Proposal to covert from system based reward to voter based reward; to implement an accept quorum mechanism; and to return the reject cost to 1 ICP

[justmythoughts]

@bjoernek

For the non-active governance voters (passive holders) the reward would however depend on how many governance proposals will be submitted and voted on, correct? E.g. on a day with 10 governance proposals they will receive almost no rewards. Thus one could use governance proposals to a) “punish” passive holders and b) to lower the daily supply increase. I am not sure if spamers would have an interest in a) or b) but this is a side effect worth considering

This abuse is possible b/c of the high weightings on individual governance proposal rewards. Setting a fixed % of voter rewards attributable to governance proposals on a daily basis would solve this.

Something like, you receive X% of total potential voter rewards per day based on your governance participation. The mechanism for doing this is outlined in Proposal to fix governance proposal rewards at 75% on a daily basis.

I think this combined with your idea of rewards without redistribution might be the solution.