Hello Community,
As a voting Grantee for the SNS Management service, I’ve been deeply involved in exploring the SNS framework over the past few months. I’ve brainstormed various ideas, propositions, potential solutions, and use cases that I’d like to share here. While some of these may not be perfect, I’ve invested significant thought and effort into reconstructing the SNS mission statement, identifying current problems, understanding why it’s not functioning as intended, and proposing ways to revive it.
This post focuses on the current state of the SNS Framework, particularly The pause of the Neurons’ Fund, as outlined in Proposal 135970, To say the least, this situation highlights issues that are “not community-serving, insufficient, and lacking real value.” I’ll start with an overview, pose some key questions that need clear definitions, and share my personal takes.
This is an open discussion, and I invite everyone to chime in respectfully. Please keep comments on-topic and focused on signal over noise. If replies stray off-topic or become irrelevant, I’ll ping the moderation team to mute them. I especially welcome input from the SNS Review team (like @rem.codes and @Gabriel @Gwojda and any DFINITY team members who can add value, correct assumptions, or share roadmap details I’m unaware of.
Current State of the SNS Framework
pause of the Neurons’ Fund via Proposal 135970. addresses significant concerns about the matched funding mechanism. Here’s a summary for context:
Proposal 135970 TL;DR
DFINITY proposes to pause the Neurons’ Fund. This would prevent the creation of SNS proposals requesting a Neurons’ Fund contribution but still enable SNS launches without Neurons’ Fund.
Problem
The idea of the matched funding algorithm was to take the swap activity as one signal of how popular and promising a project is and adjust the Neurons’ Fund contribution accordingly. One downside is that the dapp owners can participate in the swap with their own tokens and thereby make their project look more valuable than it is. Therefore the community raised concerns about the current Neurons’ Fund matched funding design. As this may result in a loss of trust in the SNS framework we think it is important to take action.
Proposed action
As an immediate action, we propose to pause the Neurons’ Fund by a change to NNS governance. A submission of a proposal requesting contributions from the Neurons’ Fund would always fail - such proposals could not even be created. SNS launch proposals without a Neurons’ Fund component could still be submitted as of today.
Alternatives considered
The NNS could just agree to reject all SNS proposals that request a Neurons’ Fund contribution. This is an approach that was also proposed by some community members. DFINITY agrees that this is a valid approach and plans to reject all proposals with a Neurons’ Fund request (in case this motion is adopted, until the proposed change is implemented). If the NNS agrees that this is a measure that should be taken, we think it is still worth to additionally enforce this in the code. This is not only a stronger, more reliable measure, but also makes it easier for NNS voters to understand what they need to vote on.
Going forward
This immediate action gives the community more time to think about how the Neurons’ Fund mechanism can be improved and discuss and propose such changes in future proposals.
This pause underscores the need for reform to rebuild trust and effectiveness in the SNS ecosystem.
Key Questions and Statements to Define Clearly
To move forward productively, we first need to establish clear definitions for the SNS framework’s core elements. Here are some fundamental questions:
- What purpose does the Service Nervous System (SNS) serve?
- In ideal circumstances, who benefits from a 10/10 SNS launch?
- How does a 10/10 SNS project launch, function, operate, and what is the end goal of an SNS launch?
- What should the Neurons’ Fund function be, and what are the criteria for being eligible for a Neurons’ Fund contribution?
- What rights and privileges does a participant get for contributing to an SNS launch, and what should this participant expect to gain?
My Personal Takes
Below, I’ll share my perspectives on each question. These are based on my reflections as a grantee and aim to spark constructive dialogue.
Q1: What purpose does the Service Nervous System (SNS) serve?
The SNS Framework serves as a stock exchange on the ICP network. Participants (investors) buy into or put faith in teams that have outlined a mission statement to solve a specific problem. This crystallizes in the form of a “project” with tokenized shares representing the team’s vision and mission. Participants can directly involve themselves in the mission through governance votes, using voting shares or power proportional to their “belief” or contribution (acquired at launch or on the open market). By staking their contributions, they confirm their commitment to being part of the solution.
Q2: In ideal circumstances, who benefits from a 10/10 SNS launch?
In ideal circumstances, participants know exactly what to expect from the team, including the roadmap, timeline, and progress toward solving the stated problem. The beneficiaries of this value exchange fall into three groups:
- The Project Team: They can build and solve the problem they’ve set out to address, while receiving monetary compensation for delivering the crystallized project.
