Request for feedback: Compounding Maturity Proposal

there is no secret cartel of whales…

you’re just doing that whole concern troll / destabilize / divide and conquer crap. Stop it!

There definitely is, most of the supply is held by VC who spent a lot of money on ICP at prices retail buyers never seen, the same whales are now staking those absurd amount of tokens for 8 years and increasing their voting power thanks to maturity and age bonus and if (when?) this proposal passes they’ll stack even more cause maturity won’t be taxed. I think the recent governance proposals showed quite clearly we need people parties and some form of quadratic voting asap, otherwise the NNS will just be a farce where a few holders and Dfinity are the ones who actually decide.

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How is that different than any other staking system?

the major difference is they don’t change the rule while investors are locked in.

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Borovan, in the ICDevs vote discussion, (where I was on the same side as the whales) a spokesperson for large stakeholders literally wrote on this forum in the first person plural, speaking on behalf of a bunch of whales. And the posts were clearly from someone deeply knowledgable, a long-time insider.
JaMarco, about how Dfinity’s staking system is different, I have explained it before, but here goes once more. At genesis a number of blockchains have been dominated by a few large holders. But these holders have been incentivized to sell when prices are high. There is no 8 year lock-in with huge rewards on offer in any other system. As a result, no entrenched oligopoly has persisted in a major L1 token.
I understand that it is difficult to distinguish supporters of a system who are criticising particular aspects of it from those who, as Borovan says, are concern trolling with an intent to destabilize. I have tried to keep my posts substantive, but recognise that they did grow angry at times. I was frustrated with the way Dfinity approached the Mario issue and now this one. Anyway, I have now reached a definitive conclusion, which is not to put too much more energy or resources into ICP. I will hold on to the stake I already have, and shift to being a passive observer from here on in.

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Oh yeah, that cartel of whales. I remember now!

Legitimate question here…
This proposal will pass. This means the majority of voting power believe maturity is not taxable. And the new system will not increase the ICP supply. I respect that.
In that case, why don’t we increase the rewards to 25 or 30% of actual supply instead of the 10 to 5% over 8 years as we have now?
99% of the rewards will be only maturity wich seems to be a non tangible asset.
99% of investors will not (most probably never) claim the maturity to avoid paying tax
This maturity will not increase the ICP supply

I am asking… what would be the downside of this?

@dominicwilliams @jwiegley Curious to have your opinion on this.

When are you saying our rewards will be nerfed up to 10 to 5%?

as indicated here

I have been going off the 21% 8 year neuron factor from the governance tab, i know it will drop over the years but how do you factor that in with the circulation numbers and are you saying this proposal has chopped our rewards down even more?

1- As per the link, the total rewards will decrease over the next 7 years to reach 5% of the supply. We are at about 9% now. That was planned.

2- With this proposal: There are more then 28 millions ICP still inform of maturity that were not mint, thus not staked and not rewarded. With this proposal, those maturity will now be part of the shared rewards. So, soon as implemented, those maturity holders will certainly stake their maturity and expect an important drop of your rewards. I, personally, expect a 25 to 35 % decrease. I may be off though. We will see but an important drop will happen for sure.
No surprise if your 21% is dropping to 15% or so.

his is not political democracy. This is financial democracy, where those who have more economic interests within the system have more voting power than those who only have a few cents. Because if you have more to lose you should have more voting power.

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That circulation chart is buggy as hell for me, i feel lost trying to balance these two tabs so right now we are at 9% according to the chart how does that then equal 21% for 8 year neurons

Oooofff 15% another massive blow down from 28% if true

You are at 21% for many reasons. Not all ICP are staked and those staked ICP are not all in 8 years. So the 8 years have more share rewards. This explain why you have 21% while the rewards supply is 9%.
The downgrade from 21% to 15 % is only my assumption and I hope to be wrong. It will depend how many of these 28 millions ICP in maturity holders will decide to stake. But it is obvious to me that this proposal was to include them in the reward pie, without having to mint the maturity. So this is why I expect them to stake their maturity and we should see quiet a drop. The near future will let us know for sure.

Ah cool gotcha well needless to say a lot of people will be for your rewards boosting idea should we have another massive drop down

What would be the reason to increase the incentive? Since that maturity could be converted to ICP – it’s not foreknown that everyone would re-stake it – such an increase in rewards could dramatically increase ICP inflation.

The downside to increasing the total voting reward supply is that ICP will eventually be minted. I don’t think we need to change the voting reward supply. I only want to see proposals that can incentivize people to reduce the sell pressure of ICP into the open market and that can reduce the uncertainty of so much undispersed maturity. I don’t mind tokenomics changes that incentivize increases in governance participation by changing how voting rewards are divided up, but I’m generally opposed to ideas that inflate ICP supply.

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Bill From ‘Bitcoin Senator’ Lummis Would Alter Capital Gains Landscape for Crypto

The Responsible Financial Innovation Act

The bill would clarify that capital gains don’t apply to “productive” activities such as mining or staking because you’re not getting rid of the asset. Mining refers to using computing power to help secure a blockchain network and potentially earn crypto as a reward. Staking refers to dedicating your crypto to a network to increase security and earn passive income.

“The current gray area is that you might be accruing a capital gains taxable event under proof of stake as it stands right now, even if you’re just delegating,” said Lindholm.

Some simpler proposals for tax optimisation:

  1. Prefer capital gains to income. Reduce the base level NNS rewards thus reducing income but increasing likelihood of capital gain as overall issuance is reduced.

  2. Reward voting with “stock options” not free ICP or maturity Do not reward NNS neurons with maturity, ICP or anything directly convertible to ICP but with options at some nominal value payable in cycles (e.g. $0.01) that can be optionally exercised after some vesting period. (No tax is paid by either the option holder when options are granted (and even vested), but when the options are exercised, the option holder will be subject to Income Tax and NICs on the difference in price between the “strike price” and the actual market value of the shares at that time)

(Edit won’t work this only applies to employees)

  1. Remove the maturity variable,Instead just keep the voting record.
    Some options for converting to ICP are:
    (a) Neurons should be able to prune their voting record and be rewarded by the protocol with ICP for the act of pruning it. (Reward is for the act of pruning not the act of voting)
    (b) Neurons should be able to request that their voting record be pruned and replaced with ICP reward and this should be subject to a vote. (Reward is subject to discretionary vote like KYC proposal or discretionary bonus or enmass dividend)
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Unless it’s a one-way opt-in right? It would make me feel a lot better if we allowed people to opt-in per neuron. As long as you can’t opt out after the decision, why would that hurt the tax arguments?

Considering this is a major breaking change in a complex dynamic system, perhaps there’s an engineering process argument for not introducing a breaking change into the system when it isn’t necessary.

Let’s allow others the option of making their own tax determinations instead of deciding it for everyone.

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