ReProposal: Spam Prevention - Convert from system-based rewards to voter based rewards

I agree/ will vote yes on this proposal. I am especially grateful for the note mentioned above. Thank you for the clarification.

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I am all for it to fund projects as long as the project present a credible revenue plan and show it will be profitable at some point. We need to understand all the treasory, soon as distributed to support a project, will come back on the market and put pressure down on ICP price. Some project may easily abuse and create themselves good paying jobs without any intention of results.

We already have community funds for new projects. I would only not mint any of these extra tokens and reduce inflation. By increasing ICP price, the community fund create extra value as well.

I like the proposal especially the NNS treasury part, It’s very important to incentive people involve governance.

People’s participation in NNS governance is now suppressed since there is no reward but punishment(currently is 10 ICP, maybe be increased in future).

Based on fairness, the initiating neuron whose NNS proposal is approved should receive reward from the NNS treasury.

Yes, fully agree. Designing and implementing such a treasury would be a big undertaking. As far as this proposal goes and as highlighted by @skilesare the first step would be to track how many voting rewards are allocated vs not-allocated.

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We have set up Neuron 17762192467656896776 to make the proposal for** https://forum.dfinity.org/t/reproposal-spam-prevention-convert-from-system-based-rewards-to-voter-based-rewards/15352**. You can fund it by sending ICP to 7dc178d1ef3b65e5499dffcf58c913a94dde53d0b23b017af3160f72cd3cbf26

I plan to make the proposal on Friday provided we get the 10 ICP.

Please retweet for attention: https://twitter.com/ICDevs_org/status/1570045572588994560
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I had received 10 ICP recently and decided to pay it forward. Please continue with your proposal :+1:

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@bjoernek
@skilesare
The proposal looks really promising.

One point here what should be reconsidered:
allocating of un-distributed rewards to an NNS treasury

The treasure is a possibility of other staker to participate in future products.

it makes to me more sense if the un-distributed rewards would be burned instead of feeding the inflation “monster”

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Thank you @skilesare and thank you @LightningLad91 ! Appreciate you guys.

Austin, do you intend on coding this up yourself or do you need to rely on Dfinity to implement it if it is approved? Either way, you have a sense for how complicated it is to implement?

As a non-dev i don’t know the inner workings on actual code changes that are pushed to the NNS. Does Dfinity code up ALL the changes or are some code changes community proposed?

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You don’t need to worry about this issue for this proposal. We’ll address the NNS treasury idea at a later date

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The proposal point to specific code changes and dfinity has advised me that they think the changes are the fastest executable path that has been proposed. It would be phenomenal if a community member belted out a pull request for them, but realistically I think dfinity knows what needs to be done and will tee it up quickly.

If I knew rust better I’d attempt it. I have built this similar functionality in the origyn governance canister which is where I got the idea.

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Hi all,
FYI, here is the code change required to implement this proposal (h/t to @johan for providing this).

Within rs/nns/governance/src/governance.rs and within the function distribute_rewards only the following few lines need to change (in addition there is some work for adjusting several test cases)

I am not sure if the actual code changes are also discussed in this forum. For this example I found it insightful to share, because it underlines how practical the proposal is.

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What code is necessary to track and allocate unused_voting_right each day in a way that it can be dispensed into an NNS treasury? I think we should be able to query this information from the governance canister. I don’t want the governance rewards from unused_voting_right to disappear. It should be retained so it can be allocated if a NNS treasury is adopted.

I will do some research later if needed, but there was an account set up where unclaimed ICP from genesis neurons were to be deposited automatically after a period of time. I think DFINITY passed a governance proposal that enabled this action to be bypassed so genesis neurons had more time to claim, but the idea was important because it would have prevented unclaimed neurons from continuing to receive voting rewards and contributing voting power as a default follower of DFINITY. I think we should deposit governance rewards from unused_voting_right in a similar way.

The proposal is live: Internet Computer Network Status

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I actually rejected this proposal for selfish reasons. I actually follow ICP Maximilist for voting but, I actually log on and vote every single day myself and I like that I, theoretically, I get rewarded more than somebody who doesn’t vote or votes less. Even though I voted this way, I am totally open to what the smartest thing for the project actually is. But, at the same time, I would like to earn the maximum voting rewards possible as an active participator and as an 8yeargang (staked 8 yrs, 8 yr dissolve delay with no plans to ever pressing “start dissolve”), I am in this for the long haul and don’t mind that we are inflationary now as, I know that eventually (within the next 2 years more or less…just my guess) as more and more dapps are created and used more and more that we will eventually be deflationary on a major scale. My thinking anyway. I think i’m right but, again, I am totally open to the smartest thing for the project. I would also be happy with the current proposal if those overflow rewards are used for Advertising the ICP project which would theoretically help in increasing the ICP price, hence, we all benefit from that.

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At the current time, you are not rewarded more than someone who doesn’t vote. This proposal makes it so that you would be rewarded more. Perhaps this was unclear in the description…if so, please let me know 1. What made you think you currently get rewarded more than someone who doesn’t vote and 2. what made you think this proposal would reward everyone the same.

I guess I read it wrong. I thought that any “extra” rewards of non-voters are distributed among the voters and that the proposal aimed to put those rewards aside as opposed to dividing them among the voters?

That was the case when we had the weight of governance proposals up at 20, but that was reduced to 1 a few weeks ago…this proposal is set up to make it so that we can weigh those governance proposals highly again and give rewards to those that vote 100% of the time.

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Gotcha. Thanks for the clarification.

This may be off-topic, however, with @KennyBoyNYC graciously admitting that they read the proposal wrong. I started re-visiting the idea of possibly having a way to uncast/ re-cast your vote within the 3-4 day period governance proposals are open, if by chance you misread, or perhaps someone’s phone has a screen malfunction and it “freaks out” and selects one for you (this is mainly speaking to phones on the brink).

Again, I apologize if this diverts the topic. I just felt this was a good example, of an honest mistake, that could be fixed/ would be a nice addition.

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Thanks for the notice and kind words and, I agree with your suggestion and would be great if there was a way to change ones vote during the voting period/before the final vote is executed. Im sure its a time consuming task, as most things are, for a programmer to code that update and, i think that thats a great idea and i would vote for it but i think there are more pressing things to spend time on at the moment. Maybe in a year or so but, rethinking it, that would be an important update to make right away as, theoretically, if a major whale or material amount of people voted in error on something of significance that we should be able to change the vote diring the voting period.

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