Thoughts on improving Neuron Fund Distribution
The current (retired) Neuron Fund framework has been gamed by bad actors and rightly shut down. I welcome this pause and wanted to share my thoughts as a founder on what a good solution might look like.
Component 1: Locked Liquidity
A significant portion of the Neuron Fund’s contribution (maybe 25%) should be matched to the projects tokens and placed in DAO controlled liquidity on the leading ecosystem DEXs . Ideally this liquidity will be split across at least two DEXs and could be split according to each DEX’s respective TVL or another metric.
I have seen this mentioned by others and agree that it’s a great idea, but it doesn’t help teams keep building. That’s why we need more.
Component 2: Use Neurons to create a runway
As part of the SNS proposal, a team should be able to create a proposed burn rate/ ICP need by year. It seems reasonable to lock the rest of the NF in neurons of 1,2,3,4 years etc according to the teams proposals. It should also be possible for a SNS to propose to get the NF distribution in a single 8 year neuron. They could then use the maturity as an ‘infinite runway’ .
Component 3: Make the NF contribution dynamic according to vote
If NF members were allowed to vote, project by project on their level of support, the final amount contributed by the NF could be dynamic based on how helpful the project would be to the community as a whole rather than a 1 size fits all curve. There are a million ways to skin this cat, but one way would be a new vote type that uses a numerical input or a slider that goes from 0 to 1.
Component 4: Implement ‘Rage Quit’ mechanism for all DAOs
If a project is doing well, it should be trading at a premium to the value in their treasury. If the project is doing poorly or has lost the trust of the community, there might be more ICP value in the treasury per circulating token than the current swap price(circulating = not in treasury but in a DAO member’s wallet or a neuron). In this case, the DAO member should be able to burn their tokens in exchange for their share of the treasury. This mechanism, combined with locking NF in neurons according to projected needs ensures that teams would be unable to draw funds faster than the community expects. It also ensures that DAO members (and the NF) have significant value that they can access if the project fails.
Ideally components 1 and 2 would be implemented before the NF returns to operational. Components 3 and 4 would likely be more complex but could be implemented after the NF is back online.
Thanks to everyone for reading and sharing thoughts you might have.