Hi everyone,
I’m the developer behind DVINITY, an on-chain gaming project built entirely on ICP. I’ve been building it since late last year, and this is actually my first time posting here as the DVINITY developer.
Over time the project has grown quite a bit, and I’ve been thinking about reworking its relatively simple tokenomics into something more sustainable and self-reinforcing.
I know gambling isn’t everyone’s cup of tea, and I’m not really looking to start a discussion about gambling itself here.
What I’m mainly interested in is feedback on the technical/economic architecture behind the proposed model.
The idea combines:
- Protocol revenue
- Staking
- Activity-based mining
- Market buybacks
- A protocol-owned ICP neuron
- Cycles funding
- A reserve-aware reward system
- And what I’ve started calling the **Protocol Battery**
The interesting part to me is that the system could become somewhat counter-cyclical: during periods of low activity, the reward reserve continues accumulating. When activity returns, those accumulated reserves can create stronger incentives for participation.
Nothing below is set in stone. The percentages are initial examples and I actually think keeping most parameters adjustable is important.
I’d especially like opinions on whether the flywheel makes economic sense, potential attack vectors, sustainability of the mining model, and whether there are better ways to structure the protocol-owned neuron.
-–
# DVINITY Tokenomics Rework
## Protocol-Owned Growth, Sustainable Rewards and the Protocol Battery
**Status: Discussion Proposal**
DVINITY’s current tokenomics are deliberately simple:
- Approximately 95% game RTP
- 3% of wager volume allocated to DVINITY stakers
- 2% allocated to treasury
This proposal explores replacing that single-layer model with a broader economic system designed to balance player value, staking income, development, infrastructure, protocol-owned capital and activity-based rewards.
The proposed model raises target game RTP to approximately **97%** and distributes the remaining expected 3% across several functions.
A **2.5% explicit platform allocation** would fund stakers, development, DVINITY buybacks and protocol-owned ICP growth.
The remaining approximately **0.5%** represents expected backing growth over the long run.
The central idea is not the exact percentages.
It is the flywheel:
**Real platform activity funds rewards and protocol assets.
Protocol assets generate recurring resources.
Buybacks fund activity-based mining.
Mining creates additional incentives to participate in the games.**
-–
# 1. Design Principles
The proposed model is based around several principles:
- Reward capital and activity differently.
- Prefer revenue-backed rewards over uncontrolled token emissions.
- Maintain protocol resources during periods of low activity.
- Use active periods to grow future productive capacity rather than distributing everything immediately.
- Keep economic parameters adjustable.
- Do not depend on DVINITY price appreciation for sustainability.
The mechanism should remain useful even if the initial percentages eventually change.
-–
# 2. Proposed Game Economy
DVINITY would target approximately **97% long-term RTP**.
RTP is a statistical expectation over a large number of wagers. Actual results can deviate significantly over shorter periods because of variance.
For every **100 ICP wagered**, the proposed long-term allocation would be:
| Allocation | Amount |
| Player RTP | 97 ICP |
| DVINITY stakers | 1 ICP |
| Development | 0.5 ICP |
| DVINITY buybacks | 0.5 ICP |
| Protocol-owned ICP / compounding | 0.5 ICP |
| Expected backing growth | ~0.5 ICP |
The 2.5% platform allocation is explicit.
The remaining approximately 0.5% is **not guaranteed profit**.
It represents the expected residual of a 97% RTP game before realized variance and is intended to strengthen game backing over time.
-–
# 3. Staking — Capital Commitment
DVINITY staking remains a core component of the protocol.
Under the proposed initial allocation, stakers receive:
**1% of wager volume**
Protocol-owned liquidity positions may provide an additional source of staking revenue.
The purpose of staking rewards is straightforward:
DVINITY holders who commit capital to the ecosystem participate in revenue generated by actual platform activity.
This is deliberately separated from gameplay and mining rewards.
### Stakers provide capital commitment.
They can receive:
- Protocol revenue
- LP-generated revenue where applicable
- Governance participation
- Potential future distributions from protocol-owned assets
### Miners provide activity.
They can receive:
- Devotion
- Mining opportunities
- Gameplay-related rewards
- DVINITY distributed through the mining system
This prevents every incentive from simply becoming passive yield.
**Capital commitment is rewarded through revenue and governance.**
**Activity is rewarded through Devotion and mining.**
-–
# 4. Devotion Mining — Activity Participation
Devotion mining creates a second incentive layer for active users.
Eligible gameplay generates **Devotion**.
Devotion can then be used to participate in the mining system.
Mining rewards are supplied from a protocol-funded DVINITY reserve.
The important distinction is that DVINITY does not need to continuously mint new tokens to fund these rewards.