- The Participants/Investors: They can expect their monetary contribution to gain value through higher token prices, utility from the solution, and maturity rewards (like interest or dividend payments on their investment).
- The Broader Network Community: They benefit from the solution by using the project, leveraging the participants’ faith and the team’s dedication to deliver real value to the ICP ecosystem.
Q3: How does a 10/10 SNS project launch, function, operate, and what is the end goal of an SNS launch?
A 10/10 Launch means the project raises the maximum amount targeted, with clear milestones, a doxxed/known team that’s reachable and communicative before and after launch. The team works for the participants, not just treasury withdrawals.
- Function: It solves the stated problem in a way that drives adoption to the ICP network. The team follows DFINITY standards with regular “R&D” calls to update on progress, allowing participants/investors to join, ask questions, and address concerns.
- Operate: Focuses on operational longevity for long-term sustainability, providing ongoing value to participants/believers in the early solution, idea, or startup. This value can be exchanged for more than the initial investment.
- End Goal: The finish line is never truly reached—it’s an endless journey like a maze, with new opportunities, problems, and solutions. Each step builds on the last, advancing value, utility, and network participation.
Q4: What should the Neurons’ Fund function be, and what are the criteria for being eligible for a Neurons’ Fund contribution?
The Neurons’ Fund should ensure that teams solving a problem are prepared, bootstrapped, and ready for startup challenges. It provides guide rails for founders, helping them understand and tackle obstacles.
Eligibility criteria should include:
- Fully Doxxed Team: No anonymous teams.
- Public Good Focus: The project must solve a problem that evolves the ICP network in terms of adoption, security, or utility.
- Full Open Source: Anyone can clone, remake, or remix the project.
Q5: What rights and privileges does a participant get for contributing to an SNS launch, and what should this participant expect to gain?
(I personally view SNS launches as early seed investments into startups/companies. If there’s a “conflict of interest”—an exchange of value between Party A and Party B—there should be an expected outcome from that exchange.)
Participants gain the right to monitor, influence, and ensure their investment/contribution is used as intended per the SNS launch conditions and problem statement. They can hold the team accountable to prevent misuse.
They also gain the privilege of directly interfering in the project’s crystallization by affirming or denying proposed changes via voting. This utilizes their participation privilege, making them actively involved in the mission statement and solution completion.
Current Framework Results
To better illustrate the current state of the SNS framework, I’ve compiled data from the provided dashboard screenshots. This includes all listed DAOs with key metrics. I’ve calculated the Evaluation at Launch for each as the raised amount in ICP multiplied by the ICP price on the launch date (using the provided raised $ value as it reflects the historical USD equivalent at launch).
For clarity, here’s a comprehensive table: from the dashboard
| Name | Raised | FDV | Current ICP Treasury | Launch Date | Evaluation at Launch |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Motoko | $1,183 (100 ICP) | $692,810 | 2,374 ICP ($7,431) | May 15, 2024 | $1,183 |
| FuelEV | $1,484,364 (205,399 ICP) | $651,210 | 0 ICP ($0) | Feb 14, 2025 | $1,484,364 |
| BOOM DAO | $1,225,973 (409,865 ICP) | $262,790 | 24,878 ICP ($77,867) | Sep 15, 2023 | $1,225,973 |
| NFID Wallet | $1,305,596 (199,274 ICP) | $354,650 | 132,694 ICP ($415,321) | Feb 9, 2025 | $1,305,596 |
