Periodic confirmation - design

This doesn’t seem to address the root of the problem at all to me. It seems as though it has been complicated to avoid the removal of following.

Periodic Followee Confirmation, while many won’t admit it, aims to ensure that the followee is consciously choosing to delegate their vote to the selected entity.

Rather than this system forcing them to re-delegate their voting power, they must instead simply cast a vote, detracting from the core value of the function - the conscious decision to follow a specific party.

I also find issue in the fact that barriers that were previously brought up to me in regard to this topic, have now been forsaken, due to the fact that “friends” are pushing the proposal through.

For example, what is the notification campaign on this feature? It was previously suggested that no less than an email campaign be followed through according to DFINITYs mailing list.

What about the fact that “DFINITY shouldn’t be pushing or forcing this, it should come from the community themselves”?

Proposals have passed on this topic before, and they were ignored, because it wasn’t convenient for DFINITY. Quite frankly, without using “we’re the foundation, we built this” or “trust me”, why should we trust you to have the best interests now, and not just be doing this out of convenience for yourselves…?

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If you actually read my comments then you would see that my position is so what, who cares, roll my eyes at the idea of automating around this proposal. It should take way more work than it’s worth compared to just meeting the minimum expectations. In no way do I think that the fact that someone could perform this automation should be a reason not to proceed. It’s an idea that should not be allowed by the majority to stifle the conversation.

I’m a little confused on your position here. Would you please clarify? Do you want DFINITY to move forward with implementation of a periodic confirmation change?

My interpretation of this proposal is that the vote that is cast must be triggered manually instead of using a Followee. Do you interpret it differently? The controller of the neuron that votes may have multiple neuron and may also have hotkey control of other neurons belonging to a different controller. As a matter of convenience for users, voting manually with any one of these neurons will satisfy the need to vote manually. I think the assumption that is being made, which I think is reasonable, is that if you vote manually then you are performing an act of active NNS governance. If you vote manually, then you likely know your Followee selections and have made intentional choices about who to follow. If you think this is an unreasonable assumption, would you please clarify why?

this sounds like a significant disincentive to staking on the nns versus elsewhere. also pointless complexity as @dfxjesse explained. the original proposal should be be revisited, since it was made over two years ago and opinions have likely changed.

This isn’t periodic confirmation, this is saying “they cast a vote so they probably know who they’re following, otherwise the NNS will directly reduce their APY”. Please don’t conflate the two.

If they don’t cast the vote, remove the following - why keep it & just remove voting power (APY)? Surely you see how removing voting power from the system makes your fear of a 51% even more plausible?

Can you also help me understand how it is that none of your previous concern are a problem now?

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I highly recommend you read through the latest comprehensive discussion about increasing decentralization. I think you have been busy with other things recently and may not have noticed, but real progress is happening. Topics like periodic confirmation of neuron followees and grants for voting neurons have finally made it to the top of the priority list on the roadmap for DFINITY. The concrete proposals that have been offered are really quite good.

Below is the conclusion from the previous thread, but it really is a good read from the beginning because lots of people in the community offered well reasoned and civilized feedback.

Hi everyone

I strongly disagree with this idea.

Investors such as myself will be put through yet another hurdle and lowers confindence, whats next ? What else will be changed? All because youd like to lower infatuation.

It feels like a carrot has been dangled and now hulla hoops are needed to be jumped through in order to reach 14.9% interest.

Im sure its okey for the majority of people on this forum as its no change to them to vote manually but think bigger than yoursleves think about investor confidence and what we all originally signed up for.

This will lower investor confidence and force them to look elsewhere.

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There are many people that share your opinion. It is a fair opinion.

The debate and voting on proposals like this will always reflect a balance between those who want no change and those who see change as necessary.

I also think it’s important to remember that ICP is a utility token and the tokenomics are 100% aligned with awarding governance participation. We don’t get paid for staking. We get paid for voting. That should be clear to everyone before they sign up for any ICP governance participation to recieve rewards. In my opinion, this proposal helps remind people of that commitment. We should not fool ourselves into thinking that we have invested in a set and forget asset. The NNS is intentionally designed to be mutable, which by definition means people need to remain aware of changes and vote according to their convictions. I think the community has a big role to play in reminding ourselves that our tokenomics are not like other investments even if we want them to be. We are all offered governance rewards to stay active in that governance process.

