Maybe so. I always understood there to be a distinction between topics for community consideration and a draft proposal. Not really a big deal but it helps me frame my thoughts when responding. I’ll try to be more flexible going forward
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Additionally democracy doesnt mean everyone happy but equal opportunities.
NNS is ugly or I dont like the blue button and set proposal to change it in pink is pure depreciation of IC.
Reputation of IC, democracy are clearly defined by laws governing behaviors and actions.
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I think the real problem here is that anyone can create a proposal. As the nns grows there will always be bad actors that exploit this.
I always imagined the evolution of the NNS into a complex government entity.
People campaign for you to delegate your votes to them and then they will work full time creating bills and voting on new changes. In this vision we normal people aren’t proposing new governance votes. We need to submit our votes to said elected government officials.
So I propose the long term fix is to create a position like a congress of people that love ICP and their job is to sponsor bills.
I would argue it should be people with a lot of followees but we don’t have enough of those… maybe we need to increase the amount of people we follow and these groups sponsor bills.
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Read up on Swiss democracy (I’ve lived in Switzerland for some years now). You may change your mind.
Yes, there are good reasons to have elected representatives (particularly in the real world) but there’s no good reason to always have to go through them.
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With the current rewards system, how many ICP must be staked in a neuron in order for that neuron to receive 2 ICP for voting on one governance proposal? If this is even a possibility, spam proposals will never go away as long as governance votes are given more weight. I was OK with removing Dfinity and ICA as followees on governance topics as a move to more decentralization but really didn’t see the need for higher reward weighting.
Dfinity didn’t vote on most proposals after the Simple Majority voting mechanism was implemented late 3Q 2021. There were a lot of governance proposals that had only 5-8% of total voting power cast. It wasn’t until the proposal weights were implemented that people started making sure they were voting and now we are at 45% participation. Proposal weights are the mechanism that caused an increase in voter participation.
The reason spam proposals are attractive to some people is because over half the voting power is not intentionally participating in governance as the system is designed. The basic idea behind the proposal as currently presented is that removing default following for All Topics Except Governance will remove the root cause of why spam proposals are attractive.
Voter participation just meaning that people adjusted their follower settings to someone other than Dfinity correct? I admit that some people vote manually but there is no way to measure that and I’d argue most vote passively.
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I think a 5 ICP proposal cost makes sense in our environment today, but I would want to build into the language of the proposal a mechanism for reverting it back to 1 ICP in the future. I think there are valid reasons for not wanting to solve this problem with proposal cost increases alone, but it makes sense as a temporary solution. What do you think? What would be the conditions in which the cost should be reverted? Or do you think 5 ICP should be a permanent solution?
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I definitely don’t think it should be permanent. I always assumed it would be a setting that is adjusted on an as-needed basis. At least that’s how I interpreted the NNS documentation at Genesis.
I think we’ve seen plenty of evidence to suggest that 1 ICP is too cheap. Going to 5 ICP seems like a good first step and we can monitor the outcome. If it’s effective we can leave it be until the day ICP market cap rises and we recognize the need to lower the cost.
Edit: fwiw - I am in favor of coming up with a better long-term solution (excluding the resetting of neurons). But I think we have levers we can pull today to deter this sort of negative behavior
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I think that the network is young, and we are dealing with bootstrapping a voter base. The different types of proposals are not any more or less important to each other, imho. So the weighting should be severely adjusted. If we implemented a minimum threshold (3%, or whatever) of manual votes before a proposal becomes “valid,” and we have less weighting to the governance proposals (lower incentive for spam), we could capture real change, with less active participation. The participation is what was not functioning prior to the “shocking” change to the follows and weights.
Can I say, as an aside, that thinking through all of this with you all is TOUGH AS HELL! And simply going through all of this, with an intent to make the system better, deserves kudos across the board. Thank you all for your contributions.
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NNS Motion costs only 1 ICP, and if it passes, 1 ICP will be refunded, so the adapted motion(s) has no cost at all! There should be a cost to bringing a motion. Perhaps if it fails 2 ICP and passes 1 ICP or flat fees pass or fail, and I think that is even better. Bringing a motion should be another way of burning ICP
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Can we just stipulate that it’s always worth $200 to make a governance poll and the icp is updated once a week. So the amount of icp is variable to market conditions.
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Proposal cost in cycles, paid in ICP. I love it. (Burn baby, burn!)
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Very insightful analysis! Thanks for taking the initiative!
I actually think this one is the best solution, maybe with a tweak that nullify any proposal that doesn’t meet 3% overall participation (or 6%?, anyway some sensible number).
As community leaders, named neurons should take an active step in dealing with spams. So they will all abstain if it is clearly a spam, which saves everybody’s time.
If a topic manages to get above 3% without any named neuron’s participation, it means we have large enough a crowd who bothered to vote manually, or we have an “unamed” neuron that is also a “community leader”. In either case, it says that enough voting power don’t think the topic is a spam, so perhaps it really isn’t?
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I have a substack article coming out later today on this topic. There’s about 49M in voting happening through manual votes.
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What percentage is this?
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Truer words have never been spoken. It’s an honor to be part of this messy process knowing that in the end we are building the most resilient DAO in the world.
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Your criticism is harsh, but right on the nail. I know some seed investors who are not “technical” enough to use command line, and do not have a hot key setup to vote manually. They are already missing out in governance voting rewards, and it would be really unfair that they are banished from getting any rewards at all.
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Nice, I look forward to reading it. Do you intend to explain how you distinguish between manual and passive voting?
Thinking about “rewards” I had this thought stream:
- We want ICP to be a governance token, NOT A SECURITY!
- Seed INVESTORS see this as an INVESTMENT (not active participation) ← That makes ICP a security
- Seed investors are not active voters (if they were, we would call them voters, not investors)
- Seed investors made their money on the value increase in ICP, NOT ON GOVERNANCE REWARDS!
- Governance rewards are not intended to be investment rewards, SEED INVESTORS DO NOT DESERVE THESE, they aren’t contributing to governance!
I LOATHE the consistent discussion about how to “protect” investors. Don’t. They can fend for themselves. I’m NOT empathic towards people who want their money to earn them money for doing nothing. Value must be proven. The seed investors earned their rewards, ICP is more than $0.07. If they want rewards from voting, THEN MAKE THEM VOTE!
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