Tokenomics Rework Proposal— The Protocol Battery

Hi everyone,

I’m the developer behind DVINITY, an on-chain gaming project built entirely on ICP. I’ve been building it since late last year, and this is actually my first time posting here as the DVINITY developer.

Over time the project has grown quite a bit, and I’ve been thinking about reworking its relatively simple tokenomics into something more sustainable and self-reinforcing.

I know gambling isn’t everyone’s cup of tea, and I’m not really looking to start a discussion about gambling itself here.

What I’m mainly interested in is feedback on the technical/economic architecture behind the proposed model.

The idea combines:

- Protocol revenue

- Staking

- Activity-based mining

- Market buybacks

- A protocol-owned ICP neuron

- Cycles funding

- A reserve-aware reward system

- And what I’ve started calling the **Protocol Battery**

The interesting part to me is that the system could become somewhat counter-cyclical: during periods of low activity, the reward reserve continues accumulating. When activity returns, those accumulated reserves can create stronger incentives for participation.

Nothing below is set in stone. The percentages are initial examples and I actually think keeping most parameters adjustable is important.

I’d especially like opinions on whether the flywheel makes economic sense, potential attack vectors, sustainability of the mining model, and whether there are better ways to structure the protocol-owned neuron.

-–

# DVINITY Tokenomics Rework

## Protocol-Owned Growth, Sustainable Rewards and the Protocol Battery

**Status: Discussion Proposal**

DVINITY’s current tokenomics are deliberately simple:

- Approximately 95% game RTP

- 3% of wager volume allocated to DVINITY stakers

- 2% allocated to treasury

This proposal explores replacing that single-layer model with a broader economic system designed to balance player value, staking income, development, infrastructure, protocol-owned capital and activity-based rewards.

The proposed model raises target game RTP to approximately **97%** and distributes the remaining expected 3% across several functions.

A **2.5% explicit platform allocation** would fund stakers, development, DVINITY buybacks and protocol-owned ICP growth.

The remaining approximately **0.5%** represents expected backing growth over the long run.

The central idea is not the exact percentages.

It is the flywheel:

**Real platform activity funds rewards and protocol assets.

Protocol assets generate recurring resources.

Buybacks fund activity-based mining.

Mining creates additional incentives to participate in the games.**

-–

# 1. Design Principles

The proposed model is based around several principles:

- Reward capital and activity differently.

- Prefer revenue-backed rewards over uncontrolled token emissions.

- Maintain protocol resources during periods of low activity.

- Use active periods to grow future productive capacity rather than distributing everything immediately.

- Keep economic parameters adjustable.

- Do not depend on DVINITY price appreciation for sustainability.

The mechanism should remain useful even if the initial percentages eventually change.

-–

# 2. Proposed Game Economy

DVINITY would target approximately **97% long-term RTP**.

RTP is a statistical expectation over a large number of wagers. Actual results can deviate significantly over shorter periods because of variance.

For every **100 ICP wagered**, the proposed long-term allocation would be:

| Allocation | Amount |

| Player RTP | 97 ICP |

| DVINITY stakers | 1 ICP |

| Development | 0.5 ICP |

| DVINITY buybacks | 0.5 ICP |

| Protocol-owned ICP / compounding | 0.5 ICP |

| Expected backing growth | ~0.5 ICP |

The 2.5% platform allocation is explicit.

The remaining approximately 0.5% is **not guaranteed profit**.

It represents the expected residual of a 97% RTP game before realized variance and is intended to strengthen game backing over time.

-–

# 3. Staking — Capital Commitment

DVINITY staking remains a core component of the protocol.

Under the proposed initial allocation, stakers receive:

**1% of wager volume**

Protocol-owned liquidity positions may provide an additional source of staking revenue.

The purpose of staking rewards is straightforward:

DVINITY holders who commit capital to the ecosystem participate in revenue generated by actual platform activity.

This is deliberately separated from gameplay and mining rewards.

### Stakers provide capital commitment.

They can receive:

- Protocol revenue

- LP-generated revenue where applicable

- Governance participation

- Potential future distributions from protocol-owned assets

### Miners provide activity.

They can receive:

- Devotion

- Mining opportunities

- Gameplay-related rewards

- DVINITY distributed through the mining system

This prevents every incentive from simply becoming passive yield.

