!ONLY “1 ICP” IN ICX'S SNS ICP Treasury! What is the Warning!, the Reflection!, the ACTION! for us?!?!?!

[Accumulating.icp]

After a stagnant investigation, identical actions have been repeated by BOOM DAO - an SNS dApp endorsed by multiple DFINITY employees, and the DFINITY Foundation themselves.

Action needs to be taken - the foundation can not repeat their previous fault of indefinite intentional ignorance, as showcased in so many subjects prior.

This needs to be solved in a timely manner, otherwise you are leaving countless users vulnerable to exploitation of the faulty centralized system that is liquid democracy in isolation.

This passive “we’ll get around to it… eventually…” stance is going to leave us in a TERRA LUNA situation. And while the Foundation says it’s not a problem until we’re there - I’d like to see someone attempt to correct the TERRA LUNA event.

[nolyoi]

Wot?

[DHemingway]

I’m confused what the problem is? I think it’s sounds like a bunch of people crying about nothing.
BoomDAO did exactly what they said they were going to do. I applaud them in removing ICP from the treasury neuron and staking it - I wish every SNS project would do more of the same. They also gave the BoomDAO Foundation 2-years of funds to make other strategic developments and investments in to their product. Again no problem that I can see as it’s not the DAO’s decision to decide where the funds go, it’s the leaders of BoomDAO and that was expressly made very clear well in advance of Boom’s SNS. So either people don’t read or don’t ask the right questions and therefore just gamble money(ICP) around the ecosystem.

Maybe you have a different set of expectations to what the BoomDAO project is or isn’t, but that’s not Boom’s fault, that person’s fault is Accumulating.icp’s fault.

[IC_Maximillion]

@IC_Maximillion

Having easy access to tokens, worth millions of dollars, laying around in the treasury, can make the most honest devs fantasize.

[JaMarco]

Apparently BOOM DAO said they were going to take this action in their SNS sales proposal before hand. Do you know if that’s true?

Singularity 8'ter ∞

[Accumulating.icp]

@DHemingway

I’m confused what the problem is?

You mean other than the fact that they extracted 80% of an SNS DAOs Treasury in a Lump Sum, executed the proposal within 3 minutes, allocated 100x funding for themselves over liquidity pools, and claim that 80k ICP is enough to “build the future of gaming” while they had to take 320k ICP for basic tooling that was already in existence?

Seems real sustainable, thank God they’ve allocated less than 1/3 of what they took to a Neuron! If you do basic math you’ll quickly realize that the Neuron won’t regain the full 320k ICP even after 8 years staked compounded.

I’m not going to entertain this ignorance further, I’m just going to state that I’m beyond concerned for the future of ICP as a blockchain if your mindset of careless-ness continues to cultivate amongst others.

Daniel

[jwarner]

It’s in their whitepaper that they were going to use 80% of funds for roughly 24 months of development. I don’t agree with how they did it, but it was in the document. Whether they pulled it all out now, or slowly drained it over 24 months doesn’t make a difference in my mind.

Also, I haven’t seen a lot of people who actually bought into the DAO complaining about what is happening with their funds. There might be some, but they don’t seem as vocal as the people complaining who didn’t even invest in it. U.S. residents were blocked from participation, so maybe that has something to do with it.

[JaMarco]

Yea if they disclosed beforehand what they were going to do then it’s case closed, they didn’t do anything wrong.

I still don’t think this is a great way to handle DAO funds, doesn’t feel sustainable long term.

[e274426380]

If they were sincere about just wanting a payday for themselves and not RUG, then why would they withdraw a large amount of money at this point in time? What is more, if they are just paying wages, why do they not withdraw the funds once a month or once a quarter, but advance the funds all at once?

[lixx]

Lmao, Boomdao did it again, like ICX.

[Jabberwocky]

Sonic is doing it now as well

[ZackDS]

You mean the 350 K USD worth of ICP ?

Sonic

[skilesare]

@infinite

Now prohibiting Canister controlling neurons or prohibiting trading neurons has more disadvantages than advantages( Including but not limited to 1. But now that there are lots of SNSes with lots of ICP just sitting around doing nothing the situation is a bit different. Ideally these SNSes would be able to stake. Otherwise they are missing out
2. Staking is just a more optimal way to pay for development. Specially for us with small amount of funding.
3. Small capital projects or short-term difficult to profit projects caught in a vicious circle, consuming all the treasury funds, resulting in a rugpull or a soft rugpull!
It’s more important to stay alive？！
4. Not conducive to sustainable application, development, and innovation(DEFI and more)

There is one BIG disadvantage to letting canisters hold neurons and that is neuron markets that have the ability(note: not a guarantee, but a valid attack vector) to break the fundamental assumption of NNS governance: “skin in the game”. I’ve written ad nauseam about it elsewhere and won’t repeat the arguments here.

But there is no reason that you can’t let whitelisted canisters hold them. Blackholed and/or DAO Horizoned canisters should be able to hold neurons. This does not seem like a difficult feature to add given that a new proposal type mirroring named neuron could be added that stores whitelisted canisters at an address and at https://github.com/dfinity/ic/blob/e89564adda6ca8588f29780d9dfd7b8512e19f8c/rs/nns/governance/src/governance.rs#L2037 you could update to.

   if !neuron.controller.unwrap().is_self_authenticating() and !canister_whitelist.contains(neruon.controller))  {

You could even auto-add SNS-controlled canisters to the whitelist without a proposal by verifying that they were only controlled by the SNS.

