Hi all,
After reviewing Dan’s analysis of the BOOM mint exploit, I realized that the recent Critical Topic change, while valuable, may still leave an attack vector open.
Edge Case Scenario:
- A DAO with a balanced structure approves a proposal to double its min/max dissolve delays to signal stronger long-term commitment.
- Immediately after approval, a major holder (e.g., core team, key investor) maxes out their dissolve and submits a proposal to mint tokens for themselves.
- This could work because the voting power of min dissolve delay neurons temporarily disappears, while the boosted max-dissolve neuron suddenly holds disproportionate power—possibly enough to pass the proposal instantly.
- In this edge case, a player / core team, with a mere 22% VP could make that move. (assuming ~50% of VP was on min dissolve delay)
This creates a temporary power imbalance—a “window of opportunity” where a smaller group can act with outsized influence before the rest of the DAO can adjust.
Proposed Solution:
Implement a transition period before new dissolve delay values affect VP (Voting Power) calculations.
I’m not sure yet how this could be implemented. One idea is a gradual VP adjustment function, similar to:
- The “periodic confirmation of following” process (between months 5–6)
- With original VP and final VP associated to the old and new params.
- Maybe set a hardcoded default 7-day transition period, think it’s enough time for most neuron holders to adapt safely.
I don’t think this is urgent, but would love to hear the community’s thoughts—and especially welcome input from @lara if available.
Thanks and have a great week.