You are right that I wrongly read “we have to allow one entity”.
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Hey @lara. I just realized the implications of this detail in the proposal and don’t like it at all. I believe that daily rewards should be computed based on adjusted voting power, not potential voting power. Sleeper neurons should not be negatively affecting the governance rewards that are allocated to everyone. The total daily reward pie should be allocated proportionally to everyone who is actively participating in governance according to whatever definition is established by the NNS. Those rewards should not be diluted by sleeper neurons.
@lara @bjoernek can we please stop claiming that this prior proposal (the one linked in the quoted text “a while ago” and referenced as having advantages) was introduced to stop spam? The spam had already been resolved when that proposal was introduced (it stopped immediately when the proposal weight went from 20x to 1x on the Governance topic). The proposal was introduced due to a hypothesis that removal of the exchange rate proposal topic would create a new incentive for spam, but that hypothesis was never tested. We have a lot of SNS projects today (none of which existed back then) and none of them have a spam problem. The exchange rate proposal topic was a mechanism that guaranteed daily voting rewards to NNS participants and removing it means that there are some days where there are no rewards. Hence, the hypothesis was that spam would be submitted in order to trigger the daily reward. None of the SNS projects have this type of daily proposal, which means none of them have daily rewards, and none of them are plagued with spam. Hence, there is now empirical evidence that this change to ICP tokenomics, which resulted in the largest drop in voting rewards that we have ever experienced, was not even necessary. The only advantage that could have been created by this prior proposal was to create a source of funding that could be used to strategically help advance decentralization without increasing the inflation that is baked into ICP tokenomics design, but that was not in scope for that proposal and hasn’t been pursued since then. Hence, the change has only had a negative impact on active NNS participants by diluting the value they get out of their active governance participation. I really don’t want to see the same design philosophies that were implemented with that prior change also carried over into this periodic confirmation design.
You are right. The original periodic confirmation proposal 55651 did not include voting as a mechanism for satisfying a requirement for active governance participation. The proposal was focused solely on ensuring each neuron owner is making their own Followee choice on a regular basis. I don’t mind the voting provision since I consider it to be an act of intentional governance participation (I have a hard time believing that people who vote manually are not already intentional about their Followees), but I also would support taking it out since it is not aligned with the original proposal.
There is no doubt that staking ICP with WaterNeuron is far less complex and offers higher rewards than staking ICP in the NNS. If someone is looking for a set and forget option, then waterneuron.fi is an excellent solution. The advantage of the WaterNeuron protocol is that it enables people who only care about the investment returns and liquidity of their staked tokens to earn staking rewards while delegating the responsibility of NNS governance participation to the WTN token holders. Hence, if you stake your ICP as nICP, then you earn higher rewards than you would if you stake in the NNS and you can remove your stake from the protocol at any time. However, you don’t have to worry at all about the changes that will inevitably happen in a mutable governance system such as the NNS because there are other people who are actively involved on the governance side who are addressing those issues for you. Hence, every ICP that is staked through WaterNeuron is actively participating in governance as intended by the NNS governance design.
My preference is to start the voting power adjustment at 6 months. I don’t see a problem with the 1 month linear decrease, but it’s easier to think of the deadline for confirmation as twice a year instead of every 5 months. I think most people will think in terms of how to avoid any penalty on their voting power instead of the deadline for complete removal of voting power.
A reset of following for neurons that don’t periodically confirm would be more consistent with the original proposal 55651. I suppose if you did this then you wouldn’t need the adjusted voting power calculations at all and it would also make sense to remove the grace period ramp. You could focus all the development energy on this part of the code instead of creating the new adjusted voting power code that wasn’t part of the original proposal. I like the idea behind the adjusted voting power, but only from the perspective that it removes sleeper neuron voting power from the total voting power calculation, which in my opinion should be applied to both the determination of absolute majority on individual proposals and the determination of daily voting reward distribution. Hence, if we are not going to apply it in both ways, then I would prefer to remove the adjusted voting power calculation from the design scope altogether. As an alternative, you could simply define voting power as neurons with greater than 6 month dissolve delay AND Followees configured for at least one proposal topic. That way lack of periodic confirmation of Followees completely removes voting power from that neuron from the NNS, which addresses the concern about quickly adopting critical proposals. If this were the design, then even the concept of theoretical voting power goes away for sleeper neurons. We should not let sleeper neurons dilute the voting rewards of neurons that are active, so I would prefer that we simply take away voting power from neurons that don’t have a Followee set instead of the design that has been proposed.
