# Increase Proposal Rejection Cost

I want to suggest a unifying reward formula for proposal adoption/rejection:
Proposal Reward = (Adopt% - Reject%) * 10 ICP.
That is, if Adopt gets x% of the total voting power and Reject gets y% of the total voting power, then the proposer should receive (x% - y%) * 10 ICP as rewards, which may be either positive or negative.

1. The simple majority rule should be applied here. Requirement of at least 3% of the total voting power is unnecessary (To see this point, you should deeply understand the principle of neutrality). The absolute majority rule is also unnecessary (It ignores the significance of abstention). Someone would say that x% - y% = 0.001% means nothing, but I totally disagree: Every vote counts. In reality, we may need a minimum requirement, but that is only because counting errors may exist. Obviously, in NNS, no counting errors can exist.
(According to modern social choice theory, there are no best voting rules because of Arrow’s impossibility theorem. But in NNS, the simple majority rule is indeed perfect: it satisfies anonymity, neutrality, Pareto principle, and positive responsiveness, and there are only two alternatives (adoption and rejection), implying that Arrow’s impossibility theorem does not apply anymore.)

2. If x% - y% > 0, then your proposal is good and should be rewarded with (x% - y%)* 10 ICP; if x% - y% < 0, then your proposal is bad and should be punished with (x% - y%)* 10 ICP. I feel very strange that the adopted proposals are not rewarded. This seems very unfair to those people who submitted so many good proposals. I think it is obviously a good way of incentivizing people to submit good proposals to improve ICP’s governance. (See my another thread: The Declaration of an ICP Hodler)