What does the SEC have to do with any of this?
I think that it was a mistake as well. Fwiw this was pointed out BEFORE the proposal passed in several different venues including reddit.
That said, essentially what we are trying to do here is reduce the 40% inflated return down to 20% for the active voter; while still handicapping the passive participant. This will be an improvement on inflation.
become investment securities for the assets that sleep and forget
thatās why polkadot is great in this kind of risk management,
isnt sleep and forget is what dfinity wanted you to do right now especially with actions 1 proposal?
then the possibility of us become a securities will be high
total minted reward always still at 20percent, its just active getting more in reward so inflation is nowhere to be found if reward majority went back into compounding interest, incentivize new active small participant, further decentralization of the icp and especially increase the network adoptions
this could be a good idea tho
real world interest rate at all time high, who gonna stay with us if thereās 10 to 20percent yield same but with less volatile assets elsewhere that they could allocate
20percent at 50usd per coin is normal while 20percent at 8usd is high, yield usually go down when price go up, but this is just opposite, capital outflow is imminent
After 48623 is implemented, compounding automatically will be increased staked maturity NOT newly minted ICP. BEFORE 48623, yes, itās newly minted ICP.
IF this proposal does NOT pass:
we will have 40% for active voters , after 48623 , there will be increased staked maturity(but not increased ICP); assuming that most 8years will opt for auto-compounding.
IF this proposal does pass:
we will have 20% for active voters , after 48623 , there will be increased staked maturity(but not increased ICP); assuming that most 8years will opt for auto-compounding.
the goal of all of us here is to accumulate more vp so minted or no minted do not matter
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It would be nice to see more discussion about how to advance decentralization. The only thing that has worked so far is proposal weights and separating a proposal topic from All Topics. At this time I cannot see anything else being effective and that is because every neuron was configured with a default followee and because of the existence of the All Topics ācatch allā. No other idea has surfaced yet to stimulate decentralization.
I want to get past these discussions about how to prevent spam and move toward discussions of how and when decentralization will continue to occur. I think adequate solutions to spam have surfaced and need to be implemented and we need to focus on what decentralization means and how it will be achieved.
Iām not at all advocating for quick decentralization. We are not ready. However, the transition toward decentralization needs to be more central to the community discussion about tokenomics incentives in my opinion.
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The idea I have is to calculate the āfollowing scoreā of each neuron and detect the ultimate exposure to the NNS. If you donāt vote manually than your bonus is affected by this score(magnitudes to be discussed). So If I follow dfinity only and that means I have like 99% overlap on a category with the rest the NNS then Iām going to have my bonus negatively affected. If I follow 5 neurons who each are independent then I have much less overlap and will get a higher bonus. Some categories arenāt ready for it (exchange rate), but at some point weāll really need and want it for even that category as many people keeping an eye on the exchange rate is better than just dfinity.
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Since 01APR we know that 57.8% of the governance rewards have remained as accumulated maturity and 42.3% has been either merged maturity or spawned neurons.
Letās assume all governance rewards are currently going to voting members and 50% of the vp is voting. If this proposal were to go through, the rewards to voting participants would decrease by half. Letās also assume that the ratio of accumulating maturity stays the same if this proposal is enacted. That would mean we go from 48k in daily ICP that is either merged maturity or spawned neurons to 24k.
We canāt know for sure how much of the dispersed governance rewards is spawned neurons vs. merged maturity until neuron indexing is implemented, however back in March I estimated that 70% of the rewards were being spawned as neurons based on known neurons (it was a rough estimate that required many assumptions). If we use that 70% number, then I would guess that this proposal (should it be enacted) would decrease amount of ICP being added to the circulating supply by ~17k a day (500k a month). Thatās a rather large decrease and I would guess would have a positive effect on the price of ICP.
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If 48623 is implemented prior to this proposal, all of ICP calculations will change.
For some time, there will be little, IF ANY, increase to newly minted ICP. Depending on exactly how circulating supply is calculated, i am also nearly sure that there will be little, IF ANY, increase of the circulating supply.
Hereās the reasoning: when 48623 is implemented:
(A) Any disbursement of maturity will first occur from the staked ICP ALREADY in the neuron. Clearly no new ICP will be minted until the staked ICP in the neuron is exhausted.
(B) Any auto-componding of maturity will cause staked maturity to increase; but NOT circulating supply of ICP.
I have reason to believe that 48623 has higher priority within dfinity than any other improvements to tokenomics; because it has the most drastic impact on the circulating supply.
So, if the goal is to ONLY reduce the increase of circulating supply due to maturity earnings in neurons, then 48623 does a good job in the short term.
However, in addition to that, Action 1 reduces the amount of staked maturity / maturity for active voters as opposed to what staked maturity/maturity that they are getting now (20% as opposed to 40%).
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From my perspective it would make sense to separate the topic of preventing spam vs the size of the overall reward pool (and whether we should adjust/reduce it).
As you rightly describe, after implementing the proposal of this thread, one could use spam proposals to effectively half the size of the daily reward pool. Thus implementing a spam prevention change would lead to a set-up in which spam proposals will have a big impact on the overall tokenomics of the IC, which should not be the case.
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Sheesh. Hats of to you. You have some extreme patience. Makes me appreciate your community presence all the more.
spam prevention and the rewards mechanism are two completely different things. Although they directly influence one another its best to solve each one with closed loop systems that donāt expand infinitely in some form (e.g infinite catch errors or rewards per click).
Once the reward mechanism is fleshed out and bullet proof it will stop 90 percent of all spam. However the remaining 10 percent of spam must still be solved for. A human in the loop must exist for the remaining spam, we cannot solve for it programmatically without affecting valid proposals in some way.
Please check out this summary for a quick review of current events and a breakdown of NNS challenges.
https://forum.dfinity.org/t/breakdown-of-current-icp-spam-events-a-summary/12546/3
Also if you have the time let me know what you think of this concept - a micro turks system for the nns proposals with no wasted icp
I keep coming back to spam prevention either requiring 100% participation or equal weighting across the board. This problem is a head scratcher.
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