The danger is that as far as the IC Target Topology decentralisation coefficients are concerned, the IC is pretending to be there.
This undermines IC Target Topology enforcement, moving from a situation where NP centralisation within a subnet is somewhat visible (assuming honest NP declaration and diligent onboarding reviews), to one where it’s not because NPs do not actually represent the ‘independent’ entities that the target topology assumes (and which was the point of limiting node ownership to 42 per NP).
Distinct business entities do not need to be modelled as distinct ‘node providers’ on the IC.
Doing this leaves you in a position where you now need to invent a new concept, like ‘node provider providers’ to represent the group of ‘node providers’ that can be considered independent from other ‘node provider providers’. Alternatively, a ‘node provider’ itself could simply represent a handful of businesses that pool resources to provide and maintain nodes for the IC. This is what Node Providers are supposed to represent as ‘independent’ entities.
The reasoning you’re applying to managing this whole affair erodes the integrity of IC Target Topology, rather than strengthening it (which is supposed to have been the purpose). If a limit of 1 node per independent-NP per subnet is not achievable, the IC Target Topology needs updating to avoid masking the problem.
Have you decided this by yourself, or is this DFINITY’s official stance? Serious question. It’s based on faulty reasoning, at least in the context of the IC.
The knowledge that enforcement solutions are being worked on and will arrive in the future is a disincentive for offenders. Rules can exist to set expectations, even without immediate enforcement. Even unenforced rules shape behaviour by signalling what is right or wrong.