@FranHefner, I probably agree with your conclusion, but the graph is a bit odd in demonstrating it. For example, how can the projection for December 2025 show as nearly all locked, yet no proportional dissolving in the next couple of months until both locked and dissolved drop to zero? What is this data based upon?
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A workable system was proposed: committee neurons funded by a treasury. We know how that discussion went.
Possibly…I’d like the voting separate from the payment. You can pay for work…don’t pay for votes unless you want professional politicians. :).
We need ways to fund code reviewers, etc. I think Known Neurons should trust individuals that have been paid to review and audit code/become an expert…but I’d prefer that the neurons themselves don’t get paid. Incentivize the thing you want to be done or what will happen is the other thing you incentivize.
This is just intuition…I can be talked off the position.
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The distinction between governance in the real world vs. our abstraction is something to note. There are clear differentiators which incline me to believe Manual “Voters” should receive marginally more VP than delegated voters. Why?
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Real world governance – Pre-Elect officials bring forth that which they believe the majority desires. I, Imagine, vote in one of those participants. I have the expectation the elected official will deliver on their promises, but there is nothing binding them contractually or otherwise to perform their promises.
The ultimate point here is that they are elected in on promises, and then action (hopefully) ensues. They are bound to this promise to ensure continued maturation in their political role (Ie – voted in another term) -
Our Liquid democracy – I, Imagine, delegate my votes to Skilesare. (I do. Thank you sincerely for your service!) Skilesare & team performs real time work to vet proposals. In exchange for this immediately realized value, you are granted a greater proportion rewards.
Somehow would need to be a static differentiator. Obviously would not be able to grow if more users allocate their rewards to you
Thinking out loud here. Manual voters would all receive the same rate here, 100%. Delegated voters would receive 80%. This is an independent from the VP you would be allocated. Only your rewards would be offset higher.
This would apply to anyone voting manually.
As is in the context of this thread narrative, such a proposal would have to result in the net reduction of rewards – thereby decreasing future Total Supply impact and spawned maturity.
Final remark’s – you are performing work for me that is immediately recognized. You are performing a service on my behalf. That “value” should be captured immediately upon implementation. (Perhaps for exchange proposals right away, and protocol deployments upon Alpha)
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Many are concerned about the ICP token price but are you forgetting the Project and your vision of its future?
We are in a Bull market and all tokens are affected and have lost value but how low can the Market Cap go?
Let’s consider that many tokens are locked up and the owners are not able to sell their stake and can only watch as the token price falls but that doesn’t mean we won’t see the opposite.
This means that the Market Cap will or can only fall so much as we the investors can not go anywhere and the number of tokens will always stay the same.
I don’t believe we could unlock neurons as this could cause real damage and I doubt the powers would allow this to happen.
I myself like the ICP project and have taken advantage of the low token price and keep those tokens in the coin providers account to offset the price I paid on the locked tokens in my neuron and will see if this was a good choice in the future.
Others say they are going to start or consider spawning, instantly lose voting rewards and for those of us who still have not, extra rewards, so you should consider your actions if you believe in the project.
The question I will ask is why do we have a NNS?
If you put up a proposal and the proposal is accepted it will change nothing unless DFINITY makes those changes for you.
I have noticed lately a big change on the NNS voting where many are following and the team proposals being put up are executing within hours. There have been many proposals but less rewards.
I would like to know if others have found the same.
I feel the dynamics and setting of the NNS are just about right and should be left alone. Many discussions on economics have not resulted in a real breakthrough.
I feel we should let the DFINITY Team continue the building of the IC and the rewards will come later.
As for the principal idea of the NNS it has been a failure in my opinion. Investing rewarded tokens into the CF or SNS is to me just going further down the rabbit hole of investing on projects that are risky, a game of chance or nothing new.
The only part of the project that is not performing at this time is burning which means we need a lot more using the IC network.
The mindset of DFINITY seems to be set on investing in new projects which is costly, risky and we see many programmers interested by the lure of funding but not any results that I am aware of.
When the IC does network a few larger projects and the NNS starts to work as designed then do you think the ICP token could explode in price like BTC or LTC, I don’t think so as they are about transactions where the ICP is just a tool.
