Hello ICP Family,
As we refine the tokenomics and governance framework for Doxa, we are tackling a classic Web3 dilemma: How do we incentivize active, long-term governance participation without introducing inflationary token minting that dilutes early holders?
Our current configuration establishes a hard-capped genesis supply of 10,000,000 DOXA with a baseline native SNS reward rate of 0%. While this protects the token from inflationary dilution, a strict 0% native reward rate can lead to voter apathy over time if governance participants have no passive yield incentive.
To solve this without breaking our hard-cap guarantee, we are exploring a Treasury Streaming Architecture utilizing a portion of our 10% Discretionary Governance Reserve. We want to hear your thoughts, feedback, and critical insights on this approach before finalizing the implementation.
The Proposed Model: Treasury Streaming vs. Native Inflation
Instead of turning on native SNS minting (which continuously creates new tokens out of thin air), we are proposing an auxiliary smart-contract streaming pipeline:
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The Source: A designated portion of the 900,000 DOXA Discretionary Governance Reserve (10% of the DAO treasury) is transferred via a community-approved DAO proposal into an auxiliary reward-streaming canister.
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The Mechanism: An automated canister timer queries the SNS Governance canister to evaluate active voter weights (factoring in stake, dissolve delay, and age bonuses) and systematically distributes periodic tranches of DOXA via standard ICRC-1 transfers.
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The Benefit: Active voters receive predictable, continuous yield, but the total supply remains strictly capped at 10,000,000 DOXA. Zero new tokens are minted.
We Want Your Feedback: Open Questions for the Community
To ensure this model serves both long-term holders and active community members, we would love your input on the following points:
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1. Is a treasury-backed drip sufficient? Do you feel that streaming from the Discretionary Governance Reserve provides enough incentive for governance participation, or should alternative mechanisms (like protocol fee buybacks) also play a primary role?
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2. Frequency and Vesting: If we implement programmatic streaming, what distribution interval makes the most sense (e.g., monthly drips vs. quarterly distributions), and what minimum voting activity thresholds should be required to qualify?
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3. Balancing the Reserve: Does allocating a portion of the 10% Discretionary Reserve for voter streaming strike the right balance, or would you prefer those tokens remain entirely untouched for future discretionary grants and unexpected DAO opportunities?
Please share your thoughts below! How do you view the trade-off between absolute supply scarcity and rewarding active governance participants in the Doxa ecosystem post the sns?