**Capital commitment is rewarded through revenue and governance.**

**Activity is rewarded through Devotion and mining.**

-–

# 4. Devotion Mining — Activity Participation

Devotion mining creates a second incentive layer for active users.

Eligible gameplay generates **Devotion**.

Devotion can then be used to participate in the mining system.

Mining rewards are supplied from a protocol-funded DVINITY reserve.

The important distinction is that DVINITY does not need to continuously mint new tokens to fund these rewards.

Instead:

**Protocol revenue → market buybacks → existing DVINITY → mining reserve**

Active users then compete to earn those tokens.

Difficulty provides the first balancing mechanism.

As participation increases, mining becomes more difficult.

A second balancing mechanism can be based on the amount of DVINITY available in the mining reserve.

Mining emissions could therefore respond to:

- Mining difficulty

- Current mining participation

- Available DVINITY reserves

- Recent protocol revenue

- Maximum reward limits

- Maximum emission rates

The goal is a reward system that adapts to the resources actually available to the protocol.

-–

# 5. Buybacks Are Mining Funding

Buybacks in this model are **not primarily designed as a token price-support mechanism**.

Their economic purpose is to fund Devotion mining.

This creates a revenue-backed recycling loop:

**ICP generated by platform activity**

**Protocol buys DVINITY from the market**

**DVINITY enters the mining reserve**

**Active users compete to earn it**

**Participation generates additional activity**

**Activity generates new protocol revenue**

Some miners will naturally sell their rewards.

This does not necessarily break the mechanism.

If miner selling causes the DVINITY price to decline, the same amount of future ICP buyback capital can acquire more DVINITY for the mining reserve.

For example:

At 17,000 DVINITY per ICP:

**10 ICP → ~170,000 DVINITY**

At 25,000 DVINITY per ICP:

**10 ICP → ~250,000 DVINITY**

The system therefore contains a partial self-balancing property.

Lower token prices allow protocol revenue to replenish the mining reserve with more tokens.

Higher token prices reduce the number of tokens acquired per buyback, but increase the market value of the existing reserve.

This does not create a guaranteed price floor and extreme selling can still negatively affect liquidity and market confidence.

The important metric is therefore not simply token price.

It is:

**How much additional participation and wager volume does each ICP spent on mining incentives generate?**

-–

# 6. The Protocol Battery

The mining reserve introduces what I call the **Protocol Battery**.

During periods of low activity, fewer mining rewards are extracted.

At the same time, recurring protocol-funded buybacks can continue adding DVINITY to the reserve.

The battery therefore effectively **charges during downtime**.

### Low activity

Low gameplay

Less Devotion generated

Less mining activity

Lower reward extraction

Protocol buybacks continue

Mining reserve grows

**Protocol Battery charges**

When activity returns, the larger reserve creates greater capacity to incentivize participation.

### High activity

More gameplay

More Devotion

More mining demand

Battery is consumed

BUT:

More gameplay

More wager volume

More protocol revenue

Larger buybacks

Battery is replenished

This creates a potentially counter-cyclical incentive system.

**Low activity builds future incentive capacity.**

**High activity consumes that capacity while simultaneously generating revenue to replenish it.**

The objective is not to allow individual mining rewards to grow without limit.

Difficulty and reserve-aware emission controls should determine how quickly accumulated value can leave the battery.

For example, the protocol could limit how much of the mining reserve may be distributed over a rolling period.

This prevents a small number of miners from rapidly extracting a reserve accumulated during months of low activity.

-–

# 7. Protocol-Owned ICP Neuron

A further proposed component is a **canister-controlled NNS neuron**.

The initial seed would be approximately:

**1,500 ICP**

This ICP comes from legacy protocol liquidity.

The 1,500 ICP should not be viewed as the scale around which the architecture is permanently designed.

It is simply **seed capital**.

The neuron would act as a productive protocol-owned reserve.