Can you point to any neuron that exists in this configuration. This seems highly unlikely.
If these neurons really do exist or you simply want to design for this use case, then perhaps you could create a property of a neuron where the neuron owner can indicate that they intentionally have no Followees set. If they ever set a Followee, then it would automatically undo this setting. If a neuron is intentionally designated as not having any Followees, then that neuron should get full voting power.
Hopefully my position on this has been clarified earlier in this comment. If the adjusted voting power is not going to be used to allocate daily voting rewards, then I don’t want to use the new adjusted voting power calculation at all. I would rather see a Followee reset and voting power be calculated based on the existence of Followee configuration or designation by the neuron owner that lack of Followees is intentional. Sleeper neurons should not be allowed to dilute voting rewards for active governance participants.
I’m more aligned with the hypothesis provided by @bjoernek that 80% of NNS voting power is likely to participate in governance after periodic confirmation is implemented rather than the lower 40% numbers suggested by @Accumulating.icp. When the Governance proposal topic was removed from All Topics and the weight of the governance topic was increased to 20x, it only took about a week for total voting power participation on the Governance topic to increase from about 10% to 45%. This happened very suddenly. Voting rewards were impacted immediately and there was an active education campaign by the community to raise awareness of the change. In that case, voting rewards for participants who didn’t configure their neurons on the Governance topic were still receiving rewards, but at a lower level. My hypothesis has always been that if we want to increase participation further, then there needs to be a mechanism to remove rewards altogether. That was actually documented in the original proposal for periodic confirmation. If people suddenly start to see that they are getting zero rewards, then they are likely to start investigating. Hence I would not be surprised if that translates into a 20% increase over the participation rates we currently see, which is 60%. For the sake of discussion I think it is reasonable to use the numbers that we know today instead of speculating on what they will be. Hence using the 60% participation we see currently on Governance and SNS & Neuron’s Fund seems reasonable to me. At the end of the day, it doesn’t matter. Let me explain.
Below are charts of voting participation on both the Governance and the SNS & Neuron’s Fund proposal topics over the last 1.5 years. All proposals are not included since it is a very manually intensive effort to collect the data, but I believe the data is representative of the trend. I only included proposals where DFINITY voted. The amount of voting power that DFINITY triggers when they vote is evident in the voting trends for each proposal on the dashboard. They own the largest amount of voting power, so the largest jump is always associated with their vote. The blue trend is the total voting power cast on each proposal, the red trend is the voting power that is triggered by DFINITY, and the orange is the voting power that is cast be all other neurons combined. It is evident in these trends that DFINITY triggers just about as much voting power as all other neurons combined. It is enough to reach consensus on any Governance or SNS & Neuron’s Fund proposal even if it requires the full 4 day voting period.
Fortunately, DFINITY doesn’t abuse this voting power and many people in the community find it acceptable. In fact, DFINITY doesn’t own all the voting power that they trigger. The total voting power that is owned by DFINITY has gone down over this 1.5 year period from about 23% to just under 20%. Over the same time, the voting power that is triggered by DFINITY has gone up from about 23% to about 32%. This increase is fully attributed to the fact that the NNS community has gone from about 0-2% voting power that follows DFINITY to about 11-14% voting power that follow DFINITY. This has occured despite the fact that the proposal weight for Governance and SNS & Neuron’s Fund are both 20x and DFINITY has not voted on 9% of all Governance proposals and has not voted on 28% of all SNS & Neuron’s Fund proposals. Hence, the people who follow DFINITY on these topics have lost substantial voting reward over the last 1.5 years. Yet they still choose to follow DFINITY on these topics, which is their right.