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Same thoughts,

If people want to reduce inflation, they should lower the staking rewards that we are earning. This will eventually be reflected in the ICP price going up. The only thing ICP needs is more profit coming into the ecosystem. That’s how we will all earn more, not through these tricks.

Alternatively, they could change the voting reward function. For example, after 8+ years, inflation could be at 5%, but after 20+ years, it could decrease to 3.5%, etc.

The only way for stakers to really earn money is by burning cycles, growing the ecosystem, and generating profit. The goal should not be to drive away investors who stake their ICP through the NNS.

Dfinity has too much voting power. To address this, they could create another neuron and vote with that instead, requiring all active participants to switch to the new Dfinity neuron. This would make the system more decentralized while maintaining the old rules.

Although I think it’s not a bad idea, I fear that investors might lose trust in the NNS.

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For example, I bought ICP for my godson and placed it in a neuron, so it could get big in 20 years (hopefully). Now, with these new rules, I have to manage that small neuron as well.

There should be a button in the nns or another app that confirms this for all the given neurons, also neurons that are from other internet identities!

That’s also true. But it should be made clear that we only earn by voting and that it’s necessary that for people to stay active

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Below is a link to a post made by DFINITY where they pitched this idea to the community as a means for a Soft Reset. It’s not a bad idea, but there was some good discussion about it in that thread. If you haven’t seen it, I recommend reading the entire thread. It offers a lot of context on how we arrived at this current proposal including talking through an idea very similar to your suggestion.

I noticed the other day that DFINITY is now triggering 35% of total voting power in the NNS when they vote on the Governance proposal topic. They own and directly control 19.7%, but over 15% is now choosing to follow the DFINITY neuron. This time last year only about 7-8% was following DFINITY and within the last 2 years only about 2% was following DFINITY on the Governance and SNS topics. Hence, over time significantly more of the NNS neurons are following DFINITY again. This is happening in spite of the fact that the Governance and SNS topics have a proposal weight of 20x and DFINITY does not vote on a significant fraction of Governance and SNS proposals, which means those followers are losing rewards. It’s natural for people to trust and want to follow the developer team on a project, but I think most people would argue that it has a negative impact on decentralization. Regardless, it is the natural tendency.

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You make a good point regarding ‘not payed to stake but payed to vote’

Im struggling with what the point of this actually is

  1. to lower inflation
  2. shake investor (new and old) confidence by changing the way rewards are earned.
    This will not have the desired effect of lowering inflation, but the opposite as new investors are.put off and
  3. Invest elsewhere ie. WaterNeron who will be the biggest winner should this proposal be successful :wink:
  4. decentralisation? Which is totally bonkers way of dealing with the elephant in the room.

If it was to pass and then inflation is not lowerd and scores of would.be new investors have moved onto the next best thing what will do next ? And where does this stop ?

So i ask you all what is the purpose of this proposal actually is ?

I think that if NNS itself does not guarantee rewards for less active participants, they will continue to stake. Only with the help of a middleman/third party who will ensure the continuity of rewards or a service that automatically extends the reset of sleeping neurons every few weeks/months.
This is not conducive to decentralization.

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The question is, how aggressively do we want to lower inflation.
:motoko_go: :motoko_go: :motoko_go: :motoko_go: :motoko_go: :motoko_go:
I vote for D
We dont need a whole month to decrease the reward.

Take a look at the hotkey section of the proposal. Hotkeys satisfy the needs that you are describing. The proposal is intentionally trying to make periodic confirmation easy for everyone.

Isn’t this already clear? I haven’t created a new voting neuron in a long time, so I don’t know if the NNS dApp gives fair warning. Hopefully it does. Regardless, if your neuron is not voting, then it won’t get rewards. Doesn’t that spark questions? If this isn’t clear already, then I would be in favor of adding more clarification when people choose to stake.

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Whoever is moderating this, easy on the flagging.

