Did my last comment make this discussion redundant?
Short summary: To drive forward the discussion on how we can improve governance, especially to prevent spam proposals, we propose how new design proposals can be evaluated. We provide a first evaluation of some of the designs proposed in the forum, and we propose a roadmap on how to proceed with this discussion.
If those who have less than 6 months can’t make proposals then half or most of the spam is gone and continuity picking on the inactive followers to remove them from receiving rewards is self governance for your personal gain. Do the inactive know how you speak about them like this and are they aware this forum exists and want their participation?
I love the default setting that Dfinity set, shows a set of values and good leadership but the rot I see coming into this system is the greed and selfishness from within and not just from the spammers.
To make sure that I understand your thought process and idea:
You observed that the neurons which are making spam proposals have typically a dissolve delay smaller than 6 months.
Hence you propose that only neurons with dissolve delay bigger than 6 months should be able to submit proposals.
Is this a fair summary? From my perspective such a rule would not create a real hurdle to spammers. He/she could simple use one neuron with dissolve delay greater than 6 months which is easy to set up.
Your interest in my mindset is interesting when I feel I have observed a pattern about a problem with spammers that is the concern of this discussion.
I feel that the pattern observed is the mindset of the problem that you are referring to. That spammers can purchase or set up a neuron with 1 icp and then cause all the spamming they like with little risk. That all the observed spam proposals had the same pattern of being under the 6 month period. Your issue seems to be with me and not seeing my observation.
I am not trying to be fair, if you want to behave improper then I will provide my point of view but I see again you are protecting the improper and that I am unfair.
You are right, I want those too gutless to invest into the nns for greater than 6 months that have not risked their investment for better not to have a say in the nns but you would prefer to protect them and ridiculed me as having the wrong mindset.
I wonder about your mindset.
I wonder if the spammers mindset is that if a vote is designed to un-reward those neurons that spam they will lose very little but you prefer they stay.
Proposer: The ID of the neuron that submitted the proposal. When a proposal is submitted, a “charge” is placed on its balance in case it is rejected. So the balance needs to be big enough to pay the charge on (all) rejection(s). We require a neuron to have a dissolve delay ≥ 6 months to vote, and this applies to submitting proposals too.
I would like to give you a short update on discussions within DFINITY on the topic of spam prevention:
In my analysis, I initially focused on solutions which significantly reduce or completely remove the created financial incentive to submit spam proposals as first step. After further syndication, it became clear that there is a desire to come up with a more holistic solution if possible.
I will now continue to look into this (with limited capacity as a side project) and will come back once I have further thoughts and suggestions.
So for the time being this a non-conclusive update, but I thought it might be still useful for you to know.
I have mentioned this before but I have notice a pattern within the NNS voting tab where the spam has the same Proposer ID which I assume is a unique number given to a Neuron which displays the same information of a lock neuron for: 5 years, 192 days - Dissolve Delay, the only thing that changes is the voting power which is because of the rewards paid to themselves for the spam they have created.
They cannot freeze anything because you are not doing anything illegal.
KYC with government is only a matter of time. This will happen 100% guaranteed.
But government are always very slow to figure out. So it may take few years. Make a screen shot of this post and mint as NFT.
In my opinion, there are methods to combat spam proposals as follows:
Set reward and penalty rates according to the credit scores of proposals (for example, approved proposals will accumulate credit points from previous proposals and reward them. then it will increase gradually, and vice versa if Neron continuously creates spam proposals that are not approved, it will lose its credit score and will be penalized - ICP from Neron spam → this fine will be burned)
When submitting a proposal to NNS for voting, you will need to make an ICP deposit. If the proposal is approved by the community, ICP will be refunded + rewarded. Conversely, if the proposal is not approved, some ICPs will be deducted and burned.
Both of the above options will eliminate the current spam proposals in NNS like now.
These are good ideas going in similar directions! Essentially you are stating that we should consider penalising neurons if they continue to submit spam.
For this we would need to think about
How to identify whether something is spam or not - probably by a separate spam yes/no assessment done by the community.
Make sure that that it is not too easy to circumvent the penalty, as it is easy to generate new neurons (which is the point from @ysyms above). To address this we could for example require that a neuron has a high stake (e.g. 1000 ICP) in order to be able to make a proposal. If the same neuron proposes spam a couple of times it could be blocked for some time to submit proposals (or a part of the stake could be burned).