Regardless, DFINITY triggers enough voting power to satisfy this 51% attack vector and this situation has existed for the last 1.5 years. I don’t think anyone in their right mind thinks that DFINITY intends to harm the ICP ecosystem. In fact, DFINITY has taken great strides over the last 3 years to help advance decentralization and those efforts continue today. The new Grants for Voting Neurons program is a major step in that direction on the technical topics. There are very few entities in the ecosystem that perform educated reviews and vote independently on technical proposals. CodeGov does this for IC-OS Version Election and System Canister Management and LORIMER does this today for Subnet Management. However, when this new grant program takes effect in the coming months there will be 3 other known neurons that are also performing some of this work. At this time, there is already 9.5 % total voting power in the NNS that is voting independently of DFINITY on technical topics such as IC-OS Version Election and System Canister Management proposals. This is prior to implementation of the new grant program and prior to any concerted effort / incentives to drive decentralization. If the periodic confirmation proposal were implemented today, my hypothesis is that somewhere around 15.8% of voting power would be cast by entities other than DFINITY (based on 60% participation…or a little less if @bjoernek hypothesis is correct and we end up with 80% participation)
| IC-OS Version Election | System Canister Management | |
|---|---|---|
| CURRENT | ||
| Example Proposal | 132149 | 132171 |
| Total Voting Power Cast | 99.6 % | 99.6 % |
| DFINITY Triggered TVP | 90.1 % | 90.1 % |
| DFINITY Owned TVP | 19.7 % | 19.7 % |
| DFINITY Follower TVP | 70.4 % | 70.4 % |
| Other Neuron TVP | 9.5 % | 9.5 % |
| ADJUSTED | ||
| DFINITY Triggered TVP | 84.2 % | 84.2 % (=100-32.8-15.8) |
| DFINITY Owned TVP | 32.8 % | 32.8 % (=19.7/0.6) |
| DFINITY Follower TVP | 51.4 % | 51.4 % |
| Other Neuron TVP | 15.8 % | 15.8 % (=9.5/0.6) |
My prior position on periodic confirmation has been that we didn’t have all the right ingredients in place to make it worth implementing (since spam was solved in other ways). It may still be too soon to implement it, but we are getting closer. We need known neurons that are viable options to follow on technical topics other than DFINITY. There needs to be incentives for them to perform the work of reviewing and voting independently on technical proposals and possibly making technical contributions. There also need to be reasons why neuron owners will be willing to follow someone other than DFINITY. @dfisher outlined this part of the problem very well previously in this comment, but unfortunately there are not any concrete solutions that have been identified yet to address this issue. It does not improve decentralization if changes are made that simply force people to follow DFINITY due to lack of choices. Hence I think we need to be very strategic about when we implement changes that help mitigate the consequences of default following on older neurons. These are the much bigger issues than a 51% attack vector caused by a reduction of total voting power in the NNS. DFINITY already has this attack vector blocked and I see no reason why it would change when periodic confirmation is implemented.
See the table above in the ADJUSTED section for a real world example of how it would change assuming there is 60% of total voting power on technical topics as compared to today. Yes, the percentage of total voting power that DFINITY triggers would go up, but so would the community of active voters that are not following DFINITY. The drop in percentage would all come from default followers of DFINITY. DFINITY would still control the majority of the votes on technical topics, but we would already be getting much closer to decentralization and that is before the efforts that are ongoing to incentivize known neurons or future modifications that could incentivize followers to choose someone to follow other than DFINITY. Decentralization is a transition over time.
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Mmm, I didn’t know about this. It’s pretty messy. Honestly, they’ve probably already decided the proposal’s fate given the answers (and lack thereof) provided. So, I’ll leave it here. 
(As I said before, I think this is what matters for the community.)
Lots of great points. I liked this one the most 
@lara I think another point is that it needs to be made easier for users to get a sense of which are good known neurons to follow on which topics, based on that user’s preferences. Otherwise most users will just click on the quickest and easiest known neuron they can find in the list to get through the recomfirmation process as painlessly as possible (which would defeat the purpose).
Important things to consider are:
- does it even make sense to list sleeper neurons?
- why not show some very simple metrics next to each known neuron that provide a high level overview of how this neuron has voted in the last 6 months? e.g.
- Percentage of proposals voted yes, no, and none for that specific topic, providing a quick indication of activity and genuine consideration - e.g. TAGGR rejects proposals for some topics 100% of the time (so probably not a good neuron to follow for that specific topic, but a potentially good neuron to follow on a selection of other topics. For example, I cast my vote on TAGGR to inform TAGGR’s IC OS election vote, and other users do the same for this and other topics)
- The average length of deliberation before the neuron decided to vote for that topic - e.g. GEEKFACTORY and some other known neurons vote practically instantly, consistently, on numerous topics (so clearly aren’t performing any kind of due diligence and probably shouldn’t be followed for those topics, unless you’d like to reward complaicency and encourage blind voting). Also, it would be worth differentiating between average speed of yes votes vs average speed of no votes. When the WaterNeuron DAO reaches consensus this triggers a vote if it’s a ‘yes’, whereas a ‘no’ will not be cast until the last hour of the voting period (at least with the current implementation).
