I think that is right. Basically, the votes that don’t get cast don’t get rewards. So 52% of the voters wouldn’t be getting the possible rewards because they don’t vote.
- For the non-active governance voters (passive holders) the reward would however depend on how many governance proposals will be submitted and voted on, correct? E.g. on a day with 10 governance proposals, they will receive almost no rewards. Thus one could use governance proposals to a) “punish” passive holders and b) to lower the daily supply increase. I am not sure if spammers would have an interest in a) or b) but this is a side effect worth considering.
This is certainly a possibility, but I think it is also the intent of the changes in weighting. It is good for whales to have less inflation, so you are right, it could be abused. It is a bit more passive than voting to give yourself more numbers in your column, so I’d argue it is a step in the right direction, but for sure it doesn’t completely solve the problem. I guess the question to ask is does it offer enough incentive to cause spam. The “complete” answer is to set all weights to 1, but you lose incentives. I don’t think there is a complete answer that involves weights that can’t be manipulated in some way. Thus if you want to have incentives based on category weights I think you have to pick your trade-off. I’ll think a bit more on this.
Maybe the unclaimed rewards go to the community pool so the inflation still occurs, but it occurs for funding of projects?