One of ICP’s core value propositions is eliminating reliance on centralized trust — yet accessing canisters through icp0.io or ic0.app still depends on DNS, ICANN, and CA-signed certificates. This feels like a meaningful gap in the decentralization story at the last mile.
Tor’s .onion addresses are self-authenticating — the address is derived from the service’s public key, so no CA or DNS resolution is needed to establish trust. This aligns well with how ICP already handles identity and response certification internally.
A boundary node exposing an .onion address alongside its existing HTTPS endpoint seems like a relatively low-friction improvement. The onion address could even be published on-chain, letting clients verify it without trusting DNS at all. ICP’s existing response certification would still layer on top, giving both transport-level and application-level cryptographic guarantees.
Has this been explored? Are there protocol or infrastructure reasons it hasn’t been pursued? Curious whether the community or DFINITY has thoughts on this, especially given growing interest in censorship-resistant access to on-chain applications.