The Second DAO Revolution: From Vote-To-Earn to Submit-To-Earn

The first DAO revolution is Vote-To-Earn.

Now it is time to do the second DAO revolution: Submit-To-Earn.

Idea is not cheap, as long as it is good enough. If you have a smart creative idea that you think it is good for ICP, then why don’t you submit a proposal for your idea when the proposal adoption can let you get some ICP?

Voting reward is only for your minimal participation, while proposal reward is really for your genius. Submitting proposals is the real participation in governance.

Submit-To-Earn could be another huge game after the NFT game.

More importantly, Submit-To-Earn makes everyone potentially a constitution draftsman.

The following proposal reward rule may be worthy of notice: Let everyone choose a whole number between -100 and 100, and then calculate the weighted average by

where V is the total voting power, and V(n) is the voting power acquired by the number n.

If you choose 100, it means you most strongly vote Yes; if you choose -100, it means you most strongly vote No; if you choose 0, it means you abstain.

The upper bound of adoption reward is 100 ICP, and the upper bound of rejection cost is also 100 ICP. That is, the rejection cost is completely up to the community depending on specific proposals.

In my opinion, the current Yes/No system is too brutal, and the suggested new voting rule allows people to reveal their full preferences more continuously.

(100 ICP is only my first recommendation, and this number can be determined by voting itself.)

As I always say, the voting rewards of governance proposals should not be different, or not too much different, from that of other types of proposals. It is not a long-term strategy to attract new investors. Indeed, the difference between governance proposals and non-governance proposals is the main cause for spam proposals.

In my view, the redistribution of voting rewards between ICP holders is both inefficient and unethical. If ICP is planning to go mainstream, this kind of redistribution should be totally abandoned. Voting rewards should be considered as a pure staking return, which should be attractive to a lot of new investors.

Governance participation should include both voting participation and submitting participation. I think the current voting participation rate is already not too low, and the next step is to encourage people to submit good proposals. Adoption Reward and Rejection Cost together are obviously such a good solution.

We have to evolve from the Vote-To-Earn game into the Submit-To-Earn game. Otherwise, we might be all fucked up in a zero-sum game.

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The vote intensity modulation is interesting, by why would someone that proposes a change be rewarded? The whole idea of a proposal is to change the system for better as the initiator see’s advantageous. Why double the incentive?

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In principle, every adopted proposal is good for the IC community; if it is only good for the initiator but not for the others, it will certainly be rejected. I agree with you that doing good for community is already enough incentive for some people, but I do believe that economic incentive is the most powerful tool for making people do good things for community. Only sufficiently rewarding good proposals can make the evolution of NNS sustainable.

Simply, one will devote more time to NNS governance if he knows that a better proposal will be rewarded with more ICP. Someone may even be willing to become a professional proposer, as long as the proposal rewards are high enough.
The Submit-To-Earn model applies not only to NNS but also to any other DAOs.

in my view the value gain is priced in the token value, and probably the ones who make proposals are also staked in the network, so they have the best interest of the network in the long term.

the matter of competence is interesting but I would not know how to address this, as a simple vote on the outcome by the vast majority is not a validation of competence.

You should not assume that ICP is the only investment for a normal ICP investor, and I believe that most ICP investors have full-time jobs that is irrelevant to ICP.
Submitting a good proposal is a creative process, which usually costs a lot of time. If proposal adoption is rewarded with some ICP, many more ICP investors will be able to distribute more time to the ICP governance.
I am not American, but I heard that the American taxpayers do pay salaries for the senators and congressmen.

Could you further define V(n)? I don’t understand what you mean by “the voting power acquired by the number n”. There is something I’m missing about the formula.

Suppose that there are 10 neurons, denoted by p1, p2, …, p10, and their voting powers are 200, 100, 100, 10, 90, 80, 20, 300, 40, 60, respectively. Then the total voting power is
V = 200+100+100+10+90+80+20+300+40+60 = 1000.
Suppose that p1, p2, …, p10 have chosen -50, -10, 10, 10, 60, 60, 10, 0, -10, 100, respectively, from {-100, -99, …, 0, …, 99, 100}. Then V(-50) = 200, V(-10) = 100+40 = 140, V(0) = 300, V(10) = 100+10+20 = 130, V(60) = 90+80 = 170, V(100) = 60, and V(k) = 0 for all k in {-100, -99, …, 0, …, 99, 100} but not in {-50, -10, 0, 10, 60, 100}. Thus we have
Proposal Reward = (-50)×V(-50)/V+(-10)×V(-10)/V+0×V(0)/V+10×V(10)/V+60×V(60)/V+100×V(100)/V
= (-50)×200/1000 + (-10)×140/1000 + 0×300/1000 + 10×130/1000 + 60×170/1000 + 100×60/1000
= (-50)×0.2 + (-10)×0.14 + 0×0.3 + 10×0.13 + 60×0.17 + 100×0.06
= 6.1 ICP.
Therefore, this proposal will be adopted with 6.1 ICP as reward.

V(n) simply means “the voting power obtained by the number n”, i.e., the sum of all voting powers whose neurons have voted the number n.

I would vote against anything that punishes passive investors. We actually need more of them not less.

Actually I agree with you. See my another thread:

Unfortunately, the reality of NNS now seems to be that most active voters prefer to punish passive investors for higher voting rewards in the short term.
If “set and forget” is an acceptable norm, then ICP could be the most attractive long-term asset for individual investors throughout human history.

I believe that as it is now, a passive investors can maximize her rewards by just following a neuron that votes on all governance proposals. Is this correct? if this is correct, then, as it is now, passive investors are fine

Of course the passive investors can simply follow a neuron as now, but it also means that the voting reward rules can change at any time. In my opinion, if you should check the voting rules frequently, then you cannot be defined as a passive investor.
I hope that one day abstention can become a legal option and anyone not voting will be considered as abstaining automatically without any loss of voting rewards. Then together with Auto-compounding, joining the 8-year gang will be a perfect investment strategy for individual investors, and I will even consider ALL-IN-ICP.

I support 100% your defense of the passive investor