Proposal to covert from system based reward to voter based reward; to implement an accept quorum mechanism; and to return the reject cost to 1 ICP

We alr got high class investors within this great tech but still depends on us to whether push them out or make an attractive monetary policy to make them spend their capital to buy circulating supply out of market,

1 Like

Hi @mparikh,
Could you please elaborate a bit more on the potential dependencies between Internet Computer Network Status (48623) and the proposed Action 1 from this post.

In my current (potentially limited) view I see these two as not directly linked

  • Action 1 deals with determining the size of the daily reward pool as a function of total supply & the active voting power and the subsequent allocation of rewards to active voters.
  • 48623 deals with enhancements of the handling maturity. I agree that these actions can change the voting power but this would equally affect the reward calculation without Action 1, wouldn’t it?
1 Like

Great thoughts to address ICP inflation and spam proposals.

My .002 cents

  1. Voter based rewards model eliminates the high ICP inflation by replacing the paradigm of ‘sharing the whole piece of pie’ to ‘voters will get their fair share of pie’. In simple terms, only so much ICP is minted based on number of votes instead of mint max ICPs everyday and reward based on the every neuron’s voting power. Probably whenever a governance proposals are passed, we may reward the proposal owner (PO) based on their Neuron’s voting power or by some means. Thus encouraging more participation by others for great proposals.

  2. Spam proposals - Place a temporary spammer flag score the on the PO’s account. So, the future proposals will be conciously reviewed. And keep increasing the spam score (or levelling up the spam badges) and increase the cost to submit the proposal and the rejection cost too.

Basically, I am leaning towards awarding for good proposals and punishing for spam proposals. Rejected proposals are not changed and as proposed, the cost to be brought back to 1 ICP.

1 Like

Thank you very much for the assessment @Kyle_Langham! This is really useful for comparing views. I will share my (quite similar) assessment below, split by Action 1,2 &3.

Hi @skilesare, all,
please find below a draft assessment of this proposal against our design goals. Feedback on this assessment is very welcome!

Action 1. Convert from a system-based rewards model to a voter-based reward model.

  • Decentralized & active: Neutral.
  • Secure & available: Neutral.
  • Long-term thinking: Neutral
  • Efficient & scalable: Slightly positive. The removal of the spam incentive for skewing the rewards makes voting more efficient.
  • Reactive: Neutral.
  • Purposeful:
    • Skew rewards: Positive by mitigating the ability to skew rewards for active voters via the submission of governance proposals.
    • However, it is also negative as one could use governance proposals to a) “punish” passive holders and b) to lower the daily reward pool. For example, for a day with (usual) 50% participation on governance topics, 10 spam proposals would essentially half the daily reward pool.
  • Simple & accessible: Slightly worse, as it makes the reward calculation more complex to understand.

Open points/comment: As also mentioned by @wpb above, why should it be possible (as a side effect) to influence the size of the reward pool by submitting spam proposals (e.g. even cutting it by half). I understand, this could be (at least currently) be a desired effect but this is orthogonal to spam prevention and a quite fundamental change to the overall tokenomics of the system.

1 Like

Action 2 - Restrict reward qualification to a Threshold and implement an “accept quorum” for proposals.

To my understanding this is a variation of the idea voting in stages, which was also assessed here. Main benefits are positive impact on Efficient & scalable and Purposeful - mitigating bad content. Is this a fair conclusion ?

Action 3. Reduce the ICP proposal Rejection cost back to 1.

  • Purposeful: Bad content → Worsening. Lowering the proposal cost to 1 ICP makes it is easier to submit not purposeful/bad content.
  • Neutral on the other goals.
1 Like

My issue , per se, is not about the principle/s of action 1. I agree with the principle/s.

But action 1 states “A result of this proposal will be the reduction in total inflation of ICP due to the fact that some voters do no vote on all proposals or follow a voter for all proposals”.

After proposal 48623 is implemented, even when some voters vote (and decide to compound automatically), there is no immediate inflation of ICP…only staked maturity is increased. Further for some time till ICP is exhausted in the neuron, even disbursement of maturity ( as distinguished from disbursement of staked maturity) will not cause immediate ICP inflation.

If the neurons with staked maturity start dissolving, at the point of dissolution, there will be inflation of ICP EVEN IF that neuron does not vote. This is because staked maturity will be converted into newly minted ICP at the point of dissolution.

So accordingly some of calculations/assumptions ought to be clarified in the details.

3 Likes

Actions 1 was made to disincentivize and push active holder out of the NNS, outflow is imminent.

Good intentions lead to hell, better encourage our existed network participant to buy ICP out of exchange with an attractive policy instead of revenge n pushing them out.

Interest rate at all time high, lowering minted rate = mass liquidity outflow/ cuz crypto is worse than emerging market alr, who gonna stay with us when u can earn up to 10 to 20percent elsewhere with stable less volatiles assets.

we shouldn’t worry much about inflation if u have a mass liquidity inflow cuz those inflow gonna locked n compound if we got an attractive policy to get our existed top tier fund to sucking up all ICP out of exchange. 20percent minted supply at 50 to 60 USD per coin and now it’s at 7 to 8 n there’s people think it’s high hmmm

Actions 1 = anchor protocol 2.0/ messing with tokenomic is bad for the protocol especially doing the opposite of what we should do

Whales, financial analyst at dfinity please rethink before make a decision to support this kind of proposal,

We already know what icdevs is after already since they try to use BIG MACRO event to blame on active participants, I bet that they not gonna stop even after actions 1 passed/

I would personally like to see more tools built on ICP instead of tweaking the tokenomics every other week

2 Likes

Exactly but Atleast icdev should make the ux NNS usable first before dropping any bomb on the governance :grimacing:

1 Like

end goal of @skilesare is clear (from 1:03:53) protecting inactive whales to maximize their reward/ isnt that also against the foolcourt decentralize liberal principle? sounded like a double standard to me.

I believe that is misrepresentation of the discussion. I advise people to listen to the discussion and decide for themselves.

FWIW - TFC is intended to be a community driven DAO made up of diverse opinions. We want to promote open discussions from all stakeholders and appreciate all viewpoints. Hearing different perspectives is how we grow as a community.

i like the foolcourt n admired the people that behind it but please boycott the actions 1 of sir skillshare

totally against the principle of decentralization of the network and pushing the icp into securities type of token and especially against the core design of icp by dfinity