Yes, @dfisher, an NNS treasury or community fund controlled by a decentralized authority would be a game changer if conflicting priorities could be rationally resolved. However, we first need to understand that the NNS is currently not capable of prioritization, since it relies only on approval voting, like all DAOs. Approval voting implicitly assumes that all proposals are effectively independent of each other and not in direct conflict as “alternatives” to be prioritized (e.g., competing for the same limited funds in a resource allocation context, as you describe). In short, I would strongly support such a treasury fund eventually, but definitely not with the NNS as it exists today (i.e., regardless of whether DFinity becomes fully decentralized or even is not allowed to vote). My arguments here directly address the concern in this thread from @bjoernek and other DFinity members about “whether the current grant process could be steered via NNS voting.”
Atomizing decision-making authority is generally not a difficult task to initiate when almost everyone agrees (as we already do) that there should be no dictator. However, resolving the conflicts between individual priorities most certainly is difficult, especially when those conflicts grow exponentially as decision authority is atomized. Many other complications can arise too, such as when decision makers have different confidence or familiarity levels regarding certain alternatives, or when they have varying levels of expertise on different decision criteria (e.g., performance vs. cost vs. end user experience benefits).
I am currently scoping out my PhD project that is officially kicking off next year. A significant focus of mine will be to address this collective prioritization problem, which actually has quite a long history in multiple academic fields. This problem is far more complex than it first appears, as outlined in my first (and second) posts on this forum yesterday, linked below:
If someone at DFinity is interested in collaborating on a mock-up of a voting front end (on the Internet Computer, of course!), then perhaps we could experiment on different solutions together as I work on building out an algorithmic back end during my PhD project. A front end should not be that difficult to mock up fairly quickly. It would just have to include a more robust capture of prioritization data beyond an up or down vote on a single proposal. Other researchers should also be encouraged to experiment independently with their own algorithmic back ends based on any pilot voting data generated.
Computational social choice as a nascent field of research offers a rich set of options to address this collective prioritization problem, so it would be wise for DFinity to collaborate with multiple researchers to pursue multiple potential solutions. DFinity has the largest team of research cryptographers on the planet. So the intellectual benefits of leveraging a healthy combination of diverse knowledge and friendly competition to solve difficult computing problems should already be quite familiar to everyone here. I personally believe that such a diverse intellectual environment is what made the Internet Computer possible. The IC protocol already transcends far beyond the scope and potential impact of any other blockchain. I also believe that this is what could make the Internet Computer the future of the entire Internet – to allow it to transcend even beyond what many say is impossible.
As DFinity correctly stated in the past, the NNS is truly the “crown jewel” of the Internet Computer. However, it is also the IC’s most vulnerable single point of failure in achieving its grander vision for humanity. That is no doubt why the NNS persists as the IC’s most publicly criticized feature in generating FUD hysteria. In my view, the challenge ahead of us is clear: if we cannot cross the prioritization chasm in DAO governance, then I fear that this crown jewel might eventually be lost as the FUD hysteria begins to take root in reality.
The central issue here is much bigger than a treasury fund proposal. Using the NNS as it exists today to prioritize competing resource allocations of any sort would only expose its fundamental weakness more explicitly. This would lead to more FUD hysteria as “infighting and politicking” inevitably erupt into public view. When the heavy hand of dictatorial power must publicly intervene to resolve these conflicts in an unavoidably arbitrary fashion, it would uncomfortably remind everyone which trusted, centralized authority has always been required to make such resource allocation decisions. No conspiracy would even be necessary if it could easily be painted as one.