It seems that the CF and SNS are our only choice but we need to see some better projects because I haven’t seen any great proposals on the NNS.
All projects should only be allowed onto the network through the CF or SNS and include projects that don’t need funding but are encouraged to offer token NNS owners investment opportunities as an idea. That means DFINITY should be marketing the benefits of the IC to the top 100 companies to come aboard.
To sum up my thoughts:
(Too many tokens and not many rewards) = lousy returns
Current projects are great for DFINITY to test the network.
really can’t agree with u any more. token is not constant. its total amount will become higher year by year.
defaltion is nearly zero. Even though you think one day there will come out a successful dapp on IC, but it still need cycles burn rate increase 400X times than now which can destroy inflation per year. I just calculate the data at price 4$. If price pump up to 100$, cycle burn rate needs to increase 10000x times, But we all know after one years’ hard word since IC came out, so much dapps already come out, it’s burning rate of ICP is only 100,000 per year. however the inflation is 30-40,000,000 ICP token released every year.
they really need to change
Why are you posting on multiple accounts now? You need to relax and stop spamming.
Actually harms nobody.
They earn ICP, if ICP price go up(very likely happen if deflation rate is cut down), everybody is winner.
And, this one below. You DFINITY which has tens of millions tokens should take out your tokens to support devs.
- increases burning turns up deflation, but harms devs (which is quite scary)
"consider linking voting rewards in some ways to the amount of burned cycles in a given time period (presumably minus the node provider rewards). "
This is the what i highly recommended . And I think no body will refuse this suggestion. It doesn’t harm anyone because rewards are still distributed by nns locking time, at the same time find away to keep balance between huge inflation amount with small burned deflation amount, And everyone should get appropriate rewards just based the development of IC ecosystem. At least it harm nobody, I truly trust this will help ICP pump up if IC continue to develop.
I hope team can make a plan or votes.
If I understand correctly, you are referring to raising the cost (in cycles) of computation. The reason I say it harms devs is because it increases the continous cost of running a canister, indefinitely. When using “harm” i only mean increase costs and shift the incentive structure, not that I think they are being aggressively targeted.
I expect that a lot more people will become devs on the IC than on any other hosting platform. The self-hosting model will be, imo, hugely popular, so it is spreading the cost wide, but affecting everyone.
I take the point through that a higher ICP price would directly benefit the devs too (if they are paid in ICP) but there are so many factors that can affect the price of ICP, that the majority of devs/people will have no control over. If the cost of computation goes up, however, you are sure to affect them and can only hope that ICP goes with it.
Your post got me thinking 
I think the point you make about rewarding the real work done by named neurons is right, but I also think that delegation is part of the design and should not be de-incentivised. In trying to separate these ideas, I would ask ‘does the nature of the reward for the named neurons need to be the same as the reward for delegated voting?’
This is speculative and maybe has already been discussed, but what about rewarding named neurons with staked maturity? These entities are showing that they are community hubs and, one would think, are in it for the long term. Because of this, perhaps this would be an acceptable form of compensation for them…
Giving additional rewards to these neurons in the form of staked maturity is, in effect, restricting the availability of the new currency, so not necessarily increasing inflation, but still recognises the work as adding value. It might also separate the concerns - both values could be tuned without affecting each other.
@skilesare very curious to hear your take on this.
@Denis is this related to the proposed system you mentioned? do you have a link to this discussion?
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Staked maturity is better than straight ICP from a philosophical standpoint, but my mortgage company doesn’t take staked Maturity. 
If I’m receiving payment for doing good work for the IC I’d much rather it not be connected to how I end up voting…it just ties to many things to the vote and can create a crisis of consciousness.
Imagine a scenario where I analyze a pending change to the IC…I see that it will result in many more opportunities for me to vote and get rewards, but it isn’t necessarily the best thing for the IC. How do I vote? I’d like to think I make the right choice, but I’m not confident most will. I’d rather be paid for publishing my analysis separate from my vote so that I can give good recommendations and separate my economic vote from my system guidance. Being able to change you vote after the followed neuron has voted will help this process as well.