Using an illustrative **7% annual reward rate**, 1,500 ICP would generate approximately:

**105 ICP maturity per year**

An initial maturity allocation could be:

| Allocation | Approx. Year 1 |

| 50% compound | 52.5 ICP |

| 25% cycles | 26.25 ICP |

| 25% DVINITY buybacks | 26.25 ICP |

The neuron reward rate is not guaranteed and may change.

The 50/25/25 allocation should also be treated as an adjustable starting parameter rather than an immutable rule.

-–

# 8. Revenue-Fed Neuron Growth

The most interesting part of the neuron model is that growth does not depend on neuron maturity alone.

Under the proposed game economics:

**0.5% of wager volume → protocol-owned ICP**

This ICP can continuously increase the protocol-owned reserve.

For example:

| Monthly wager volume | Added to protocol-owned ICP |

| 2,000 ICP | 10 ICP/month |

| 3,000 ICP | 15 ICP/month |

| 5,000 ICP | 25 ICP/month |

| 10,000 ICP | 50 ICP/month |

At **3,000 ICP wagered per month**, this represents:

**180 ICP/year of additional protocol-owned ICP**

before maturity compounding.

The neuron is therefore better understood as a **revenue-fed endowment**.

The initial 1,500 ICP starts the engine.

Platform activity grows it.

As the neuron becomes larger:

- More maturity is generated

- More ICP can compound

- More cycles can be funded

- More DVINITY can be bought for the Protocol Battery

This creates another feedback loop:

**Activity → protocol-owned ICP → larger neuron → more maturity → more productive capacity**

-–

# 9. Cycles and Infrastructure

A proposed **25% of neuron maturity** would fund cycles.

The objective is not necessarily to make DVINITY completely self-sufficient from the initial 1,500 ICP neuron.

Instead, the neuron creates a recurring baseline contribution toward compute costs.

During low activity:

**Neuron maturity → baseline cycles funding**

During higher activity:

- Development revenue increases

- Protocol-owned ICP grows faster

- Future neuron maturity increases

The intended hierarchy is therefore approximately:

**Neuron maturity → baseline infrastructure**

**Development revenue → additional infrastructure/development**

**Development wallet → operational buffer when required**

Over time, a sufficiently large protocol-owned neuron could potentially cover a meaningful portion of DVINITY’s infrastructure costs.

-–

# 10. Liquidity Revenue

Protocol-owned liquidity positions can generate trading fees independently of game wagering.

These fees can provide an additional revenue stream for DVINITY stakers.

This further separates the two primary reward groups:

### Stakers

Earn from productive protocol revenue.

### Miners

Earn from the Protocol Battery by contributing activity.

A user can of course participate in both.

-–

# 11. Example — 2,000 ICP Wagered in One Month

The following is an illustrative example and ignores short-term game variance.

With **2,000 ICP wagered**:

| Allocation | Amount |

|—|—:expressionless:

| Expected player RTP (97%) | ~1,940 ICP |

| Stakers (1%) | 20 ICP |

| Development (0.5%) | 10 ICP |

| DVINITY buybacks (0.5%) | 10 ICP |

| Protocol-owned ICP (0.5%) | 10 ICP |

| Expected backing growth (~0.5%) | ~10 ICP |

Assume for illustration that:

**1 ICP ≈ 17,200 DVINITY**

The wager-funded buyback alone would purchase approximately:

**10 ICP × 17,200 = 172,000 DVINITY**

before AMM price impact, fees and price changes.

At the initial 1,500 ICP neuron size and an illustrative 7% annual reward rate, the 25% maturity buyback allocation contributes roughly another:

**~2.2 ICP/month**

This means approximately:

**12.2 ICP of total monthly DVINITY buybacks**

in this example.

At the illustrative market rate, that represents roughly:

**~210,000 DVINITY/month**

flowing into the Protocol Battery.

Again, actual amounts will depend on token price, liquidity and AMM price impact.