| Nuance | $821,074 (262,408 ICP) | $343,990 | 102,121 ICP ($319,628) | Oct 3, 2023 | $821,074 |
| TRAX | $2,989,059 (314,734 ICP) | $331,690 | 36,417 ICP ($113,983) | Dec 23, 2023 | $2,989,059 |
| Sneed | $352,200 (30,000 ICP) | $287,550 | 7,582 ICP ($23,731) | Jan 30, 2024 | $352,200 |
| ICFC | $1,526,705 (81,294 ICP) | $260,570 | 60 ICP ($188) | Mar 31, 2024 | $1,526,705 |
| Mimic | $81,742 (20,000 ICP) | $248,280 | 1 ICP ($3) | Jul 27, 2023 | $81,742 |
| Catalyze | $198,030 (60,200 ICP) | $207,630 | 84,917 ICP ($267,581) | Sep 8, 2023 | $198,030 |
| Swampies | $59,921 (4,860 ICP) | $180,920 | 0 ICP ($0) | May 25, 2024 | $59,921 |
| Personal DAO | $62,709 (10,745 ICP) | $138,040 | 7,522 ICP ($23,542) | Mar 19, 2025 | $62,709 |
| PHASMA | $82,356 (12,051 ICP) | $88,480 | 2 ICP ($6) | Aug 12, 2024 | $82,356 |
| Neutrinite | $2,076,768 (224,525 ICP) | $2,850,000 | 22,972 ICP ($71,901) | Dec 27, 2023 | $2,076,768 |
| Cecil The Lion DAO | $182,932 (30,101 ICP) | $2,720,000 | 1 ICP ($2) | Mar 24, 2025 | $182,932 |
| ICPEX | $1,837,097 (29,319 ICP) | $2,430,000 | 100,619 ICP ($314,929) | Mar 25, 2025 | $1,837,097 |
| EstateDAO | $2,039,712 (130,580 ICP) | $2,210,000 | 74,779 ICP ($234,052) | Apr 22, 2024 | $2,039,712 |
| Yuku Al | $2,819,973 (176,690 ICP) | $1,970,000 | 1 ICP ($3) | Apr 10, 2024 | $2,819,973 |
| ICPanda | $2,231,699 (132,381 ICP) | $1,790,000 | 664 ICP ($2,078) | Apr 3, 2024 | $2,231,699 |
| SONIC | $1,607,155 (519,375 ICP) | $1,730,000 | 74,835 ICP ($234,226) | Oct 9, 2023 | $1,607,155 |
| DOLR AI | $4,431,224 (1,070,428 ICP) | $954,480 | 354,991 ICP ($1,110,087) | Jul 13, 2023 | $4,431,224 |
| IC Explorer | $1,469,529 (221,245 ICP) | $905,680 | 66,245 ICP ($207,341) | Feb 27, 2025 | $1,469,529 |
| TACO DAO | $668,883 (127,078 ICP) | $896,130 | 57,527 ICP ($180,055) | May 23, 2025 | $668,883 |
| ELNA AI | $3,077,879 (239,710 ICP) | $817,330 | 57,959 ICP ($180,255) | Mar 16, 2024 | $3,077,879 |
| Alice Fun | $792,815 (85,971 ICP) | $712,700 | 0 ICP ($0) | Jan 21, 2025 | $792,815 |
| ORIGYN | $1,061 (88 ICP) | $1,750,000 | 88 ICP ($275) | May 26, 2024 | $1,061 |
| FomoWell | $1,901,771 (176,781 ICP) | $1,620,000 | 90,501 ICP ($283,261) | Jan 19, 2025 | $1,901,771 |
| Gold DAO | $7,249,077 (783,718 ICP) | $1,155,000 | 39,874 ICP ($124,801) | Dec 27, 2023 | $7,249,077 |
| IVC | $9,933,785 (1,248,379 ICP) | $10,800,000 | 840,989 ICP ($2,631,929) | Aug 19, 2024 | $9,933,785 |
| WaterNeuron | $3,195,873 (435,963 ICP) | $8,410,000 | 0 ICP ($0) | Jul 3, 2024 | $3,195,873 |
| OpenChat | $5,133,900 (1,000,000 ICP) | $7,810,000 | 100,486 ICP ($314,512) | Mar 17, 2023 | $5,133,900 |
| Kinic | $2,036,584 (509,244 ICP) | $6,410,000 | 300,390 ICP ($940,193) | Jun 17, 2023 | $2,036,584 |
| Dragginz | $13,740 (3,141 ICP) | $4,690,000 | 0 ICP ($0) | Dec 10, 2022 | $13,740 |
| KongSwap | $1,998,581 (255,336 ICP) | $3,790,000 | 120,238 ICP ($376,332) | Nov 1, 2024 | $1,998,581 |
| ICPSwap | $6,741,718 (335,641 ICP) | $3,380,000 | 80,553 ICP ($252,122) | Apr 6, 2024 | $6,741,718 |
| DecideAI DAO | $2,297,852 (664,534 ICP) | $3,240,000 | 5,515 ICP ($17,261) | Aug 25, 2023 | $2,297,852 |
| ICLighthouse DAO | $6,390,211 (440,704 ICP) | $3,040,000 | 180,228 ICP ($564,096) | Mar 14, 2024 | $6,390,211 |
Summary of All Launches
- Amount collectively raised in Value: $80,320,731
- Amount collectively raised in ICP: 10,451,862 ICP
- Amount collectively held in current treasury in Value: $9,288,992
- Amount collectively held in current treasury ICP amounts: 2,968,023 ICP
This data highlights the overall performance and retention within the SNS framework. Notice that only about 11.56% of the raised value remains in treasuries collectively ($9.29M out of $80.32M),
Proof of Failure
We’ve witnessed widespread funds misappropriation across various SNS projects. For instance, FuelEV had to initiate a full rollback of their SNS sale, refunding all initial participants in ICP to restore trust after community concerns arose.
