- Proposer: The ID of the neuron that submitted the proposal. When a proposal is submitted, a “charge” is placed on its balance in case it is rejected. So the balance needs to be big enough to pay the charge on (all) rejection(s). We require a neuron to have a dissolve delay ≥ 6 months to vote, and this applies to submitting proposals too.
The according assessment is posted here.

I highly recommend you include the proposal linked below from @Jarred-Sauce in this assessment. It was a late addition to the discussion, but I think it is a very simple and elegant solution that disincentives spam for advertisement and announcement (e.g. “bad content”). It penalizes the a spam proposer without penalizing a quality proposer and without penalizing the voter. It does this in a way that is scalable, simple, accessible, efficient, and secure.
Please find the assessment here.
Hi all,
I would like to give you a short update on discussions within DFINITY on the topic of spam prevention:
In my analysis, I initially focused on solutions which significantly reduce or completely remove the created financial incentive to submit spam proposals as first step. After further syndication, it became clear that there is a desire to come up with a more holistic solution if possible.
I will now continue to look into this (with limited capacity as a side project) and will come back once I have further thoughts and suggestions.
So for the time being this a non-conclusive update, but I thought it might be still useful for you to know.
Have a great weekend
Björn

holistic
I have mentioned this before but I have notice a pattern within the NNS voting tab where the spam has the same Proposer ID which I assume is a unique number given to a Neuron which displays the same information of a lock neuron for: 5 years, 192 days - Dissolve Delay, the only thing that changes is the voting power which is because of the rewards paid to themselves for the spam they have created.
6.3-test Proposer: 16392997059792243989
6.2-test Proposer: 16392997059792243989
6.1-test Proposer: 16392997059792243989
5.31-test Proposer: 16392997059792243989
Which at the moment is 14 proposals inline of the above. I only printed those 4 but the same Proposer ID is used.
In my mind if, that proposer is a known spammer then I can think of many ways to have a holistic approach to fixing this problem but maybe I misunderstood this.
Creating new neurons is very simple, I suggest that DFINITY should freeze all my ICPs and cooperate with governments to KYC neurons
Internet Computer Network Status
sorry I am busy voting on 6.4-test
doesn’t need to be that troublesome,you can actually follow me and vote NNS Neuron ID 12860062727199510685 (internetcomputer.org)
They cannot freeze anything because you are not doing anything illegal.
KYC with government is only a matter of time. This will happen 100% guaranteed.
But government are always very slow to figure out. So it may take few years. Make a screen shot of this post and mint as NFT.

KYC with government is only a matter of time. This will happen 100% guaranteed.
But what if we (genz/millennials crypto native) grow up to become an elite and influence the policy maker in dc and brussel with our Fortune
If they KYC neurons, we will fork this chain
We? The high school?

Hi all,
I would like to give you a short update on discussions within DFINITY on the topic of spam prevention:
In my analysis, I initially focused on solutions which significantly reduce or completely remove the created financial incentive to submit spam proposals as first step. After further syndication, it became clear that there is a desire to come up with a more holistic solution if possible.
I will now continue to look into this (with limited capacity as a side project) and will come back once I have further thoughts and suggestions.
So for the time being this a non-conclusive update, but I thought it might be still useful for you to know.
Have a great weekend
In my opinion, there are methods to combat spam proposals as follows:
-
Set reward and penalty rates according to the credit scores of proposals (for example, approved proposals will accumulate credit points from previous proposals and reward them. then it will increase gradually, and vice versa if Neron continuously creates spam proposals that are not approved, it will lose its credit score and will be penalized - ICP from Neron spam → this fine will be burned)
-
When submitting a proposal to NNS for voting, you will need to make an ICP deposit. If the proposal is approved by the community, ICP will be refunded + rewarded. Conversely, if the proposal is not approved, some ICPs will be deducted and burned.
Both of the above options will eliminate the current spam proposals in NNS like now.
you havent gone to high school before? understandable
Thank you for being on topic, The same crowd turn up on these subjects and go off topic for noise @bjoernek I’m sure will consider our input.
These are good ideas going in similar directions! Essentially you are stating that we should consider penalising neurons if they continue to submit spam.
For this we would need to think about
- How to identify whether something is spam or not - probably by a separate spam yes/no assessment done by the community.
- Make sure that that it is not too easy to circumvent the penalty, as it is easy to generate new neurons (which is the point from @ysyms above). To address this we could for example require that a neuron has a high stake (e.g. 1000 ICP) in order to be able to make a proposal. If the same neuron proposes spam a couple of times it could be blocked for some time to submit proposals (or a part of the stake could be burned).
@bjoernek the problem to know if it is spam or not is very simple, next to the Adopt button, Reject just needs to add a Spam button. When the community selects the Spam button, it is a proposal that has not been approved and is a spam proposal.
I am not saying that we should penalise, I would say, if the community rejected a proposal then a rethink of that proposal should be held with the community and the neuron should not be permitted to make a proposal for a time without affecting the neuron owners rights to make changes or vote on that neuron.
I think having more than one or many neurons could become very tedious and setting the stake to a high value won’t affect those who have the most to gain as they have large numbers. This would affect a person like me who wants good things but can’t afford the entry value for a proposal which is then a penalty to me.
Setting up a filter to lock out a neuron that the community has deemed rejectable gives the time needed for the community to decide what action to take for that neron but the filter, as pointed out, can have the power to lock out a neuron decided by the community by rejection before an damaging update to the NNS.
A lockout should be the penalty and not giving out fines as burning someone’s stake. A bad idea today could be considered a great idea in the future and then a neuron holder would have a right to a claim.
@ysyms has shown the community their neurons are obvious spam but a real spam would disguise itself as an official proposal and be passed by the community who lack programming skills. The proposal could have all the right words but the code could be damaging and nothing to do with the written.
I am not sure but I would hope that any code created to be updated to the NNS has been approved by a IC team and updatable to the NNS by that team only and not some code anyone can write and can then update the NNS?
I’ll try to stay on topic, despite the over-engineering and ever-decreasing circles.
So we should create a holistic solution to a problem that arose because no-one (apparently) considered the undesired possible effects of making “governance” motion proposal worth 200 times some others.
Perhaps the solutions should consider the voting weights as part of the solution, rather than tacking on bulky review processes, a human-led judgement of neurons and some kind of crime and punishment system, all in the name of trying to correct a simple change that massively (and obviously) incentivises exploitation of the voting system.
I have put forward a proposal that I think is more elegant solution and is one that can be also be integrated into other ideas. This idea focuses on allowing the community to respond effectively, rather than trying to build every eventuality into the code itself, while not doing anything about the exploit incentivisation.
I am more apathetic now, partly because I care less about staring at pages of spam on the NNS and partly because there is a clear agenda to prioritise participation over a balanced reward scheme. Why else would Dfinity reject reverting the weights to 1, and only treat a resolution as a side project.
@bjoernek @Jan Please take action soon to eliminate spam proposals. it feels very uncomfortable for people who want to participate in voting and administering the NNS.
It looks like an abusive and unconscious act of someone thinking only of their own interests and forgetting about the people around them and the community.
I think it is more important than all the other proposals that need to be addressed soon. thanks a lot.