- At the very least the known neuron description should be visible in the dapp (currently it’s just the name). As a side note, the description should be allowed to be updated without requiring the neuron to change name (as is currently the case). Things change over time, and the description needs to be able to reflect important changes regarding how the neuron is managed.
- how are the known neurons listed in the dapp ordered?
- Why?
- Is this a desirable bias?
- Why not randomise it?
- Why not allow the list to be dynamically sorted by the user based on the stat(s) that they’re interested in?
Without making information like this easily and immediately available to users when setting up their followees, I doubt we’re going to see much improvement in the intentfullness with which neurons other than DFINITY are followed.
I’m really glad to see these sorts of conversations taking place, and it does sound like we’re steadily moving in the right direction in terms of governance decentralisation 
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In addition to this, it would be great if each known neuron were able to signal which proposal topics where they specialize and for those known neurons to be moved to the top of the list for that proposal topic. In fact, I’m not even sure why we would list all known neurons for every proposal topic at all. It seems like only known neurons that specialize in the topic should be listed as a known neuron followee option for that topic. Of course, you should be able to enter any neuron ID you want and it seems reasonable to make it relatively easy to see all known neurons, but by default we should make some attempt as filtering the known neuron followee options to neurons that have claimed a specialty in the topic.
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In my opinion, it’s better to distribute the VP (and rewards) among a set of active actors rather than removing it from the count. That way, we avoid inflating DFINITY’s VP close to 50% and genuinely improve decentralization. I would love to hear your thoughts on this.
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This would be very good. There’d probably also need to be a way of verifying and/or dissuading those who provide a disingenuous signal.
I’ve just noticed that a lot of what we’re talking about falls under the Plasma component of the IC Roadmap 
Engagement platform for named neurons: Make information about named neurons’ voting behavior easily accessible for voters to make informed decisions whom to follow.
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I suppose a way of accomplishing that is to use the register known neuron proposal type to register each known neuron for each topic. That way the NNS can decide who should be on the list of known neurons for each topic. It could work very similar to neuron management proposals where you submit a separate proposal to change your followees for every topic. In this case, the register known neuron proposal could be submitted to register the known neuron for each topic where they make a commitment and the full NNS could decide. The same proposal type could also be used to deregister known neurons from the proposal topic if people feel they are doing a poor job.
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I think I agree if I understand you correctly. I’m all for ideas that create incentives for people and organizations to get involved in technical proposal reviews and that create incentives for neuron owners to follow them. I think Voting Rewards Function on the dashboard should be a cap on voting rewards that are distributed to all NNS governance participants, but that the distribution should include greater incentives for those that put in more work. Hence, I think it is a horrible waste of resources to simply forfeit governance rewards when people choose not to participate while we have a gaping hole in the decentralization of the NNS. We need to be putting resources into developing people and organizations that can make real contributions to NNS governance at the protocol level. That’s my first priority, but if we are going to continue not incentivizing technical contributions to NNS governance through the NNS, then I think a better use of forfeited voting rewards would be to distribute them to everyone who is voting as per the original tokenomics design, which would indeed include DFINITY having a higher voting power.
That said, I already showed in a previous comment that DFINITY already triggers half of the voting power that is cast on Governance and SNS & Neuron’s Fund proposals today. They may not own 50% of total voting power in the NNS, but there are a lot of people willing to follow them and that is their right. It doesn’t require 50% total voting power in the NNS to execute a proposal. Hence, I don’t think we should avoiding changes like periodic confirmation due to the concern about how much voting power is controlled by DFINITY. If DFINITY ends up with an ability to trigger more than 50% voting power, then based on prior voting behavior I think DFINITY will become less likely to vote on controversial topics and they will seek ways to shake away their followers so they don’t trigger so much voting power. It’s happened several times before. I think DFINITY has a genuine and demonstrated interest in advancing decentralization of the NNS. I think our focus should be on cultivating people and organizations that can take a more active role in the decentralization of the NNS on technical topics and rewarding them for that work.
