I think this is the case. I think the distinction between nICP and WTN is understood by those discussing this. What they’re getting at is that if you assume one person, or a united clique, own >50% of WTN SNS VP, then the VP of everyone else in that DAO will never ever make a difference on the NNS (even though that’s what they bought their WTN for if they are taking their role seriously, which they should be). As far as the vote on the NNS is concerned, your WTN VP will never make a single bit of difference. This is all true, if you’re to assume the premise.
Given that this is crypto, rather than trying to prove that the premise isn’t true / won’t become true (you can’t), the solution is to make the NNS VP that WaterNeuron triggers actually reliably representative of the WTN community (even in the event that the above premise is true) i.e. instead of a potential clique triggering 100% of WTNs NNS VP using only 51% of the SNS VP, they would only be able to trigger more or less 51% of WaterNeuron’s VP on the NNS.
This would significantly reduce the potential attack vector that WaterNeuron has the potential introduce to the NNS. This would therefore mean that WaterNeuron could be trusted with more VP before the NNS would potentially need to take an interventionary course of action (ideally this would never be needed).
There is therefore every reason to address this issue (for security, as well as for WTN’s potential for long term success and investor returns). The only reason to avoid addressing this is the technical complexity. I’ve had some thoughts about that and plan to post something on a related thread later.
In the meantime, I think it would help for everyone to at least agree that there’s an issue. The WTN dev team have already acknowledged that there’s potential for improvement in this area.
Let’s see if we can get on the same page.