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The periodic confirmation, as initially passed, was to make voters consciously choose who they are going to follow. I am not sure if this accomplishes that.It should be a complete reset to null.

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I agree that it feels important to have true resets built into the system, like term limits.

My major concern is the accumulation of power, especially with DFINITY having so much accumulated power due to the default advantages of starting the network.

From the OP: “The voting power of all other neurons is not affected”

Does this mean that for example DFINITY’s neurons would not have reduced voting power as the sleeper neurons following them have their voting power reduced during the 5th month of inactivity?

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Hi all, thanks for all the feedback and questions.

Let me address some of the main points that were raised - phrased and summarised in my words:

  • Why does the voting power start decreasing after 5 months rather than 6 months, which would be nice as it is a biannual confirmation? Why is it not 3 months?

The idea was to pick a period that is short enough to have some effect but long enough so that it is realistic for most neurons to perform one of the actions without being a major hurdle. I think the originally proposed 6 months is a good sweet spot for this.
There is no major difference whether we start the voting power decrease at 6 months or arrive at zero voting power at 6 months. If the community prefers the former to make this a biannual confirmation, we can adjust the design accordingly.

We think that 3 months is a bit too often. We could consider having a shorter period in the beginning to see the first effects earlier - e.g., set the timer to 3 months ago so that the first neurons have to confirm within this time.
We think however that we should not go below 3 months because all integrations need enough time to prioritize and implement support for this and the communication has to reach all neuron owners so that they know they have to do this.

  • Why have a decline at all and not just go from full to zero voting power?

We agree that this might not make a huge difference for NNS dapp users and similar frontends, as a warning can already be shown earlier and basically serve as a “grace period”. However, this is not true for users who interact with the NNS through a command line tool - they only learn about the neuron upon sending requests. Therefore, we still propose the decline.
Note that we don’t think this will be substantially more engineering work and, as was noted, for most users it should not complicate things as they would be prompted to take action already before the decline.

  • What is the definition of “directly vote?”

This is a vote that is directly cast by a neuron’s controller or hotkey, no matter which frontend is used. But it does not include votes that are automatically registered by the governance canister due to following. Technically, any call to the neuron management function register_vote is considered a direct vote.

  • Is this feature useful if one can circumvent it?

It is known that this is the case and generally it is very hard to prevent automation. The idea is that this feature likely captures a substantial portion of the voters and therefore still has a positive effect.

  • Why does the design not actually reset the following? Why is there no complete reset?

We agree that there is some benefit to a full reset as it forces neurons who come back after a long time to make an active decision rather than just reactivate their account.

We can adjust the design and governance could fully remove the following settings for neurons who reached zero voting power due to the adjustment.
This will increase the code complexity slightly as it requires a new regular job on the governance, but we can also implement this while the rest of the feature is already released (as this case is only relevant after a few months).

  • Why is direct voting one of the actions considered?

This was briefly explained in the original post, but let me try to explain this better.

The design with the voting power adjustment has advantages over the alternatives as explained in “Alternatives considered”. Consider a neuron that has no following set at all and directly votes every day. In this design, the neuron would have adjusted voting power after a while, because it does not confirm following which is just not relevant for the neuron. Adjusting the voting power of this neuron does not seem to be fair as this is a neuron that is the most active governance participant that can exist.

I think on a more practical level, neurons that directly vote on a regular basis are likely neurons that are interested and engaged and already make conscious decisions on who to follow. Also, they are likely regularly visiting the NNS dapp and would also see the prompt to confirm following.

  • What is the notification campaign associated with this feature?

We plan to reach out to all the projects that we know of that integrate with the NNS and widely inform users on the channels that we have, e.g., on the forum, X, information about new feature in the NNS dapp, etc.

  • Will manually vote with any one of my neurons reset the timer for all my neurons?

No, this is not the case. If a neuron votes, this will only reset the timer of this one neuron.
Note however, that if you cast a direct vote on the NNS dapp, you can select multiple or all of your neurons. If you select multiple ones, a direct vote will be cast for each of those neurons. For this feature that means that all selected neurons’ timer would be reset. This is likely how most users vote, but I wanted to clarify that it is not enough to vote e.g., with only one neuron using a command line tool.

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