[Proposal] Reducing minimum staking time for expanding governance participation

  1. I agree on the premise, not sure about the execution, here is why:

Say a DAO is designing a staking mechanism and decides to start with 8 years lockups only, after a while things aren’t going good, so it’s proposed to lower the minimum lockup time to 7 years, now the DAO has to trade a % of the stake reserved for 8 year lockups to attract more stakers.
Vote passes and it proves to be succesful so another proposal is made: lower minimum lockup time to 6 years, rinse and repeat. What I’m trying to say is everytime the DAO makes this trade, they decide to cut a % from the existing lockup tranches to attract new stakers, assuming the DAO is looking for price appreciation of the asset and functioning governance, at some point this trade won’t be worth it anymore.

Why do I think the trade isn’t worth it now:

Existing stakers already have a variable (90% likely to worse due to lower inflation and potential new stakers) and low APY on an asset that has historically performed badly, cutting yet another slice from already existing small pie really has to be worth it. From a financial point of view it’s worth it as long as staking provides some form of deflation to the circulating supply, now what’s this point? 6/3/1 month? Weeks? Days? Depends on who you ask, in my opinion not lower than 3 months. Maybe @Kyle_Langham could give us his opinion on this.

  1. What I was referring to was an old topic of discussion: Proposal to Change Dissolve Delay Bonus and Age Bonus Parameters by @wpb

I don’t have anything to propose at the moment, tokenomics for me are a sacred aspect of the protocol and I don’t have a background in economics or things of this kind, but I think changes should be rare and very well considered in all aspects, the data provided by @nikhil.ranjan seems incomplete from what I see, where would the new rewards come from if the exisiting tranches are unchanged?