No offense Diego, but I’m not sure what conclusion this is supposed to draw. I stated that it was an opportunistic scenario, and you’ve started your rebuttal by crediting the proposers, and then went on to make a blank statement like #2 (I’m assuming to discredit me in some way?). In regards to #3, I’d agree we’re all very capable, and competent enough to decide how we vote. However, on the NNS, that isn’t how it works, as a majority of voting power is delegated to Named Neurons, out of convenience, and to maximize rewards. So it doesn’t typically spark a true community-wide discussion, and the formation of opinions on proposals like you’ve mentioned - it comes down to what names neurons decide & agree with. I’d also agree that inspiration for proposals, from proposals, can be a great thing, but in this scenario, based off the fact that the treasury was mentioned in the spam proposal, it appears as though this was strategized, which feels almost ingenuine, if that makes sense? I strongly agree with #4, and hope we continue to have such a vocal, and evergrowing governance “table” going forward. In regards to #5, I agree with this, but it’s only applicable to those who follow the governance + forums. Which unfortunately only tends to be DFINITY, Developers, NN, and other dedicated governance participants (from what I see atleast, but to be fair I’ve got my fair share of forum catch-up to do). So if we wouldn’t have made such a big deal as we did about this scenario, most people wouldn’t have even known this proposal existed. However I think this just circles us right back into the decentralization of voting power issue though😅
I’d never call anyone so dedicated to the network foolish, and I hope you can appreciate the honesty in return❤️
If you got a sense that I tried to discredit you, then that is bad writing on my part. I just addressed directly the accusations that one proposal was created in bad faith to further another. If you meant something different, then I am the one who misunderstood your question.
I think that is very reasonable. To be honest, one take away I have is that I don’t think the “temperature check” really hit its intent because of many things you said. I frankly regret we (Dfinity) voted on it before communicating our intent, and I will certainly ask we think twice before voting on any more “temperature check” proposals.
This is where I think the proposers got “damned if you do, damned if you don’t.”
They linked to the forums because they wanted to be overt about their intent. Was that enough context for most voters? I’m not sure it was, despite their intent. Yet it was enough for the proposal’s scope to be called into question (should people interpret the proposal only or consider also the conversations linked?). No obvious answers everyone would agree to.
To be completely honest, I did not do my due diligence beyond reading the NNS Proposal & code, so maybe this is a personal responsibility thing. However, if it comes down to personal responsibility, it should also be the proposers’ to portray their intent within their proposal (which to be fair, they did in this situation via link, but maybe we need forum discussions on all governance proposals before proposing?). But I’d agree it’s really hard to define a scope , because while the intent (depicted through forums discussions) is relevant, the proposal itself is what’s passed through the NNS, so it will be hard to align people with a set of values, as Isaacs “Defining an Ethos for the NNS” shown.
I want to respond to point #2… I consider this to be a clear objective of theirs from the beginning.
If not, why would @skilesare mention his preference to use the “abandoned ICP” to create a treasury in the spam proposal (and several additional times). How can you present of funding a treasury with a proposal to create “abandoned ICP” if not premeditated?!
@wpb has also indicated his preference as well to use this ICP to create a treasury.
So I really don’t like the framing of this as some of us in the community are misinterpreting their explicit words.
If they aren’t linked then reduce inflation as a result of the change to voter-based rewards…do not allow tracking of “abandon ICP”…and create a separate proposal on minting ICP via higher inflation to fund a treasury.
@AndraGeorgescu your questions to Dfinity are certainly valid, there is a sense in the way the proposal was drafted that its true purpose might be a treasury fund. @skilesare provided an answer by way of a timeline check, but that was not apparent in the proposal draft.
My question to you is that I get the feeling, perhaps mistaken, that you are opposed to the idea of a treasury funded by ‘abandoned icp’. If this is the case, I would love to hear why, because @dfisher 's post on the treasury got few responses. As an admirer of Distrikt, your opinion matters a lot to me.
