron, which I cannot control, and they can choose to follow someone else any time for any reason.

I have no idea how much Enzo, Leo, and David control, but it does not add up to 51%. The strongest argument you have is that the dev team can trigger the largest following, but that’s true for any SNS because people naturally prefer to follow the dev team. CodeGov at least tries to help that problem by offering a credible and reliable alternative.

The 51% issue is solved if we build into the WTN protocol an ability for every WTN neuron owner to easily set their own preferred NNS neuron as a Followee for the Vote on SNS Proposals topic through a trustless vote relay mechanism. There should be no need to follow another WTN neuron on this topic. The fact that it’s the only practical choice is the only reason the 51% attack issue is possible for WTN at this time.

@jonit

Have I miss understood something about SNS’s? If I was to put my project on an SNS and wanted to make sure I had control I would hold 51% and lock it forever. I would remain the majority holder and direct the project with input from interested parties. If I didn’t do that I would have to accept other people could take over

You would risk take over, or at least attacks that paralyze progress, if someone else owned only 33% vp on cast votes on critical proposals, which could be as little as 20.7% total voting power in your SNS. You would want to be very careful about the max contribution that you allow at the decentralization swap and the SNS parameters that you choose. Someone could easily own 20.7% TVP with only 8% commitment in the decentralization swap. The damage that can be caused on critical proposals goes up exponentially with very little contribution if a whale suddenly decides to reject everything.

[Mico]

@wpb

You would want to be very careful about the max contribution that you allow at the decentralization swap and the SNS parameters that you choose

Let’s not forget people using many different identities to bot it. Ya know the case people are trying to use against wtn rn.

[Farat]

@Thyassa

Our actions are mainly born out of embarrassment when looking at the SNS page and its mainly just garbage.

The same applies to Dragginz, it seems like a discarded project. Considering the disparity in resources, it’s the weakest one. All this fuss is because you are failing at your own project.

[ICPsimp]

Is NFID not a decent project?

[jonit]

@skilesare

If you have some way to read that document and come away with an impression that the ‘happy’ path is anything other than an SNS DAO should start off with founders having less than 51% and that one should expect and devs work toward increasing distribution, please let me know.

That just arbitrary rules chosen for a particular purpose by a group of people its not specifically how all DAO’s should or could be be run there are many ways that still give voting power to interested parties

[jonit]

for many projects the SNS was used a tool to raise money rather than a tool to hand out control. In my opinion different types of projects would have different optimal levels of decentralisation.
A software program that performs a specific task, runs almost automatically and needs periodic maintenance updates could decentralise more than a project that needs a creative at the helm.
Also within the DAO different types of proposals could require more or less VP from a founder.
Also there could be teams of “experts” who are voted in for limited periods to carry out specific functions and would have higher voting power under a specific remit.
I think we can see that decentralising too much too soon is unlikely to result in successful projects.

[GrahamE]

Gold dao founders are smart. This was a good purchase and is good overall.

[Farat]

@Farat

• A decade of development, and still no working product: After nearly ten years, Dragginz has yet to deliver a functional game. This level of delay is unacceptable by any reasonable standard.
• Lack of transparency and decentralisation: The project remains closed-source and far from decentralised, betraying the very principles the Internet Computer (IC) was meant to uphold.
• Founder’s destructive behaviour: The founder has actively undermined other DAOs and, in the process, damaged the lives and efforts of genuine builders in the ecosystem.
• Likely culpability in the token collapse: It’s plausible that the founder and early investors contributed to the catastrophic crash of the token price — from a staggering $700 down to just $3 — eroding trust and devastating holders.
• Obscene personal enrichment: While the community suffers, the founder enjoys a lavish lifestyle in Monaco, seemingly indifferent to the ruin left behind.

We need to remove that Dragginz rubbish from the IC

[lara]

FYI, there is now a post related to this topic by DFNITY here

[TheUltra16]

Ive never suggested or said anything like this lol.

I was and am simply impressed by your efforts around what he does. Its impressive. That simple

[WebTreeSoftwareSolut]

My efforts are my own. I have my own 8year staked interests to protect in whatever way I deem fit.