I respectfully disagree.
This perspective focuses on governance rewards as a financial instrument, priotising the desire for a fixed-income asset. That’s not what governance tokens are about.
The sanctity of IC governance is what protects the entire network, and everyone’s stake. I think we should be pushing for NNS governance to be more like SNS governance.
When governance participation is low, of course it makes sense to increase rewards for those who participated (in a zero-sum fashion, such that the total rewards distributed remains stable relative to participation). This a self-stabilising supply and demand mechanism, significantly reducing the chances that participation ever drops too low. The lower the rate of participation, the more danger the network is in, and therefore the higher the financial incentive should be to participate.
The argument that voters should receive fixed voting rewards (even if they’re the only one voting) makes little to no sense. This makes rewards predictable for the individual (as opposed to for the network), and therefore more appealling to each individual? (even though it would equate to the minimum possible rewards under the alternative regime)
@aterga, why not look at making the NNS voting reward mechanism more like SNSs, if the goal is consistency. Recently related discussion → Periodic confirmation - design - #128 by Lorimer