Instead:
**Protocol revenue → market buybacks → existing DVINITY → mining reserve**
Active users then compete to earn those tokens.
Difficulty provides the first balancing mechanism.
As participation increases, mining becomes more difficult.
A second balancing mechanism can be based on the amount of DVINITY available in the mining reserve.
Mining emissions could therefore respond to:
- Mining difficulty
- Current mining participation
- Available DVINITY reserves
- Recent protocol revenue
- Maximum reward limits
- Maximum emission rates
The goal is a reward system that adapts to the resources actually available to the protocol.
-–
# 5. Buybacks Are Mining Funding
Buybacks in this model are **not primarily designed as a token price-support mechanism**.
Their economic purpose is to fund Devotion mining.
This creates a revenue-backed recycling loop:
**ICP generated by platform activity**
↓
**Protocol buys DVINITY from the market**
↓
**DVINITY enters the mining reserve**
↓
**Active users compete to earn it**
↓
**Participation generates additional activity**
↓
**Activity generates new protocol revenue**
Some miners will naturally sell their rewards.
This does not necessarily break the mechanism.
If miner selling causes the DVINITY price to decline, the same amount of future ICP buyback capital can acquire more DVINITY for the mining reserve.
For example:
At 17,000 DVINITY per ICP:
**10 ICP → ~170,000 DVINITY**
At 25,000 DVINITY per ICP:
**10 ICP → ~250,000 DVINITY**
The system therefore contains a partial self-balancing property.
Lower token prices allow protocol revenue to replenish the mining reserve with more tokens.
Higher token prices reduce the number of tokens acquired per buyback, but increase the market value of the existing reserve.
This does not create a guaranteed price floor and extreme selling can still negatively affect liquidity and market confidence.
The important metric is therefore not simply token price.
It is:
**How much additional participation and wager volume does each ICP spent on mining incentives generate?**
-–
# 6. The Protocol Battery
The mining reserve introduces what I call the **Protocol Battery**.
During periods of low activity, fewer mining rewards are extracted.
At the same time, recurring protocol-funded buybacks can continue adding DVINITY to the reserve.
The battery therefore effectively **charges during downtime**.
### Low activity
Low gameplay
↓
Less Devotion generated
↓
Less mining activity
↓
Lower reward extraction
↓
Protocol buybacks continue
↓
Mining reserve grows
↓
**Protocol Battery charges**
When activity returns, the larger reserve creates greater capacity to incentivize participation.
### High activity
More gameplay
↓
More Devotion
↓
More mining demand
↓
Battery is consumed
BUT:
More gameplay
↓
More wager volume
↓
More protocol revenue
↓
Larger buybacks
↓
Battery is replenished
This creates a potentially counter-cyclical incentive system.
**Low activity builds future incentive capacity.**
**High activity consumes that capacity while simultaneously generating revenue to replenish it.**
The objective is not to allow individual mining rewards to grow without limit.
Difficulty and reserve-aware emission controls should determine how quickly accumulated value can leave the battery.
For example, the protocol could limit how much of the mining reserve may be distributed over a rolling period.
This prevents a small number of miners from rapidly extracting a reserve accumulated during months of low activity.
-–
# 7. Protocol-Owned ICP Neuron
A further proposed component is a **canister-controlled NNS neuron**.
The initial seed would be approximately:
**1,500 ICP**
This ICP comes from legacy protocol liquidity.
The 1,500 ICP should not be viewed as the scale around which the architecture is permanently designed.
It is simply **seed capital**.
The neuron would act as a productive protocol-owned reserve.
Using an illustrative **7% annual reward rate**, 1,500 ICP would generate approximately:
**105 ICP maturity per year**
An initial maturity allocation could be:
| Allocation | Approx. Year 1 |
| 50% compound | 52.5 ICP |
| 25% cycles | 26.25 ICP |
| 25% DVINITY buybacks | 26.25 ICP |
The neuron reward rate is not guaranteed and may change.
The 50/25/25 allocation should also be treated as an adjustable starting parameter rather than an immutable rule.
-–
# 8. Revenue-Fed Neuron Growth
The most interesting part of the neuron model is that growth does not depend on neuron maturity alone.
Under the proposed game economics:
**0.5% of wager volume → protocol-owned ICP**
This ICP can continuously increase the protocol-owned reserve.
For example:
| Monthly wager volume | Added to protocol-owned ICP |
| 2,000 ICP | 10 ICP/month |
| 3,000 ICP | 15 ICP/month |
| 5,000 ICP | 25 ICP/month |
| 10,000 ICP | 50 ICP/month |
At **3,000 ICP wagered per month**, this represents:
**180 ICP/year of additional protocol-owned ICP**
before maturity compounding.
The neuron is therefore better understood as a **revenue-fed endowment**.