Failure after failure has plagued a system that isn’t working effectively for teams, participants, or the broader ICP network. Examples include 51% attacks, DAO wars, inability to pass proposals, slow treasury drains, and outright rug pulls—such as those alleged in Seers or the Cycles-Transfer-Station project. The ICFC project stands out as a case of gradual treasury depletion through repeated transfers. I’m currently unaware of any SNS launch that has truly benefited all three entities (the team, participants, and network). In about 90% of cases—excluding transitions like Sneed, OGY, or Motoko—the primary beneficiary is often just one group, leaving the others at a loss. Teams frequently fail to deliver due to incompetence, execution challenges, or outright malice, which I view as defrauding investors of value.
That said, there are standout projects that continue to develop, ship features, and maintain progress. These successes often stem from experienced teams on their second or third venture, such as Kinic, which boasts one of the healthiest treasuries, prudent spending, and strong execution on their outlined problems. There are others—you know who they are—but they’re the exceptions, not the rule.
We’ve also seen highly questionable actions executed by some SNS DAOs, like the BOOMDAO Minting Proposal 653. As outlined by @lara from the DFINITY Governance team:
Analysis of BOOMDAO Proposal 653
We can draw the following conclusions from the data.
- There were only 2 eligible neurons on the minting proposal (653) because all other neurons had a dissolve delay below neuron_minimum_dissolve_delay_to_vote_seconds at the time when proposal 653 was created. Therefore, these 2 neurons comprised 100% of the eligible voting power and could adopt the proposal quickly.
- The value of neuron_minimum_dissolve_delay_to_vote_seconds had been dramatically increased from 48 hours to over 54 years by proposal 617 (shown by the red line)
- Proposal 617 was inside a stream of many proposals setting the neuron_minimum_dissolve_delay_to_vote_seconds to 48 hours.
- In particular, proposal 620 (shown in purple) was the first of those to be executed after 617, resetting neuron_minimum_dissolve_delay_to_vote_seconds from 54 years back to 48 hours.
- The window during which neuron_minimum_dissolve_delay_to_vote_seconds was very high (54 years) was just over 20 minutes (as shown by the arrows), but that was enough for the two neurons to set their dissolve delay to 83 years and be the only eligible neurons during this period.
- All other neurons (apart from these two) could have participated and potentially voted against the minting proposal 653 if they also increased their dissolve delay to a value over 54 years after the execution of proposal 617 and before the creation of the minting proposal 653 - thus within a very short time frame.
Takeaways
Proposal 653 was not adopted due to a technical bug in the code, but due to a series of proposals with arguably confusing or unexpected effects for some users. For this reason, we conclude with two takeaways.
- To make it harder to change nervous system parameters in the future, the NNS released a new SNS governance version that makes the topic “DAO community settings” that includes changes to the parameters critical (forum post, proposal). This means that going forward a proposal to change the parameters can only be adopted under stricter conditions (see documentation for the detailed rules for critical proposals).
- In the Boom DAO case, if proposal 617 were critical it would not have been approved (the condition that ⅔ of the cast votes are in favor was not met as there were 36.8% yes and 30% no votes of the overall voting power).
- In general, it is always possible that few parties get a majority of the voting power by buying enough tokens if there are enough SNS DAO members willing to sell their tokens. Making proposals critical does not prevent this - it merely shifts the line of how much voting power is needed to dominate voting in the given topic.
- In a lot of the voting frontends it is hard for human voters to read the proposals that change the SNS parameters and spot the exact change of each proposal. We plan to look into updating the NNS dapp to
- Make it more visible which parameter would be changed in a given proposal.
- Make the parameters easier to read (e.g., not only show the dissolve delay in seconds, but in a more readable format).