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I mostly agree, @wpb. I’m just concerned that this proposal, as it stands, relies on an optimistic assumption about increased participation. If this assumption proves incorrect, DFINITY could gain more than 50% control over certain topics (without followers), which is a threshold we must avoid crossing at all costs, at least for legal reasons.
Also, if this is pushed to the SNSs later on, there is a good chance that most of them end up with the team having more than 50% as well.
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This is a very reasonable position and I’m sure many will vote on this proposal with this concern in mind. If you don’t mind, I’d like to give a little more history about how we have already been in this position and how it was resolved by DFINITY. I wrote a medium article about it in May 2022.
At genesis, the Governance proposal topic was included in the All Topics catch all category AND all neurons were configured by default to follow ICA (neuron 28), which is controlled by DFINITY. Decisions on proposals were also made by Absolute Majority for the first 6 months after genesis. This meant that over 50% of total voting power in the NNS was required to vote to adopt in order for it to pass. If this threshold was not reached, then the proposal would always be rejected. It quickly became obvious that people were not voting manually on Governance proposals, so the only way that they could pass is if DFINITY voted. Since for the Governance topic DFINITY wanted the community to decide the vote, they were forced to wait until the final hours of the voting period and then cast a vote that matched the majority at the time.
This raised a lot of red flags of course, so then the Simple Majority voting mechanism was implemented. This new mechanism executes proposals based on majority of votes cast and only requires a minimum of 3% total voting power to vote to adopt in order for a proposal to execute. So by Nov 2021, DFINITY didn’t have to vote in order for Governance proposals to reach consensus and they actively abstained on all Governance proposals. They really had no choice because voting on any Governance proposal meant that they triggered the remainder of the voting power in the NNS (all 100% TVP). DFINITY did not vote on any Governance proposals at all between early Nov 2021 and late Feb 2022. This means that DFINITY had no voice in the outcome of those proposals.
So the solution to this problem that DFINITY created was to remove the Governance proposal topic from the All Topics catch all category and to increase the weight of Governance proposals compared to all other proposals. They also created the Register Known Neuron proposal topic specifically so the community could make themselves known as reliable Followee options. These changes were implemented by late Feb 2022. It drove a lot of people to start participating in NNS governance, which had a huge impact on the decentralization of the Governance proposal topic. The SNS & Neuron’s Fund proposal topic was implemented later and followed the same pattern as the Governance topic.
So if pessimistic assumptions on the impact of periodic confirmation turn out to be true and DFINITY gains more than 50% total voting power on the Governance and SNS & Neuron’s Fund topics, then all it will do is paralyze the voice that DFINITY has on these topics. They will most definitely be motivated to drive further change. Perhaps that will be for legal reasons. Or perhaps that is because they are among the biggest believers in decentralization.
I don’t believe that any SNS projects had default following set up for the team neuron. Hence, all following that exists for SNS project is already by active choice by the neuron owners. I’m not aware that this issue needs to be addressed on any SNS projects.
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I hope so.
Just in case we don’t want the codebases to diverge too much.
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too late for the original 8 year gang.
this is what delegating your NNS vote to a followee is supposed to be, which you want to change. no difference at all.
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Do you agree that what you quote as your concern is
- already the case in today’s design and
- would also be the case if we implemented a reset of following instead of the design proposed here?
Already today “a neuron which votes on all proposals on a given day will receive the pro-rata share in terms of total NNS voting power of the total daily available rewards.” (from the post you also quoted)
In particular, this total NNS voting power includes the sleepers’ voting power.
If you agree with this, are you then just saying that you think this aspect of the governance is not good?
If this is not really a distinguishing factor between the options we discuss here, I’d rather have a separate discussion on this. It seems to me that none of the options exclude changing this later if the NNS wishes to do so.
Delegating your NNS vote to a Followee does not in any way absolve you from the responsibility of making sure your own neuron is always participating in NNS governance. ICP is a governance token. We don’t get paid staking rewards by the NNS. We get paid voting rewards. If something changes because the NNS decides that the current design is not working as intended, it is up to you to change accordingly. When effort is made to get the word out about changes you cannot be absent or ignore the changes.
