Off topic for this thread, but why do you say a compromised Internet Identity is “game over” when using a hardware wallet? If using a hardware wallet, performing ICP operations requires the hardware wallet.
True but I’d still lose access to my ICPs cause the attacker can remove the wallet and revoke access to my II
would you lose access to ICP? What is to prevent you from creating a new II and attaching the hardware wallet there?
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I don’t buy NFT because they are not artistic, I am sure the engineers couldn’t do any worse!
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@kvic utilities nft is the future/ just look at the success of uniswap V3
Sure, it’s not me to decide that, people have many talents and sometimes surprising hobbies.
And I’m sure that a NFT from @dominicwilliams or @Jan would be very popular!
The proposal will get enacted only after taking adequate feedback from community and changes as per discussion.
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That’s Rejected for me
Any comment on possibly limiting this to nom-governance proposals?
Thank you for starting this discussion on how a decrease in the minimum dissolve delay to receive voting rewards can attract new participants to NNS governance. I agree with that hypothesis, but needed time to study the proposal and model the changes before I wanted to comment. During that review, I concluded that there may be a better way to make the change that I’d appreciate if you will consider. I have documented it in the medium article linked below because it is too much information for a forum post. The article contains a link to a Google Sheets document that I shared that enables you to test the full model, check it for accuracy, and challenge assumptions.
I can definitely support tokenomics changes that lower the minimum dissolve delay to receive voting rewards. However, I want to do it in a way that also makes it more attractive to stake long term and mitigates an increased security risk from enabling voting participation from stakers that are not committed for the long term. I believe the modeling data presented in this article shows that a more holistic approach to these tokenomics changes can be achieve by two simple changes to our current tokenomics: decrease the minimum dissolve delay to receive voting rewards from 6 months to 1 month AND increase the maximum dissolve delay bonus to from 2x to 3.5x. These parameters seem to make it more attractive for very short term staking and for very long term staking.
I look forward to learning what you think about this alternate suggestion.
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Wenzel, how would you feel about the reduction in APY / VP that arose from providing a steep curve to short term stakers between 0-6 months to NOT come pro rata across the curve but rather just reduce the starting point of 6 month stakers?
I believe that would solve your issue of unfairly penalizing long term stakers for the benefit of short term stakers. It would add in a steep curve between 0 and 6 months and marginally steepen the curve between 6 months and 8 years
Drawbacks will be added in the next version of the post.
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The current proposal requires developer time as also the shape of the curve changes.
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Thanks for this proposal @wpb, especially appreciate your sheets with all the numbers.
I would prefer to keep proposals as small as can be. Could you not have two separate proposals, one for reducing the min voting dissolve delay, and one for changing the max dissolve delay bonus? I think keeping the dissolve delay bonus linear while lowering the min voting dissolve delay is appealing, but I don’t think we should increase the max dissolve delay bonus and incentive 8y neurons even more than we already do today.
The part wrt 51% attacks in your blog post i believe is not exactly right. If you want to do a 51% attack on governance, you would use 8 year neurons, because if you can fully take over control, you could unlock your tokens anyway via a proposal. By boosting the max dissolve delay bonus, you increase the power for 8y neurons, and therefore make it cheaper to do a 51% attack on governance (but i still don’t see it as a realistic threat).
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Changing tokenomics (reward vs dissolve delay curve) destroys the assumptions we used to choose a particular dissolve delay. So If we change it, maybe we should also allow changing the dissolve delays of our neurons?
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I wouldn’t want to implement this change as two separate proposals. In order to add staking options at the low end of the dissolve delay spectrum, I think we need to incentivize the high end of the dissolve delay spectrum. While they could be separate proposals, I wouldn’t want one getting implemented and not the other because that would not meet the objective of the OP. I believe it is a very simple change to constants in a few lines of code and requires no new code, so it seems it could be a quick and easy proposal to implement.
I agree with your point about the 51% attack vector. I only felt the need to say something about it because it is sometimes used as an argument against lowering the min dissolve delay. I just wanted to preemptively put data behind a response that lower DD is not a security risk with either of these proposals.
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I’m not opposed to someone using the models to test different hypothesis and come up with additional suggestions. The AltProp that I documented in the article is what I came up with as the best solution to meet the objectives of the OP during my analysis, but there could be other good solutions. This forum topic is a proposal by @nikhil.ranjan, so any actionable ideas that are suggested need to convince him to change specific details of his proposal.
I think a shorter term staking option is a reasonable idea to incentivize more people to participate in IC governance, but the returns need to be attractive enough for people to participate. I’m not sure 1.7% for 1 month accomplishes that goal, but 6.4% has a better chance of success.
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I thought the entire idea behind the NR proposal was expressly not to provide meaningful rewards to short term stakers (less than 6 months).
Rather, the intent was to provide a “taster” of governance such that they learn how it works and stake for longer. It’s buy before you try. One risk with your proposal is that we may have a bunch of folks who actually stake for 1 month.
You’ve mentioned that low rewards won’t be very good (1.7% for a month) but that’s actually the point. It’s not an unintended consequence. It’s just a way for folks to tinker with governance.
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I invested into the NNS stake protocol because I read a about this article: Internet Computer price today, ICP to USD live, marketcap and chart | CoinMarketCap
May 1, 2022 - Staked, so I am a newbie and lots to understand.
While I believe other parts of ICP seem to be moving forward and making contributions to further this project I have been very disappointed with Governance.
Governance has given followers a bad name that they should be penalised for not actually voting but the only proposal being put up are system team updates that only need to be followed anyway.
Other than Governance calling me a name and wanting to take away my rewards for themself I also see a pattern for lowering other standards that were put in place and it’s more about how to further reward themselves while claiming to make more newbies find staking their investment in the NNS more attractive.
Reality is that no one is investing in anything at the moment, check out the stock market, war, disease and the main thing is the colossal debt racked up by most governments around the world.
This is the perfect time to be staked in this project.
I propose that the followers of the NNS invest further funds to their stake for the future of this project, as I will, wait out this period of fear and the desperation that comes from it, vote NO.
We need an easy to use wallet and easy to use staking to attract people that don’t want to learn how to use nns. at the moment binnance use fund only for shorting ICP.