Reactive vs. Proactive Measures
The examples we’ve discussed, such as the BOOMDAO incident, represent responses to crises that have already unfolded, rather than forward-thinking safeguards designed to prevent them. While these fixes address immediate vulnerabilities, they highlight a broader pattern: the SNS framework often reacts to exploits instead of anticipating them. This leaves participants and the ICP network exposed to recurring risks. I could cite additional cases, but for those engaged in the forum, the pattern is evident—there’s a deep-seated systemic flaw at play. Yet, we struggle to precisely identify its nature, pinpoint its origins, or assign responsibility for resolution. Assuming good faith from all involved, it’s reasonable to believe that everyone shares the goal of achieving flawless 10/10 SNS launches, where teams, participants, and the network all thrive, prosper, and evolve together.
Locating the Root Problems
At its core, the SNS framework’s failures stem from several interconnected issues:
- Inadequate Governance Safeguards: The system lacks robust mechanisms to prevent manipulation, such as easy hostile takeovers or parameter exploits, leading to imbalances in power and decision-making.
- Misaligned Incentives: Teams may prioritize short-term gains (e.g., treasury access) over long-term delivery, while participants face locked funds with minimal recourse or rewards.
- Insufficient Accountability and Transparency: Without mandatory milestones, doxxing, or enforceable roadmaps, bad-faith actors can exploit the system, eroding trust and deterring genuine participation.
- Economic Vulnerabilities: Low liquidity, token price volatility, and unrestricted treasury access enable rug pulls, slow drains, and value extraction, perpetuating a cycle of failure.
These root causes create a fragile ecosystem where exploitation outweighs collaboration, as evidenced by the data and historical patterns.
Impacts on Key Stakeholders
The absence of these protections manifests in tangible harms across the board. For development teams, DAO wars emerge as a constant threat: opportunistic whales can acquire undervalued voting power amid depressed token prices and illiquid markets, staging hostile takeovers. This diverts authentic builders—who may have invested years in their projects—from problem-solving to defensive negotiations or concessions.
Participants, meanwhile, are left holding staked neurons in underperforming ventures that rarely yield profits or benefits. Their capital remains immobilized for extended periods—often months or years—without meaningful returns, turning investments into sunk costs.
The ICP network bears the heaviest burden from this dysfunction. As malicious actors drain treasuries unchecked, trust diminishes, prompting participants to exit the ecosystem. This results in declining adoption, a shrinking user base, reduced cycle consumption, and stalled innovation. Projects frequently fall short of delivering viable solutions, producing subpar or abandoned products. The typical endpoint? Gradual treasury depletion until exhaustion, followed by canister failures (running out of cycles and dropping from indexing), team departures, and widespread value erosion. Users and the network are left with diminished resources, lost opportunities for growth, and unresolved problems that either linger or burden new teams to tackle afresh.
The Vicious Cycle and Its Consequences
This repetitive pattern spirals into a self-reinforcing decline: potential investors lose faith, viewing SNS launches as vehicles that primarily enrich teams through unintended treasury misuse, rather than delivering shared value. Ultimately, this dynamic proves net negative for two-thirds of the involved entities, as reflected in the earlier data table—only about 11% of raised value remains in treasuries, with roughly 33% of ICP retained. The stark 2/3 imbalance reveals that 66% of ICP has disproportionately flowed to just one-third of participants (often teams or exploiters), a disparity that’s unfolded over the past three years.
Failure to Uphold DAO Principles
This trajectory underscores the framework’s fundamental shortfall in embodying the ideals of a “Decentralized Autonomous Organization.” True decentralization would distribute power equitably, preventing such massive value losses (up to 90% in aggregate). Autonomy, derived from the Greek roots auto (self) and nomos (law or convention), implies self-sustaining rules that propel the organization forward independently. Yet, SNS DAOs routinely falter here: canisters deplete cycles and cease functioning, contradicting the notion of self-propulsion. In essence, the current setup falls short on both decentralization and autonomy, demanding reforms to realign with these core principles.
Current Trajectory for Operational DAOs
As we examine the SNS framework’s challenges, a pressing concern emerges: the unsustainable burn rates of many DAO treasuries. These act like one-way “cookie jars”—funds flow out for operations, development, or withdrawals, but rarely replenish through revenue streams. This design flaw positions most operational DAOs on a path to depletion, with no inherent mechanisms for self-sustainability. A true “treasury” implies inflows and outflows; here, it’s often treated as a finite “treasure” chest, leading to predictable failure without external intervention. Yet, as self-propelling, autonomous entities, DAOs shouldn’t rely on bailouts or repeated raises to survive.