With WaterNeuron, when you stake ICP you get nICP, which is not a governance token. The ICP is deposited into a neuron that the WTN token holders control. Hence, your nICP earns staking rewards and has no voting responsibility.
Staking with the NNS and with WaterNeuron are fundamentally different.
I can relate to this as an 8 year gang member myself. It’s my largest investment in the internet computer ecosystem by far. However, we all knew when we decided to stake that staking alone is not enough to earn rewards. There are no staking rewards with ICP…there is only voting rewards. If you think you can set and forget your neuron and earn rewards indefinitely then you are at high risk of missing changes that require you to take additional action. The responsibility that you accept when you decide to stake ICP in the NNS is that you will govern the NNS. You will not get paid rewards for that activity if you don’t remain aware of changes that have been adopted by the NNS. The NNS governing body is responsible for making sure that the value of the governance rewards that are provided are maximized, so if there are holes in the system that are preventing optimal governance then it is well within the rights of NNS participants to make changes that help mitigate those problems. While there was not an alternative in the first 3 years that paid a return on staking alone, one exists now in the form of WaterNeuron.
Yes, this is the system we have today. Because the referenced change switched from “used NNS voting power” to “total NNS voting power” in the daily rewards calculation, sleeper neurons are currently diluting the rewards that are allocated to everyone who is actively participating in NNS governance.
Indeed I do believe that this referenced change was not good for governance (since it hasn’t been used to help advance decentralization in the ways described). However, I think taking the concern I have expressed into consideration now is fundamental for the implementation of the intent of the original periodic confirmation proposal. That proposal was adopted at a time when daily rewards were distributed to all voting power that voted, not to all voting power that existed. Even though the sleeper neurons are not getting rewards when they don’t vote today, they are diluting the rewards for people who do and they will continue doing so at a higher rate if this current design is implemented. People voted for this proposal knowing that the daily reward distribution is divided among all voting neurons. I believe that people voted for this proposal because they believe that sleeper neurons should not be diluting the voting rewards of active participants and they should not be the cause of spam (which was solved by reducing he proposal weight for Governance from 20x to 1x, not by the implementation of proposal 80970). You have a choice in how the voting rewards are distributed with this design and I believe choosing to implement it according to total voting power goes against the original intent of the periodic confirmation proposal.
If you were to distribute voting rewards based on the Adjusted Voting Power modification presented in this design, then implementation of this design would completely remove the problem of sleeper neurons and would get us back to the original reward distribution design. All voting rewards would be distributed to neurons that are actively participating in governance.
In the event that we are trying to lower inflation by continuing on this current design of distributing rewards based on total voting power instead of active voting power, then perhaps a more appropriate way of handling that would be to decreasing the size of the Voting Reward Function so the daily reward pie is smaller.
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@wpb makes a very good point. There’s a distinction between total potential voting power (that Wenzel is refering to above) and total adjusted voting power (based on activity/reconfirmation) in this design. If the adjusted voting power is what’s used for determining the outcome of the proposal, then surely adjusted voting power would also be the most appropriate way of determining the rewards for having voted on that proposal. I believe the implementation (in addition to how it needs to be described) would be simpler this way.
I’m not convinced there’s a need for drawing this distinction, unless it’s an intentional move to reduce inflation. I strongly agree that that should be handled separately and explicitly, if that is the intent.
Would you be able to clarify the reasons for drawing this distinction between total ‘potential’ and total ‘adjusted’ voting power (why not just use ‘adjusted’ vp in both cases)? This clarification would help me to understand this proposal a lot better
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yes, that’s why we set followees. i haven’t messed with my settings since 2021. that doesn’t mean i’m inactive. it’s just annoying to have people think we need a babysitter telling us to press some pointless button on a timer (which can apparently be automated around anyway).
that is true. the way you are punished if you’re not paying attention is if your followee stops voting. so, you have to keep an eye on things.
like i said before, if you’re trying to decentralize the voting power from following dfinity, a one-time reset / confirmation of followees is sufficient, unless i’m missing something. there is no need to repeat it every few months and waste everyone’s time.
Dubious speculation: The idea might be to move VP to WaterNeuron or a new canister currently being developed by some ex-Dfinity members, where you wouldn’t need to click.
I agree that doing it periodically doesn’t make much sense since it’s going to be programmed away.