-–

# 12. The Economic Flywheel

The complete system can be summarized as:

**GAMEPLAY**

**WAGER VOLUME**

**STAKERS + DEVELOPMENT + BUYBACKS + PROTOCOL-OWNED ICP**

**BUYBACKS FUND THE PROTOCOL BATTERY**

**DEVOTION MINING REWARDS ACTIVITY**

**ACTIVITY CAN CREATE MORE GAMEPLAY**

**MORE WAGER VOLUME**

At the same time, a second loop operates underneath it:

**PROTOCOL-OWNED ICP**

**NNS MATURITY**

**COMPOUNDING + CYCLES + BUYBACKS**

**LARGER NEURON + PROTOCOL BATTERY**

**GREATER FUTURE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY**

And wager activity continuously adds new ICP principal:

**WAGER VOLUME → 0.5% → PROTOCOL-OWNED ICP → FUTURE MATURITY**

The objective is for these loops to reinforce one another.

-–

# 13. Governance and Parameter Flexibility

One of the most important design decisions is to separate **mechanisms from parameters**.

The mechanisms can remain relatively stable:

- Staking revenue

- Devotion mining

- Buybacks

- Protocol Battery

- Protocol-owned ICP

- Maturity routing

- Cycles funding

But the percentages should remain adjustable.

Potential adjustable parameters include:

- RTP targets

- Staker allocation

- Development allocation

- Buyback allocation

- Protocol ICP allocation

- Neuron maturity allocation

- Mining difficulty

- Mining emission limits

- Reserve thresholds

- Maximum mining rewards

The current percentages should therefore be considered **initial proposal parameters**, not permanent tokenomics.

-–

# 14. Potential Governance of the NNS Neuron

A canister-controlled neuron also creates an interesting future governance possibility.

DVINITY stakers could potentially vote on selected NNS proposals using their staked DVINITY as internal voting power.

The controlling canister could then cast the neuron’s NNS vote according to the outcome of the DVINITY governance vote.

This would turn the protocol-owned neuron into both:

1. A productive economic reserve

2. A community-controlled governance asset

This functionality is not required for the economic model and should only be implemented after technical and security review.

-–

# 15. Future Maturity Allocation

The proposed initial maturity allocation is:

**50% compound**

**25% cycles**

**25% mining buybacks**

This prioritizes growing the productive reserve while funding infrastructure and the Protocol Battery.

If the neuron eventually becomes substantially larger, governance could decide to allocate some maturity elsewhere.

For example:

**50% compound**

**25% cycles**

**12.5% mining buybacks**

**12.5% staker rewards**

This is deliberately presented as a future possibility rather than a current commitment.

At small neuron sizes, compounding may be more valuable than fragmenting maturity across too many destinations.

As the productive reserve grows, additional distributions become increasingly viable.

-–

# 16. Shutdown and Regulatory Resilience

A long-dissolve neuron introduces an important risk:

**illiquidity.**

If DVINITY gambling activity had to stop for regulatory, commercial or technical reasons, the protocol cannot assume that neuron principal would immediately become available.

Operational liquidity should therefore remain separate from long-term protocol-owned capital.

A shutdown policy should eventually define:

- Whether the neuron begins dissolving

- How remaining maturity is handled

- How infrastructure is funded during shutdown

- What happens to the Protocol Battery

- What governance rights remain

The broader architecture may also outlive any individual DVINITY product.

Subject to governance, legal constraints and transparent expectations, a protocol-owned endowment could potentially support other ecosystem software if the original gaming activity ceased.

The productive asset therefore does not necessarily need to disappear simply because one application does.

-–

# 17. Risks and Open Questions

This proposal still contains assumptions that need to be tested.

### Mining effectiveness

The largest question is whether mining incentives actually create additional gameplay and retention.

If mining rewards cost 100 ICP but generate almost no incremental activity, the allocation should be changed.

If 100 ICP of incentives generates substantially more productive activity and recurring revenue, the flywheel begins to work.

This needs real data.

### Mining extraction

Difficulty and reserve-aware emissions need to prevent miners from rapidly extracting accumulated reserves.

### Liquidity

Thin DVINITY liquidity means both buybacks and miner sales can create significant price impact.

### Game variance

97% RTP is a long-term mathematical expectation.

Short-term results can still cause backing to decline.

### NNS rewards

Neuron reward rates are variable and should never be treated as guaranteed yield.

### Neuron liquidity

A two-year dissolve delay creates meaningful liquidity risk.

### Regulation

Regulatory requirements may affect game availability, staking, rewards or treasury design in different jurisdictions.

