Thank you for the update @aterga. You did a very nice job leading this discussion. Thank you.
As a general rule, I do think we should strive to make the NNS and SNS as similar as possible. Differences such as spawning a new neuron vs disbursing creation confusion among newcomers and frankly existing users. Personally I’m disappointed this change did not go through such that inflation on the SNS and the NNS worked more similarly, regardless of if spam is a problem currently or not on the SNS.
Let’s please try keep this in mind as we make future design enhancements.
I missed this discussion until now unfortunately, and I find it disappointing that Dfinity have opted not to implement this feature.
I frequently have to explain to OpenChat users how the voting reward distribution works because they reach out thinking things are broken due to their rewards fluctuating massively each day.
I’d love to be able to say to people, “stake for X duration, vote on everything, and you’ll earn Y%”.
You can do this for the NNS, and it is really useful.
But for SNSes, when people ask how much they’ll earn, no-one can give an answer.
Hamish I agree. It’s weird to benefit or suffer from other people’s actions which one cannot control or predict. Predicting yields is very helpful for financial investors.
Its also weird the NNS and SNS have different monetary rules.
I respectfully disagree.
This perspective focuses on governance rewards as a financial instrument, priotising the desire for a fixed-income asset. That’s not what governance tokens are about.
The sanctity of IC governance is what protects the entire network, and everyone’s stake. I think we should be pushing for NNS governance to be more like SNS governance.
When governance participation is low, of course it makes sense to increase rewards for those who participated (in a zero-sum fashion, such that the total rewards distributed remains stable relative to participation). This a self-stabilising supply and demand mechanism, significantly reducing the chances that participation ever drops too low. The lower the rate of participation, the more danger the network is in, and therefore the higher the financial incentive should be to participate.
The argument that voters should receive fixed voting rewards (even if they’re the only one voting) makes little to no sense. This makes rewards predictable for the individual (as opposed to for the network), and therefore more appealling to each individual? (even though it would equate to the minimum possible rewards under the alternative regime)
@aterga, why not look at making the NNS voting reward mechanism more like SNSs, if the goal is consistency. Recently related discussion → Periodic confirmation - design - #128 by Lorimer