The initial 1,500 ICP starts the engine.
Platform activity grows it.
As the neuron becomes larger:
- More maturity is generated
- More ICP can compound
- More cycles can be funded
- More DVINITY can be bought for the Protocol Battery
This creates another feedback loop:
**Activity → protocol-owned ICP → larger neuron → more maturity → more productive capacity**
-–
# 9. Cycles and Infrastructure
A proposed **25% of neuron maturity** would fund cycles.
The objective is not necessarily to make DVINITY completely self-sufficient from the initial 1,500 ICP neuron.
Instead, the neuron creates a recurring baseline contribution toward compute costs.
During low activity:
**Neuron maturity → baseline cycles funding**
During higher activity:
- Development revenue increases
- Protocol-owned ICP grows faster
- Future neuron maturity increases
The intended hierarchy is therefore approximately:
**Neuron maturity → baseline infrastructure**
↓
**Development revenue → additional infrastructure/development**
↓
**Development wallet → operational buffer when required**
Over time, a sufficiently large protocol-owned neuron could potentially cover a meaningful portion of DVINITY’s infrastructure costs.
-–
# 10. Liquidity Revenue
Protocol-owned liquidity positions can generate trading fees independently of game wagering.
These fees can provide an additional revenue stream for DVINITY stakers.
This further separates the two primary reward groups:
### Stakers
Earn from productive protocol revenue.
### Miners
Earn from the Protocol Battery by contributing activity.
A user can of course participate in both.
-–
# 11. Example — 2,000 ICP Wagered in One Month
The following is an illustrative example and ignores short-term game variance.
With **2,000 ICP wagered**:
| Allocation | Amount |
|—|—![]()
| Expected player RTP (97%) | ~1,940 ICP |
| Stakers (1%) | 20 ICP |
| Development (0.5%) | 10 ICP |
| DVINITY buybacks (0.5%) | 10 ICP |
| Protocol-owned ICP (0.5%) | 10 ICP |
| Expected backing growth (~0.5%) | ~10 ICP |
Assume for illustration that:
**1 ICP ≈ 17,200 DVINITY**
The wager-funded buyback alone would purchase approximately:
**10 ICP × 17,200 = 172,000 DVINITY**
before AMM price impact, fees and price changes.
At the initial 1,500 ICP neuron size and an illustrative 7% annual reward rate, the 25% maturity buyback allocation contributes roughly another:
**~2.2 ICP/month**
This means approximately:
**12.2 ICP of total monthly DVINITY buybacks**
in this example.
At the illustrative market rate, that represents roughly:
**~210,000 DVINITY/month**
flowing into the Protocol Battery.
Again, actual amounts will depend on token price, liquidity and AMM price impact.
-–
# 12. The Economic Flywheel
The complete system can be summarized as:
**GAMEPLAY**
↓
**WAGER VOLUME**
↓
**STAKERS + DEVELOPMENT + BUYBACKS + PROTOCOL-OWNED ICP**
↓
**BUYBACKS FUND THE PROTOCOL BATTERY**
↓
**DEVOTION MINING REWARDS ACTIVITY**
↓
**ACTIVITY CAN CREATE MORE GAMEPLAY**
↓
**MORE WAGER VOLUME**
At the same time, a second loop operates underneath it:
**PROTOCOL-OWNED ICP**
↓
**NNS MATURITY**
↓
**COMPOUNDING + CYCLES + BUYBACKS**
↓
**LARGER NEURON + PROTOCOL BATTERY**
↓
**GREATER FUTURE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY**
And wager activity continuously adds new ICP principal:
**WAGER VOLUME → 0.5% → PROTOCOL-OWNED ICP → FUTURE MATURITY**
The objective is for these loops to reinforce one another.
-–
# 13. Governance and Parameter Flexibility
One of the most important design decisions is to separate **mechanisms from parameters**.
The mechanisms can remain relatively stable:
- Staking revenue
- Devotion mining
- Buybacks
- Protocol Battery
- Protocol-owned ICP
- Maturity routing
- Cycles funding
But the percentages should remain adjustable.
Potential adjustable parameters include:
- RTP targets
- Staker allocation
- Development allocation
- Buyback allocation
- Protocol ICP allocation
- Neuron maturity allocation
- Mining difficulty
- Mining emission limits
- Reserve thresholds
- Maximum mining rewards
The current percentages should therefore be considered **initial proposal parameters**, not permanent tokenomics.
-–
# 14. Potential Governance of the NNS Neuron
A canister-controlled neuron also creates an interesting future governance possibility.
DVINITY stakers could potentially vote on selected NNS proposals using their staked DVINITY as internal voting power.
The controlling canister could then cast the neuron’s NNS vote according to the outcome of the DVINITY governance vote.