These risks are reasons to make the system measurable and adjustable rather than reasons to hardcode today’s assumptions.

-–

# 18. Proposed Initial Parameters

| Parameter | Initial Proposal |

| Target game RTP | ~97% |

| Staker allocation | 1% of wager volume |

| Development allocation | 0.5% |

| Mining buybacks | 0.5% |

| Protocol-owned ICP growth | 0.5% |

| Expected backing growth | ~0.5% |

| Initial neuron seed | ~1,500 ICP |

| Maturity → compound | 50% |

| Maturity → cycles | 25% |

| Maturity → mining buybacks | 25% |

| Mining emissions | Difficulty + reserve-aware + capped |

| LP revenue | Potential additional staker revenue |

These values are intended to start discussion and modeling.

They are not intended to permanently constrain future governance.

-–

# Conclusion

The proposed DVINITY tokenomics rework shifts the protocol away from a simple fee-distribution model toward a multi-layer economic system.

**Stakers are rewarded for capital commitment.**

**Miners are rewarded for activity.**

**Development receives recurring funding.**

**Game backing has room to grow.**

**Protocol-owned ICP creates a productive long-term reserve.**

**Buybacks recycle real platform revenue into the activity economy.**

The Protocol Battery adds another property:

**quiet periods can accumulate future incentive capacity.**

When activity is low, reward extraction decreases while recurring buybacks can continue filling the mining reserve.

When activity returns, that accumulated reserve can provide stronger incentives, while the new activity itself generates revenue that helps replenish the battery.

At the same time, part of wager revenue continuously increases protocol-owned ICP, allowing the productive reserve itself to grow alongside platform usage.

The result is an attempt to create a self-reinforcing system:

**Activity grows the protocol.

The protocol funds future activity.

Downtime builds reserves.

Growth increases future productive capacity.**

Whether that flywheel actually works is ultimately an empirical question.

That’s exactly why I’m sharing this as a proposal rather than presenting it as finished tokenomics.

I’d love to hear thoughts, criticism, attack vectors or alternative approaches — particularly from people experienced with protocol economics, NNS neurons, incentive design and on-chain game economies.

Jeezzz Christ. Can I just get a link to the game thing? Why did you post such a massive thing ?? :skull:

Honest question, as I’m busy trying to make something worthwhile..;

What’s wrong with simply having players gamble/play with $icp, and the house takes a tiny cut of the action? Do you need to create your own tokens?

Hey! First off, thanks for the response.

Whether the token itself is needed is a different discussion, but I’ll try to answer your question.

No, a token isn’t needed for the dApp to function. Players can wager ICP or SOL and the house simply takes a small cut.

But if you get through the “massive thing” :sweat_smile:, you’ll see that I’m trying to build more than just a gambling dApp. The idea is to build an ecosystem around DVINITY with gameplay, mining, staking and governance all interacting with each other.

Having our own fixed-supply token also gives us known parameters to design those systems around. That’s especially relevant for staking and governance, where supply distribution and voting power actually matter.

Could we just run the casino with ICP and forget about the token? Absolutely.

But that’s not really what I’m trying to build.

As for the link to the damn game https://dvinity.eu/ does this helps? :slight_smile:

This is interesting because I think you may be wanting to solve three somewhat separate problems inside DVINITY: the game-specific incentive model, long-term infrastructure funding, and staking/reward infrastructure.

The first one absolutely belongs to DVINITY - e.g. Devotion, who earns rewards, anti-extraction rules, etc. I’m less convinced every IC project should have to build the other two from scratch.

I’ve been working on this from the opposite direction with Jupiter Faucet and a partner liquid staking project that is almost launch-ready (called IO). The idea is to make the ICP → productive stake → recurring maturity → cycles/future funding machinery reusable infrastructure.

Here’s a very broad overview diagram

There are numerous ways in which this can be used. A project can make a long-term ICP commitment, while a Relay observes the actual cycles burn of its canisters, funds those needs first, and routes genuine surplus elsewhere - including back into an NNS neuron if desired. So quite a lot of your protocol-owned neuron / revenue-fed endowment / cycles sections could potentially be externalised rather than becoming DVINITY-specific machinery.