Being a supporter of such a treasury, and this part of the message is not addressed to @AndraGeorgescu specifically, I would like to get a sense of why people are opposed to it, and the messages on the forum so far have not provided that.
One clear negative response is that the proposed treasury would strengthen the hands of prominent named neurons, whose controllers would be able to direct funds as they pleased, perhaps indirectly to themselves. This is a powerful argument, if there are others it would be good to have them discussed.
I agree that named neurons would be disproportionately powerful in guiding a treasury. But if their guidance felt corrupt, would this not be exposed and they would lose followers and their power? It would take time, but followers would gradually switch to other named neurons and we already have a great selection of those.
Secondly, the treasury itself could be withdrawn if enough people felt it was being misused or was not offering enough gains and it would be better just to burn the abandoned ICP. After all, nothing is permanent on the IC.
@mechaquan
You and @AndraGeorgescu have asked umpteen million times on a wide variety of social media platforms what were intentions were behind details of the proposals and you have been given good faith explanations every time directly from the authors. Yet you refuse to listen and continue to pound on your own interpretation of intent. I feel like it has become impossible to have an intellectually honest conversation with either of you.
I would like to respectfully disagree. I have listened with a LOT of interest and attention. I have taken time and resources from distrikt to give to ICP governance in order to make sure I understand the situation to the best of my ability and the point of the matter is that all the questions I’ve asked Diego still stand. What answers I’ve received from the proposers have managed only to deepen the lack of trust and add to my worries about the future of ICP governance.
That being said I would like to reiterate that the questions I’ve raised in relation to this forum post are for @diegop. I wish to know the Dfinity foundation’s stance on this issue not Synapse’s stance(you’ve made your position clear and I thank you for that).
Also I believe that I am well within my rights to ask these questions of Dfinity.
Goodmorning Ser! Unfortunately, I’m caught up with IRL stuff atm, so I can’t answer as indepth as I’d like, but to name a few, but not all, of my main concerns;
a current problem has not been accurately defined, that constitutes the need for a treasury
-developers have access to grants, VCs, and soon the community fund. for-profits / non-profits should be routed to the appropriate source of funding, rather than trying to utilize network influence to create new sources of funding
there is no decentralized, responsible mechanic to manage a treasury. majority of VP% is centralized among a few NN. there is no kyc, and no responsibility. how do we ensure transparency of funds, and that people are held accountable? it seems premature to me.
i personally have an issue with it, because from my perspective, there is no way it was not premeditated to create “excess funds” via “abandoned ICP”, to have this discussion about a treasury, and provide an easy “out” in regards to where funding comes from.
But let’s not get too distracted with that last point.
a. Yes it is possible for the blockchain to host dapps or DAOs, each of which with their own governance system.
b. There is only one NNS so the NNS can only have one governance system. The NNS, among other things, is the DAO that controls the burning and minting of ICP tokens.
). In regards to #3, I’d agree we’re all very capable, and competent enough to decide how we vote. However, on the NNS, that isn’t how it works, as a majority of voting power is delegated to Named Neurons, out of convenience, and to maximize rewards. So it doesn’t typically spark a true community-wide discussion, and the formation of opinions on proposals like you’ve mentioned - it comes down to what names neurons decide & agree with. I’d also agree that inspiration for proposals, from proposals, can be a great thing, but in this scenario, based off the fact that the treasury was mentioned in the spam proposal, it appears as though this was strategized, which feels almost ingenuine, if that makes sense? I strongly agree with #4, and hope we continue to have such a vocal, and evergrowing governance “table” going forward. In regards to #5, I agree with this, but it’s only applicable to those who follow the governance + forums. Which unfortunately only tends to be DFINITY, Developers, NN, and other dedicated governance participants (from what I see atleast, but to be fair I’ve got my fair share of forum catch-up to do). So if we wouldn’t have made such a big deal as we did about this scenario, most people wouldn’t have even known this proposal existed. However I think this just circles us right back into the decentralization of voting power issue though😅