Proposal to covert from system based reward to voter based reward; to implement an accept quorum mechanism; and to return the reject cost to 1 ICP

Governance
21

cuz atleast dfinity can pointed to us (hundreds or thousand of active retail) as an excuse for the icp to be forever call as a governance token when the sec come n knock on our door for the securities case,

22

we gonna see more outflow btw if yield getting lower (by force) cuz interest rate doesnt work that way, u need to hike the rate to incentivize the circulating supply back into the system inflow into the treasury (NNS) and its just the same with our current situation of the icp since most of reward in governance mostly back into compounding interest

23

icdevs is wrong if icdevs continue to believe, tackling the wrong issue n really think the drop in icp price is due to the 20percent minted supply/

24

After proposal Internet Computer Network Status (48623) is implemented, significant discrepancies will arise in calculating staked maturity/maturity/staked ICP.

@skilesare i request, if possible, to rephrase the proposal to account for staked maturity/maturity/staked ICP; otherwise folks who want to cash out on maturity will tend to zero on simply staked ICP.

25

I certainly don’t think the price is 100% because of inflation. I do believe that inflation were lower the price would be relatively higher. That could be .002% or 1000%. I only play an economist on tv. I’m just trying to nudge things in a positive direction.

1 Like
26

If I understood this better I would. :grimacing: I think the staked maturity/staked ICP are fungible in context of the reward percentage function? I’d need dfinity to explain how they are implementing it.

27

I think you should stick with the current algorithm for how they determine total daily voting rewards. I don’t see any reason to change this to meet the intent of your proposal action 1.

1 Like
28

like the good intention of the drop in anchor protocol yield (minted supply) by force but resulted with the downfall of terra luna cuz outflow exceeded everything, so better let it down by it own but please not by force,

29

whale that sleep within the nns deserve to share their piece of reward with us (8years gang) cuz it seem like majority of small retail are active but it actually whale that have their neuron frozen for passive, against active voter (small retail 8years gang) = support bad whales, its like a declaration of war against majority of small retail 8years gang (even tho some try to disguise to support passive but in reality they vote like an active n scare of being cancel)

31

maybe its time to drop the intention of messing with the tokenomic but instead try to work on thing that increase the demand of the icp as a currency, so that we continue to have this merveilleuse of ability to be like the federal reserve n issue unlimited bazooka whenever we want,

1 Like
32

america became the superpower n the world reserve currency is not because of the ability to limit it supply to make it valuaable for other country to adopt but instead because of the talent to always find the demand for it currency so that they could print whenever they want// btw CURRENCY IS NOT SECURITIES n we should stop approaching the tokenomic of cryptocurrency like the governance of the investment securities.

1 Like
33

A lot of the people I know just merge their maturity… which is easier now that ledger FINALLY WORKS!

You mention the inflation, do you have any numbers on what percentage of the daily rewards are locked up? If it’s going into neurons that have a significant dissolve delay does the inflation really affect the price?

2 Likes
34

Yield need to be higher if inflation really the cause of the drop in price,

35

Crypto is macro, macro is crypto/// look at the bigger pictures instead of blaming active neurons, encouraging active retail active whales to buy more ICP on exchange n stake it all back into the NNS (treasury) that’s how the monetary system work,

1 Like
36

Interest rate at all time high/ recession, credit crunch is near, capital outflow is imminent while crypto btw is worse than emerging market, I bet the possibility of ICP to drop in value like Luna is quite high if KEEP ON messing with the tokenomic n forget about the policy to attract back the capital inflow into NNS,

37

We alr got high class investors within this great tech but still depends on us to whether push them out or make an attractive monetary policy to make them spend their capital to buy circulating supply out of market,

1 Like
38

Hi @mparikh,
Could you please elaborate a bit more on the potential dependencies between Internet Computer Network Status (48623) and the proposed Action 1 from this post.

In my current (potentially limited) view I see these two as not directly linked

  • Action 1 deals with determining the size of the daily reward pool as a function of total supply & the active voting power and the subsequent allocation of rewards to active voters.
  • 48623 deals with enhancements of the handling maturity. I agree that these actions can change the voting power but this would equally affect the reward calculation without Action 1, wouldn’t it?
1 Like
39

Great thoughts to address ICP inflation and spam proposals.

My .002 cents

  1. Voter based rewards model eliminates the high ICP inflation by replacing the paradigm of ‘sharing the whole piece of pie’ to ‘voters will get their fair share of pie’. In simple terms, only so much ICP is minted based on number of votes instead of mint max ICPs everyday and reward based on the every neuron’s voting power. Probably whenever a governance proposals are passed, we may reward the proposal owner (PO) based on their Neuron’s voting power or by some means. Thus encouraging more participation by others for great proposals.

  2. Spam proposals - Place a temporary spammer flag score the on the PO’s account. So, the future proposals will be conciously reviewed. And keep increasing the spam score (or levelling up the spam badges) and increase the cost to submit the proposal and the rejection cost too.

Basically, I am leaning towards awarding for good proposals and punishing for spam proposals. Rejected proposals are not changed and as proposed, the cost to be brought back to 1 ICP.

1 Like
40

Thank you very much for the assessment @Kyle_Langham! This is really useful for comparing views. I will share my (quite similar) assessment below, split by Action 1,2 &3.

41

Hi @skilesare, all,
please find below a draft assessment of this proposal against our design goals. Feedback on this assessment is very welcome!

Action 1. Convert from a system-based rewards model to a voter-based reward model.

  • Decentralized & active: Neutral.
  • Secure & available: Neutral.
  • Long-term thinking: Neutral
  • Efficient & scalable: Slightly positive. The removal of the spam incentive for skewing the rewards makes voting more efficient.
  • Reactive: Neutral.
  • Purposeful:
    • Skew rewards: Positive by mitigating the ability to skew rewards for active voters via the submission of governance proposals.
    • However, it is also negative as one could use governance proposals to a) “punish” passive holders and b) to lower the daily reward pool. For example, for a day with (usual) 50% participation on governance topics, 10 spam proposals would essentially half the daily reward pool.
  • Simple & accessible: Slightly worse, as it makes the reward calculation more complex to understand.

Open points/comment: As also mentioned by @wpb above, why should it be possible (as a side effect) to influence the size of the reward pool by submitting spam proposals (e.g. even cutting it by half). I understand, this could be (at least currently) be a desired effect but this is orthogonal to spam prevention and a quite fundamental change to the overall tokenomics of the system.

1 Like