I believe there are some issues with the current SNS participation project:
Unreasonable token allocation. Based on the projects already launched on SNS, 51% of the tokens are initially held in the treasury, 10%+ go to the project team, and 10%+ go to the seed round. The specific amount raised in the seed round is generally not disclosed by the project team, and we are unsure if the seed round contributors are part of the team. Together, these portions amount to around 25%. Another 20%+ is allocated for SNS sales, and considering the community foundation’s participation of 50%, the participants end up with only about 10%+ of the tokens, with 1/5 unlocked immediately after the sale ends. This means that participants only hold approximately 8% of the voting power. At this point, the team and seed contributors likely control more than 50% of the voting power. Therefore, it’s normal to see situations where SNS governance proposals like HOT OR NOT can exceed 51% within 7 seconds.
Let’s calculate the cost borne by the team participating in SNS. Let’s assume Team A wants to conduct an SNS sale. Without considering the actual valuation of their project, the team decides to sell 20% of their tokens. The soft cap is 1 million ICP, and the hard cap is 2 million ICP. The community foundation participates with 50%, contributing 500,000 ICP. After some individual contributors from the community participate with several thousand ICP, Team A covers the remaining 400,000 ICP to reach the soft cap. At this point, the team holds absolute voting power. Let’s calculate the team’s expenses: a DAPP that isn’t widely used + 400,000 ICP = 1 million ICP. The return on investment exceeds 100%. Some might argue that the raised funds are in the treasury, so what can be done? There are already examples: 1. SNS1’s treasury funds transferred for voting. 2. Monthly or quarterly payments to the team for development funds. 3. The project needs to advertise and use consulting services for further development…
Once the participation ratio of the community foundation decreases, the project teams participating in SNS will carefully consider the valuation of their own projects and the proportion of primary token sales. After all, a decrease in returns can reduce the number of projects aiming to siphon ICP from the community fund.
The participation ratio of the community fund is crucial for the SNS project ecosystem. When the community fund’s involvement is substantial, project teams must be more transparent and responsible to ensure the project’s sustainable development and protect the interests of investors. Additionally, the participation of the community fund can reduce speculative behavior, as the community fund typically holds tokens for the project’s long-term value rather than short-term gains.
Reducing reliance on the community fund can also encourage project teams to focus more on innovating and developing their products rather than overly depending on fundraising. This approach may help filter out projects that lack genuine value and long-term potential, making the SNS ecosystem healthier and more sustainable.
It’s concerning to hear that the KINIC team has been actively proposing to pay themselves salaries after the SNS sale but hasn’t made any progress with the project so far.
it is unreasonable for BoomDao to plan to sell 600,000 to 800,000 ICP tokens and rely on the community fund to provide 320,000 ICP, given that the project has only been established for one month and has only a website displaying a link to a game project in the ICP ecosystem.
Moreover, it is also important to consider why the current transaction volume of projects participating in SNS is so low, and high valuations can easily lead to this situation. Except for SNS1, which can achieve 4-digit daily transaction volume, other projects rarely achieve a daily transaction volume of 100icp, and Kinic and Hot Or Not are even less than 10icp.
Therefore, this kind of sales plan is very unreasonable, and the proportion of community fund participation is too large, reaching 50%+ (afraid of dissatisfaction, since you are afraid of dissatisfaction, don’t engage in so much, insatiable), resulting in the proportion of community participation in voting governance is too low.It is recommended to reduce the participation ratio of sns community funds, respect the sales market, reasonable valuation, and fully allow community players to participate in governance.
It’s not like that! From what I can see, the developers are focused on building the project together with the community, and the payment of funds has taken place only once so far.
Rather than cutting the CF participation, we need a good screening process for projects to go for SNS. Neurons should vote no for useless projects.
Without CF no one will get funded here and a great chance for someone took over the DAO.