Trust, security and decentralisation are extremely important for a project that aims to become a foundational layer for others. Huge effort is going into this regarding Jupiter Faucet + IO, and this relates to working we’ve been doing over the years with D-QUORUM, ALPHA-Vote, CO.DELTA, and a soon to be launched governance heavy project called NNX (which will tie all of this together very soon).

The other piece I’m currently polishing is IO: essentially an ICP-backed liquid-staking layer intended to make productive staking value a reusable reward primitive. Rather than every project distributing raw ICP or inventing its own staking wrapper/emissions machinery, the underlying capital can remain productive while the reward itself remains liquid (and inflation-resistant). Note that we were once heavily involved in the WaterNeuron community (receiving bug bounties, community grants etc.), and limitations in that project, its team, and its governance is one of the main things that spurred the work on IO.


I wouldn’t suggest replacing Devotion or DVINITY’s application-specific economics. The question I’d raise is whether neuron management, maturity routing, cycles management and generic staking/reward plumbing need to live inside DVINITY at all.

That’s broadly what Jupiter Faucet + IO are intended to commoditise (and both will be 100% fair-launched as distinct SNSs soon along with NNX - we’re aiming to launch the most decentralised and robust SNSs on the IC). The Jupiter Faucet suite overview diagram probably explains the idea better that if I were to try and write it all up here.


One thing I think we should be focusing more effort on as a community is establishing a genuine ecosystem, rather than many isolated, reinvented wheels.

cc @marc0olo, @bjoern

I like the long term vision, and I like the fact you’re building activity around a game, not a static asset.

Vote on what? I like what you’ve made, but I get confused why certain things need to “democracy”. It’s your thing, so why not just own it and run it? What inspires the need to have random players stake and vote? What’s a possible criteria they’d debate and decide upon?

Honest question

If players don’t have a governance share in the infrastructure, or at least other independent parties, then a single entity can rug pull people or manipulate the game mechanics (completely undoing the whole point of being deployed on the IC). What’s the point of independent nodes distributed around the world if the project is still owned and upgradeable by someone other than the users and without their blessing?

Sorry, I think the confusion comes from this paper being specifically focused on the proposed tokenomics rather than explaining the existing DAO.

DVINITY already has on-chain governance. Currently people can create and vote on proposals such as changing certain protocol costs and creating recurring weekly lotteries. This was initially kept limited to test the governance logic.

I’ll be expanding the available proposal types over time.

Another example from this proposal: if the protocol creates a 2-year NNS neuron, its voting power doesn’t necessarily have to be controlled by me. The DVINITY DAO could decide how that neuron votes on NNS proposals.

So no, I don’t intend to “democratize” every development decision :sweat_smile:. It’s mainly about giving token holders influence over specific parts of the protocol where governance actually makes sense.

This is really interesting, and I understand your point much better now.

There is definitely overlap between what you’re building as reusable infrastructure and some of the machinery I’m proposing specifically for DVINITY.

I’ll have a proper look into Jupiter Faucet + IO, especially once IO is live.

That said, I think I’m still leaning towards building the Battery internally for DVINITY. Partly because I like the idea of the protocol owning its entire economic loop, and partly because… I genuinely enjoy building this stuff :joy:

For me it’s also an experiment: can I make revenue → treasury/neuron → maturity → cycles/buybacks/compound → staking/governance work as one autonomous system around DVINITY?

But I absolutely agree with your broader point. If every IC project eventually needs neurons, maturity routing, cycle management, etc., having robust reusable infrastructure for that makes a lot of sense.

And who knows, there may be parts where integrating existing infrastructure ends up making far more sense than reinventing them myself.

Thanks for taking the time to actually dig into the proposal and explain what you’re building.

Up to a point, but, largely, it seems like game mechanics can be made transparent with the naming of canisters.
I imagine too much voting on stuff leads to more bickering and less playing.

Cool, no worries. I encourage you to consider making that infrastructure decoupled from the actual core business logic of you dapp, such that it becomes reusable for other projects. DM me if you fancy chatting through design decisions, challenges etc.

Believe it or not I really hope you come up with a better solution than the one I’m working on. All I want is what is best for the IC (I’m heavily staked and really just benefit from whatever the network benefits from). :nerd_face: