Thank you for starting this discussion on how a decrease in the minimum dissolve delay to receive voting rewards can attract new participants to NNS governance. I agree with that hypothesis, but needed time to study the proposal and model the changes before I wanted to comment. During that review, I concluded that there may be a better way to make the change that I’d appreciate if you will consider. I have documented it in the medium article linked below because it is too much information for a forum post. The article contains a link to a Google Sheets document that I shared that enables you to test the full model, check it for accuracy, and challenge assumptions.
I can definitely support tokenomics changes that lower the minimum dissolve delay to receive voting rewards. However, I want to do it in a way that also makes it more attractive to stake long term and mitigates an increased security risk from enabling voting participation from stakers that are not committed for the long term. I believe the modeling data presented in this article shows that a more holistic approach to these tokenomics changes can be achieve by two simple changes to our current tokenomics: decrease the minimum dissolve delay to receive voting rewards from 6 months to 1 month AND increase the maximum dissolve delay bonus to from 2x to 3.5x. These parameters seem to make it more attractive for very short term staking and for very long term staking.
I look forward to learning what you think about this alternate suggestion.