Here are some initial thoughts on this (which would need to be confirmed with the engineering team)
Currently, the function distribute_rewards records only the actually distributed rewards (in the variable actually_distributed_e8s_equivalent).
In order to allow the tracking of how much maturity was allocated we could in future calculate the ratio A defined by A = (actually distributed rewards / total available rewards) and also store A in the reward event populated by the function distribute_rewards.
In order to provide this information to the IC dashboard we would need to expose the ratio A also in the function encode_metrics in nns/governance/canister/canister.rs. (In addition I would need to discuss & review with the dashboard team on how exactly to display this ratio).
To my understanding this seems to address the tracking requirement proposed in this motion proposal.
Good proposal, but devs already have access to funds in the way of grants, (soon) the community fund/sns, donations, ordinary voting rewards, venture capital, etc, why is another treasury needed?
Would it not be better to burn the excess icp? This would benefit everyone.
They have delayed the rollout of some features in order to try preventing a neuron market from emerging. I had thought it was a foregone conclusion it would happen, but I guess not. Check out the last comment by Lara Schmid in this thread:
A simple solution for treasury is to make mandatory do merge/spawn maturity at least once per 6 or 12 month, announcement will have to be on top of the forum or other platform like DSCVR, after that maturity over that period can go in a treasury. With this we will not have dormant neuron and we will know if a neuron is abandoned. Also treasury spending will have to be by a proposal on NNS,
I think is time to start a separate topic for Treasury and see how people think about that.
We should use Quadratic Voting mechanism described in the book âRadical Markets: Uprooting Capitalism and Democracy for a Just Societyâ to optimize voting power.
One-person-one-vote gave majorities the power to tyrannize minorities. NNS should give the power who really care about their rights
One-person-one-vote is not the TRUE democracy, it stops compromise among groups of people and leads to wild swings of power between ideological blocs.
So I think voting power based on Quadratic lock year should be a reasonable solution.
Hi all,
FYI, here is a short update on the implementation progress of this motion proposal:
We have now an implementation in the NNS - backend covering
The reward change itself (as per code snippet above) and additional/adjusted test cases
Setting governance reward weights from 1 to 20
Exposing total available rewards, actually distributed rewards and the ratio between the two as metric. (the idea is to show actually distributed maturity and the ratio on the IC dashboard).
This is now undergoing review and some further testing. I will keep you updated.
Very good days!
This proposal would have a better impact if the icp that is not distributed is burned. It is not the same to say that it is not distributed, to say that more tokens are burned⌠it has a much greater impact when someone reads it or for a marketing issue⌠we need to be able to communicate that these ideas are not going to generate more inflation. This is achieved if tenths that are going to burn the tokens that are not distributed. Thank you!!
@bjoernek Iâm not sure I understand your recent update. The proposal suggests that we could consider raising the governance proposal weighting back to 20, but your comment leads me to believe this is already being worked at DFINITY?
Is my interpretation of your update correct, or is this not set in stone yet?
If you look at the motion text the increase to 20 was in it:
Vote Accept to:
Convert from system-based rewards to voter-based rewards
Change the weight of governance proposals back to 20.
Keep track of âabandonedâ ICP as a governance-tracked variable.
So the motion text did not match the text provided in this forum? That really doesnât help the case about this proposal being unclear.
Edit : I see now that an updated proposal text was provided in the comments.
I am going to adopt a policy of rejecting any proposal that includes multiple changes lumped together like this. I didnât like it with the maturity proposal and this has cemented it for me.
I recommend we reconsider implementing the gov weighting.
I understand your point of view⌠But you have to think that currently itâs a plus if people see more tokens being burned⌠also, itâs not open to using those ICPs for other uses
(there were people who gave proposals to use those icp for other reasons). They burn and go. Thank you and sorry if I donât add something positive to my commentâŚ
given some discussions in this forum and also on Twitter, I thought it would be useful to add a few comments as per my understanding of this proposal on spam prevention
The proposal has three components
Adjusting the reward allocation scheme: allocate voting rewards under the assumption that neurons vote on everything.
Reward weights: Setting the reward weight for governance proposals back to 20
Tracking: Track how many voting rewards are allocated on a given day vs the total available rewards.
For the last point on tracking, as mentioned above, this could be done by showing on the IC dashboard actually distributed voting rewards and the ratio of distributed vs total available voting rewards on a daily basis.
In particular, this does not mean that the unallocated voting rewards would go anywhere (e.g. in an account or a fund). It simply creates transparency of how much of the daily available rewards, as defined by the total reward function and the total supply, is allocated.
I hope this is helpful and please let me know in case you have any questions!
better impact if the icp that is not distributed is burned.