Hey @megrogan would you mind expanding on your suggestion here? By the way, I really like all your other suggestions in that post. However, this one doesn’t quite resonate with me yet. Why is it important to have predictability on how much reward each individual neuron will receive?
It is currently very predictable how much total reward is distributed each day. This change would make the overall total reward distribution less predictable because you can’t predict who will vote on each proposal.
I get that this change reduces SNS token inflation, but is there any evidence that there is a large fraction of SNS token maturity that is being dispersed and sold and having a negative effect on token price? OpenChat was the very first SNS token swap and I participated via Neuron Fund. I still have no access to those tokens or maturity even in the neuron that has no dissolve delay. I assume the majority of participants are in a similar situation, but I don’t know for sure. If so, then there is at least a very large fraction of the token holders who cannot access the rewards anyway, which seems to make the inflation argument a moot point.
Do you think the OC community will have a negative reaction when they learn that their voting rewards have gone down if this proposal is implemented? The change seems most likely to be noticed by your most active users of the OC platform, who are also likely to be the most active voters.
Is there currently a spam proposal problem for OC that you think is driven by this reward distribution calculation? I haven’t noticed it…at least not of the same type and scale that we had to endure on the NNS. However, the change to the reward distribution calculation (the denominator in the equation in your post), was not the actual solution to spam for the NNS. The solution was to remove the high weight factor for the Governance topic, which happened before the reward distribution formula was changed. I didn’t see spam as a justification for this change in your post, so perhaps this was added by @aterga or someone else at DFINITY as a potential reason that this change might be important for the SNS framework. It would be helpful to know if you think the spam argument is a valid part of the justification from the OC perspective.
I see how the calculation is analogous, but I don’t see how the arguments that justify the change for the NNS are also applicable to an SNS. Proposal 80970 explicitly says…
Why Now?
The new exchange rate mechanism will make spam much more attractive. We need a quick fix and this is the quickest route to implementation.
and
Why bring up this proposal now again?
In connection with the new exchange rate mechanism we require a quick solution.
Earlier concerns on the ability to influence the inflation rate (and thus also reduce the predictability of total supply) are much less of an issue now, given that maturity modulation included anyway further uncertainty on this.
…these were the arguments that justified the change for the NNS and neither apply to an SNS. As far as I know, there is not a spam problem with any SNS and they don’t have a proposal topic weighting mechanism. The Exchange Rate proposal topic also doesn’t exist for any SNS. The spam problem for the NNS was resolved the moment that the Governance proposal topic weight was reduced from 20 to 1. That happened immediately after a global hackathon hosted by DFINITY that attracted a lot of new people to ICP who started asking questions about all the spam they were seeing. It was an embarrassment to DFINITY and to the entire ICP community, so DFINITY acted quickly to reduce the proposal topic weight factor for Governance topics. The concern about spam only resurfaced in the context of the exchange rate proposal changes and that concern was only a hypothesis that was never tested. In fact, if we don’t have an SNS spam problem AND there is no exchange rate equivalent proposal for an SNS that drives a guarantees daily reward, then this is likely strong evidence that disproves the hypothesis. Regardless, DFINITY was strongly behind that change at the time (again because it came on the heels of the spam embarrassment), so there was no point in trying to resist the change. Instead, the change offered an opportunity to consider an NNS treasury that could be used to help incentivize the long term decentralization of the NNS.
A result of this proposal will be a reduction in total minted ICP due to the fact that some voters do not vote on all proposals or follow a voter for all proposals. In a follow-on proposal, the NNS can determine what to do with that “abandoned” ICP. We suggest an NNS treasury but will leave it to a future proposal to finalize that.
That treasury never happened due to pushback from the community. Voting rewards drastically changed for active voting members of the NNS and many people were not happy. I think that was a primary reason why the community had a negative reaction to the treasury idea even though it offered one of the best potential opportunities to achieve the commonly held goal of true NNS decentralization. There are a lot of nuanced details and opinions tied up in all this history for this NNS change.
Anyway, I don’t really see the value of implementing this proposal in the context of SNS projects. The potential cons seem to outweigh the potential pros and there are some learning experiences from the NNS example that should be considered before applying it to SNS projects. The arguments that justified the change for the NNS don’t seem to be applicable to the SNS framework, so it seems unnecessary to implement this change.
Can we consider reverting the NNS change instead of forcing a new SNS change? I think we have evidence that the change was never needed as a spam prevention mechanism for the NNS.