I first highlighted this trajectory in an April 2025 forum post, proposing solutions like direct liquidity provision at launch using assets such as GLDT or ckBTC to bootstrap sustainable models: Addressing ICP’s Liquidity Challenges: A Case for GLDT Denomination.
This idea gained traction and materialized a few months later in July 2025 with the announcement of the SNS Liquidity Pools Design, including extensions like the Treasury Manager. This tool automates treasury actions, such as adding liquidity to DEXs without waiting for proposals, marking a step toward more dynamic management: SNS Liquidity Pools Design.
Building on this, in August 2025, I echoed a community call to action in a forum thread discussing the impending runway crunch for most SNS projects, including major DEXs, within 6-9 months: Call to Action: What Happens in 6-9 Months When Most SNS Projects Are Out of Runway, Including Our Major DEXs?. In that discussion, I emphasized the need for stricter entry standards, mandatory ROI plans, and revenue streams before approving SNS launches. As I noted:
If these SNS launches are being compared to an IPO, then more than half of them should never have launched. […] If you want to be an SNS, you need to have a ROI plan, revenue stream; you do a SNS only for one thing—that is to gather your community to evolve your product. You are selling power over this product in exchange for funds, like an IPO/Seed sale, but there is no guarantees or even plans from the DAOs. […] Teams need to be fully prepared with a business plan; if your product or app cannot generate revenue, they cannot become an SNS, because they cannot sustain themselves in the future.
Community members like @Mico chimed in, agreeing on the need for revenue replenishment (e.g., adding streams to DAO treasuries for dev payments or grant applications) and drawing parallels to traditional finance, where IPOs require sustainable models post-raise.
Your question raises a critical point: Yes, we should indeed take a deeper look into approving SNS sales, with higher standards for entry to ensure only projects with demonstrable viability and sustainable models are greenlit. However, the issue is twofold. While stricter approval criteria could filter out underprepared initiatives, the root problem lies in the current SNS infrastructure design, which treats treasuries as one-time capital infusions without mandatory mechanisms for ongoing replenishment. […] I’m currently in the process of designing a system proposal—similar in spirit to the DEX liquidity pools design, but focused on revenue replenishment that could mandate inflow mechanisms for all SNS treasuries.
I also referenced a prescient warning from an earlier forum post:
More generally, if unsuitable SNS projects fail and stumble, especially as the SNS framework is just emerging, it will undermine its reputation and slow its adoption, in turn slowing down the development of the ICP economy, reducing the capital available for mature projects, and depriving important future projects of access to decentralized funding. If early SNS projects become rug pulls, it would be even more harmful…
To illustrate the urgency, consider ICPSwap as a case study from my August analysis. Launched on April 6, 2024, they raised ~400,000 ICP (valued at ~$6M at the time). By August 14, 2025, only ~130,552 ICP remained—a burn of ~269,448 ICP over ~497 days, equating to ~542 ICP/day (~$3,252/day at then-current prices). On that trajectory, with no inflows, they had ~240 days left before depletion—projecting bankruptcy around April 12, 2026. Even if they captured 0.5% fees on their average $500K daily volume (~$2,500/day revenue), it could offset costs to ~126 ICP/day net burn, extending runway to ~1,035 days (~3 years). Yet, their treasury graph showed steady decline, highlighting the absence of effective replenishment.
This pattern repeats across many DAOs. The attached image compiles treasury outlines for various SNS projects, showing predominantly downward trends in ICP balances over time—no upticks or stabilizations in sight. This visualizes the “road to hell”: rapid depletion without reversal, setting fixed “death dates” for operations unless addressed.
I echoed this on X in July 2025, sharing an image of treasury balances and warning of the 6-9 month cliff for many, including DEXs like ICPSwap or Sonic: X Post. Without change, we’re facing a domino effect—DAOs failing one by one, eroding faith in the framework.
As a voting Grantee applicant for the SNS category, I’m committed to enforcing quality: requiring business plans, revenue models, and sustainability before launches. The recent Liquidity Pools and Treasury Manager extensions offer a foundation to restart the SNS framework. Hopping on these, we can mandate integrations that ensure every launch includes built-in replenishment mechanisms.
In the next section, I’ll outline specific proposals, solutions, and potential extensions I believe could revive the framework and reignite faith from the 2/3 entities (participants and network) in SNS launches.
Continues in 2/2 Since I hit the Limit of words