This would turn the protocol-owned neuron into both:
1. A productive economic reserve
2. A community-controlled governance asset
This functionality is not required for the economic model and should only be implemented after technical and security review.
-–
# 15. Future Maturity Allocation
The proposed initial maturity allocation is:
**50% compound**
**25% cycles**
**25% mining buybacks**
This prioritizes growing the productive reserve while funding infrastructure and the Protocol Battery.
If the neuron eventually becomes substantially larger, governance could decide to allocate some maturity elsewhere.
For example:
**50% compound**
**25% cycles**
**12.5% mining buybacks**
**12.5% staker rewards**
This is deliberately presented as a future possibility rather than a current commitment.
At small neuron sizes, compounding may be more valuable than fragmenting maturity across too many destinations.
As the productive reserve grows, additional distributions become increasingly viable.
-–
# 16. Shutdown and Regulatory Resilience
A long-dissolve neuron introduces an important risk:
**illiquidity.**
If DVINITY gambling activity had to stop for regulatory, commercial or technical reasons, the protocol cannot assume that neuron principal would immediately become available.
Operational liquidity should therefore remain separate from long-term protocol-owned capital.
A shutdown policy should eventually define:
- Whether the neuron begins dissolving
- How remaining maturity is handled
- How infrastructure is funded during shutdown
- What happens to the Protocol Battery
- What governance rights remain
The broader architecture may also outlive any individual DVINITY product.
Subject to governance, legal constraints and transparent expectations, a protocol-owned endowment could potentially support other ecosystem software if the original gaming activity ceased.
The productive asset therefore does not necessarily need to disappear simply because one application does.
-–
# 17. Risks and Open Questions
This proposal still contains assumptions that need to be tested.
### Mining effectiveness
The largest question is whether mining incentives actually create additional gameplay and retention.
If mining rewards cost 100 ICP but generate almost no incremental activity, the allocation should be changed.
If 100 ICP of incentives generates substantially more productive activity and recurring revenue, the flywheel begins to work.
This needs real data.
### Mining extraction
Difficulty and reserve-aware emissions need to prevent miners from rapidly extracting accumulated reserves.
### Liquidity
Thin DVINITY liquidity means both buybacks and miner sales can create significant price impact.
### Game variance
97% RTP is a long-term mathematical expectation.
Short-term results can still cause backing to decline.
### NNS rewards
Neuron reward rates are variable and should never be treated as guaranteed yield.
### Neuron liquidity
A two-year dissolve delay creates meaningful liquidity risk.
### Regulation
Regulatory requirements may affect game availability, staking, rewards or treasury design in different jurisdictions.
These risks are reasons to make the system measurable and adjustable rather than reasons to hardcode today’s assumptions.
-–
# 18. Proposed Initial Parameters
| Parameter | Initial Proposal |
| Target game RTP | ~97% |
| Staker allocation | 1% of wager volume |
| Development allocation | 0.5% |
| Mining buybacks | 0.5% |
| Protocol-owned ICP growth | 0.5% |
| Expected backing growth | ~0.5% |
| Initial neuron seed | ~1,500 ICP |
| Maturity → compound | 50% |
| Maturity → cycles | 25% |
| Maturity → mining buybacks | 25% |
| Mining emissions | Difficulty + reserve-aware + capped |
| LP revenue | Potential additional staker revenue |
These values are intended to start discussion and modeling.
They are not intended to permanently constrain future governance.
-–
# Conclusion
The proposed DVINITY tokenomics rework shifts the protocol away from a simple fee-distribution model toward a multi-layer economic system.
**Stakers are rewarded for capital commitment.**
**Miners are rewarded for activity.**
**Development receives recurring funding.**
**Game backing has room to grow.**
**Protocol-owned ICP creates a productive long-term reserve.**
**Buybacks recycle real platform revenue into the activity economy.**
The Protocol Battery adds another property:
**quiet periods can accumulate future incentive capacity.**
When activity is low, reward extraction decreases while recurring buybacks can continue filling the mining reserve.
When activity returns, that accumulated reserve can provide stronger incentives, while the new activity itself generates revenue that helps replenish the battery.
At the same time, part of wager revenue continuously increases protocol-owned ICP, allowing the productive reserve itself to grow alongside platform usage.
The result is an attempt to create a self-reinforcing system:
**Activity grows the protocol.
The protocol funds future activity.
Downtime builds reserves.
Growth increases future productive capacity.**
Whether that flywheel actually works is ultimately an empirical question.
That’s exactly why I’m sharing this as a proposal rather than presenting it as finished tokenomics.
I’d love to hear thoughts, criticism, attack vectors or alternative approaches — particularly from people experienced with protocol economics, NNS neurons, incentive design and on-chain game economies.