As far as getting paid goes…I think we’ll have natural ways this will emerge. For instance…why don’t node providers participate in replica deployment votes right now? They have everything to lose! (The answer is that DFINITY controls all the votes…if they stopped voting the nodes would have to step up and invest funded in protecting their investment).
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@willguest it is sort of related. There were separate discussions on committee neurons and a very heated one connected with the Treasury.
The essential dilemma is this:
Dfinity have complete control of the replica code. At some point of time, some of the burden / responsibility has to pass to the community.
However, experts from the community will not do serious work on checking replica code unless they are compensated. So, where is that ICP going to come from?
The first suggestion was to slightly reduce staking rewards for everyone and give those proceeds to committee neurons, but lots of investors opposed that.
The second way hinted at was to fund it from ICP that would have gone to stakers but would not be minted because those stakers were not voting. That debate got pretty ugly.
A third way is for experts to be funded through voluntary donations. The question is whether that would provide the stable source of funding that it needed.
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Hey @willguest, @skilesare - Thanks for conversing!
The voting power you receive is in essence, payment. Per your above conclusion, however, you differentiate the delegated voting power from the actual renumeration.
Which leads me to believe VP and remuneration from rewards should be independent, and not interdependent. Which is currently how it is…Darn that Dfinity team thinking of everything lol!
Allocating a portion of my rewards to you in the form of staked maturity is an extraction vehicle, but I don’t think I have a problem with it so long as the ceiling rewards structure remains.
If I’m receiving 20% voting rewards current state, but I choose to delegate my votes to someone else, I receive less? Could look something like this:
Current state
I Earn 20% rewards. Rewards are not indicative on person I allocate my VP to. Person I allocate to has higher voting power, but also still receives base 20% rate. (I.e same rewards rate)
More governance sway, static renumeration
Future State
I earn 20% rewards voting manually. I decide to allocate my VP to Skilesare. My Voting rewards drop to 15% for the service. Skilesare absorbs a portion of the difference (Say 3%) into a separate donation neuron. (As you already have a framework established as a not-for-profit) Skilesare continues to receive his normal 20% rewards from his manual voting. 2% is removed from ever maturing, thereby reducing the future overhang from spawned maturity.
More governance sway, Higher renumeration w/Ceiling model implemented.
I can see how this may create a conflict of interest for you as someone who votes on behalf of others. Given this, I think donations would be the most prudent form of giving.
I’m forced to choose someone that will vote in my favor, and you are incentivized to do so to receive donations. (Or payment, etc)
We are all still bound to ultimately vote in the best interest of the #IC in such a model as to sustain rewards. (Though I can see how this may create a conflict of interest to extract value in the short term at the detriment of the future state…)
Would be excellent if you could expand a bit on your analysis for replica deployment votes? Admittedly, not educated on this front.
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"consider linking voting rewards in some ways to the amount of burned cycles in a given time period (presumably minus the node provider rewards). "
this is the best way!
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NNS Neuron Marketplace:
Neuron holders that wish to sell their neuron for whatever personal reasons, should be able to place their neuron on a marketplace for others who are looking to invest further.
When I want to buy more tokens for my neuron I may be interested in neurons in a marketplace that would show the Neuron clickable address to view the main property values relevant to a purchaser.
The seller could then give a value price wanted or offered.
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THIS IS NOT TRUE.
On Internet Computer, “inflation” only goes to (1) neuron holders as a voting reward; (2) node providers who provided network & computing resources.
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The important thing is that even if there is innovative technology development, trust cannot be obtained unless inflation is prevented.
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were early miner of bitcoin benefited by early bird profits? the answer is pretty much shockingly no. Im more concerne about the node provider than early investors, because they are the back bones of whole net work. as long as node providers are not pulling the plugs, i dont think there are need to change tokenomics yet. and 8 years locking successfully lock half of ICP in long-term states, don’t tell me release them all will make price go to the moon. stream of dripping water is controlled than tsunami.
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ICP management is dominated by technicians. Technicians are not even aware that the survival of the ICP project depends on tokenomics. When you overemphasize this, they think they are solving their problem by deleting your post. It saddens me that it is ignored in the market because of bad toenomics of this quality project.
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