Again, I support rewarding short-term stakers however I do think it should be a minimum lock of 30 days and they shouldn’t get voting power.
As for the rate for the short-term it should be proportional to a 6 month lock.
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But why not voting power? I’m not trying to be difficult; I just don’t understand. It’s reduced linearly to 0. So why not? What negative impact would it have?
Either the voting power is worth it or not…
If it’s worth it then I don’t want someone only concerned with short-term risk voting and having an impact…what happens if there’s 100m combined staked short-term only?!
If it’s not going to have an impact then why is it needed?!
To allow potential stakeholders to try it out. Give them a taste for governance. Rather than simply handing them rewards.
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The APY rewards are a function of the voting power so it cannot be zero. In the proposed model the voting power for someone staking for 7 days will be ~ 1/25th and 30 days will be ~1/6th vs. someone staking for 6 months. That way the stakers won’t have much significant impact on governance proposals when staking for short duration and they will always find it motivating to increase their minimum lockup to at least 6 months.
Binance has a 10 icp limit
If that’s the case they’d stake for 6 months now? And 6 month stakers would be increasing to 8 years…but that’s not happening because people don’t want to commit…
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10% at 30 days lockup has a 5k ICP limit unless they recently changed it
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Again if it’s about governance then they can test for 1 ICP for 6 months…but the rebuttal is it takes awhile to get maturity to spawn a new neuron…so it’s about rewards.
And if it’s about rewards and short-term gets a low return based on voting power being close to zero then the point is irrelevant because it’ll also take awhile to spawn a new neuron…unless the rewards are disproportionate which most people will disagree with.
The increase in voting power (/rewards) when moving from 7 days to 6 months are very significant (26X). Our hypothesis is that this will motivate enough people to graduate to longer dissolve delays once they are comfortable with a lower barrier to entry.
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The assumption is that this will give motivation for people to start with some reasonable ICP (not just 1). Someone with a couple of hundred ICP can find it worthwhile to start with 7 days and then increase dissolve delay quickly once they become comfortable with the process.
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It would take 233 ICP with a dissolve delay of 7 days to earn 1 ICP in a year…assuming they follow and vote on every proposal. That’s not really short-term…
People who don’t want to commit to the risk of 6 months dissolve delay probably also aren’t going to invest ~$1700 for a year to earn a few bucks.
So what is the objective? To increase staking on the NNS or get people to try governance?!
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The objective is to create a way for people to stake without exchange. We need people off exchanges and this helps . Even if only 5 % of people do it that’s a win.
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@nikhil.ranjan more feedback from community:
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The goal here is to attract more people to participate in governance. I cannot comment on the viability of the investment upside but I do know that there are several people who have ICP but haven’t been staking due to the 6 month threshold. Maybe they think they may need liquidity before 6 months. We need to bring them to participate in governance because then once they see the activity in the community and the NNS in action they will feel gain more confidence with the potential of IC.
They may think 7 days voting power may not be worth it and may want to try with 30 or 90 days.It’s not about 7 days or 30 days or 3 months, I think it’s mainly about giving people more flexibility to choose with a lower barrier to entry.
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I personally know plenty of people.
@nikhil.ranjan some other feedback from community:
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Wouldn’t the onus be on Dfinity to code the change?
If so, how much time would this take?
Assuming that this is going to be a complex change: I don’t want Dfinity behind on their roadmap any further than they currently are for something that doesn’t immediately improve the network. This proposal just hopes to incentivize some tentative people to stake and we hope they lock for longer periods of time, I can name plenty of things on the roadmap more immediately important than this.
If we still have less than ideal NNS #'s after both integrations are complete then maybe we should come back to this, but this seems very premature considering the overall market hasn’t been in the IC’s favor since Genesis either. We only have the bear-market data for NNS staking.
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Very reasonable question. I will let @nikhil.ranjan answer whether it is a trivial change (change a parameter) or whether it’s something more involved. That can certainly inform the community.
This makes sense.
To make sure we give authors @nikhil.ranjan and @Lomesh-dfn1 all the due nuance, their hypothesis is NOT that getting more 7-day stakers is good. Their hypothesis is that there will be more long term stakers if the funnel of people who play with staking is widened (classic funnel logic).
Now to make sure your case is well understood (which I think is a good one):
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Their hypothesis is that more people playing with staking leads to more long term stakers. Do you disagree with this hypothesis… or think their goal is not the right one (increase participation of long term stakers). I could not tell if you disagree with the goal… or their way at getting the goal.
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I may be misreading too much into your comment, but when you say “rewarding long term stakers”, I saw an implication you had some ideas. If not, I do not mean to put you in the spot, but I did want to proactively listen and make sure your POV is well understood with proper visibility.