Who are the strongest supporters of ICP in the long term? Undoubtedly, the 8-year gang, i.e., those who are staking ICP for 8 years, always compounding, and never dissolving. If you are staking for 8 years but also dissolving or not compounding, you are not a real member of the 8-year gang. (Of course, you can sell some rewards for some reason someday in the distant future, but definitely not now.)
The 8-year gang are the night watchmen of ICP.
To maximize the interests of the 8-year gang is to maximize the interests of ICP.
While the price of ICP is going from 2800 to 12 right now (see Binance), you guys are still caring about spam proposals so much? You guys must be kidding me.
You guys know how to stop those spam proposals? Let @wpb submit enough “good” spam proposals so that any additional spam proposals cannot increase voting rewards anymore. That’s it.
You guys know what is really the most dangerous thing to ICP? The 8-year gang losing the majority of voting power. Hence the most important thing is to strengthen the 8-year gang, which should be superior to and also an essential part of the must-be-a-long-way decentralization of ICP.
If everyone can fully realize the importance and the power of the 8-year gang, ICP will be inevitable.
Then how to strengthen the 8-year gang and how to maximize their interests? The answer is simple:
Maximization of governance proposal weight + Automatic compounding.
If those two conditions are both met, then any selling or dissolving or neuron spawning will increase the relative power of the 8-year gang, because, at least, they will literally increase the relative voting power of the 8-year gang. You may need some time to think this over.
Therefore, rather than reducing the governance proposal weight to 1, we should increase the governance proposal weight to a maximum level. Then let them sell, whether they are pessimistic seed investors or short-term speculators in crypto exchanges.
How much ICP do crypto exchanges have? Are crypto exchanges staking ICP and for how many years? The 8-year gang equipped with maximized voting rewards and automatic compounding can make crypto exchanges be much more in an ICP financial strain, since, I guess, crypto exchanges cannot very conveniently stake ICP for 8 years: at every moment there are more and more people withdrawing ICP from crypto exchanges and thus crypto exchanges may lose their relative voting power as long as the 8-year gang become stronger and stronger.
There are so many people short selling ICP in crypto exchanges even though they don’t have any ICP at all. A similar case for Tesla, as Elon Musk once complained: You can sell Tesla stocks even if you don’t have any Tesla stocks at all. Thus, the market price is not only about the demand and supply of spot goods; it is also about who are willing to buy and sell in the short term even if neither of them have any spot goods.
We cannot change the rules of crypto exchanges, but we can change the rules of NNS. If we do, then the 8-year gang can buy more and more ICP no matter what the price will be. If the 8-year gang can hold more and more ICP, then the “market” price determined in crypto exchanges will be forced up.
When the Bitcoin bear run is over and those pessimistic seed investors sell out their ICP (maybe after several years), the 8-year gang can then get up and focus more on other things to make the NNS perfect. But for now, we should focus more on making the NNS strong, not perfect.
If the voting rewards can be maximized and automatic compounding is completed, then I can even consider being all in ICP. If ICP is going to zero, I can buy all ICP. Too good to be true. No one can defeat the 8-year gang unless the 8-year gang can fuck themselves up.
Please change my mind.
(1) Maximizing governance proposal weight will increase the voting rewards of the 8-year gang, but will not increase the inflation of ICP.
(2) To be honest, I mostly prefer the set & forget strategy of passive investment as a member of the 8-year gang, but it seems impossible, as for now the majority really want to punish those neurons not voting and I cannot find an efficient way to change their mind.
(3) I believe that the proposal 48623 is adopted mainly because it realizes the function of automatic compounding, even if many people hate it for some other reasons. This also raises the problem of Bundling Proposal, which seems to be a common difficulty in all voting systems.