[wpb]

@skilesare

Blackholed and/or DAO Horizoned canisters should be able to hold neurons. This does not seem like a difficult feature to add given that a new proposal type mirroring named neuron could be added that stores whitelisted canisters at an address and at https://github.com/dfinity/ic/blob/e89564adda6ca8588f29780d9dfd7b8512e19f8c/rs/nns/governance/src/governance.rs#L2037 you could update to.

This is a brilliant idea. I’m not sure if you have suggested it before, but if you did then I totally missed it. Is this something that you think you could pursue in collaboration with DFINITY as a community driven feature upgrade? I’m sure you could find developers who would be happy to help write and test the code, especially if it were offered from the bounty program.

[skilesare]

One day I’ll have to learn Rust.

I’ll ask around…there may be other reasons that DFINITY doesn’t want this, but it makes a lot of sense to me.

[wpb]

@skilesare

I’ll ask around

@levi has proven to have the passion and talent for this kind of work with his recent proposal to change significant SNS parameters. Based on what I have seen so far with the CodeGov project, I suspect @cyberowl, @zackDS, @Zane, @massimoalbarello, @ilbert, and/or @Icdev2dev could help write, review, or test the code. I’m sure you known others as well from the ICDevs bounty program.

It would be nice to see a team from the community come together to take on this kind of feature development…assuming there are no security related blockers from the DFINITY perspective.

[wpb]

@georgi

Our plan is to do some more investigation on the topic in the upcoming weeks, come up with more ideas, and then have a community discussion before implementing anything.

@lara @bjoernek

Have you all considered using existing features built into neurons with the Neuron Management proposal topic? It is possible to create a decentralized neuron as taught by @bjoern that doesn’t have a known private key and can only be controlled by Followees for the Neuron Management proposal topic. That topic can control all features of a neuron except dispersing the ICP in the neuron. Hence, once the ICP goes in as a stake, then it can never come out (unless it is a non-profit neuron). However, the Neuron Management proposal topic can be used to spawn child neurons from maturity of the parent neuron and assign principal IDs to the child neuron. If an SNS intends to use maturity to fund ongoing development, then perhaps an 8 year neuron is sufficient to meet the needs.

Part of the plans to create an SNS could be to either elect or propose a slate of up to 15 Followees for the Neuron Management proposal topic. Hence, if funding is requested from this neuron, then it would be up to the Followees of the Neuron Management proposal topic to Adopt or Reject the proposal. An entire SNS community could not vote directly on a proposal to spawn a neuron from maturity of the decentralized neuron, but they could elect representatives (who are doxed and background checked) to perform this task.

Also, from an NNS voting perspective, @christian has provided an example of how to enable automatic voting of a decentralized neuron based on canister control from a hotkey configuration. The Taggr neuron votes on NNS proposals based on the results of polls conducted in Taggr. The Taggr canister is a hotkey for the Taggr neuron, which enables the canister to vote on proposals. Here is the discussion thread from when that idea was developed. I believe he has already made the canister code for triggering the votes open source.

In the Taggr case, Christian essentially black holed control of the Taggr neuron by removing all Followees from the Neuron Management proposal topic after it was configured. That was done because the intent of the Taggr neuron is only voting and there is no desire the change that configuration in the future ever. In fact, if ICP was ever deposited into the Taggr neuron, then maturity would build forever and could never be extracted since there are no Followees for the Neuron Management proposal topic and there is no known private key to control the neuron.

In the case of an SNS, I think the best configuration that could be achieved for decentralization would be to form the neuron without a known private key, assign up to 15 Followees to the Neuron Management proposal topic who are elected by the SNS community, configure Followees for each NNS proposal topic, add a canister hotkey for controlling voting on NNS proposals, set the neuron to 8 year dissolve delay, and then stake all or a portion of the SNS treasury. The SNS team could propose a fraction of the token swap that should be allocated to an account for easy access and a fraction that should be allocated to this long term treasury neuron. The neuron could be set up this way before the SNS token swap and funds could be automatically deposited into the neuron based on the proposed allocation.

This doesn’t seem like it would take much development because all the features of the Neuron Management proposal topic, spawning neurons from maturity, and hotkey control of neuron voting already exist with all neurons. The only development that would be required is integrating it into the SNS design in a trustless way. This type of approach could also be used with existing SNSs, but there are a few trust requirements in getting the ICP form the current SNS treasury to an ICP account and then to a decentralized neuron. If an SNS team is transparent of their intent with their community, then perhaps they could convince them of this plan in advance so they don’t receive a lot of community backlash during the transition.

Anyway, it’s just an idea. It could be that SNS teams don’t believe that their long term development efforts can survive off maturity alone.

[wpb]

An alternative to the configuration described above is to use 2 neurons to accomplish the same goals described above while still retaining full NNS control of the SNS treasury. One neuron would be the decentralized SNS neuron with up to 15 Followees for the Neuron Management proposal topic and hotkey control of NNS voting by an SNS canister, but this neuron would not contain the treasury as a stake. The other neuron could be called the SNS endowment neuron and would contain the SNS treasury, but would have a private key controlled by the NNS and would be configured with the decentralized SNS neuron as the Followee for the Neuron Management proposal topic. In this way, the decentralized SNS neuron can control all aspects of the SNS endowment neuron except having the ability to disperse the ICP. They can set Followees on all proposal topics (e.g. configured to follow the decentralized SNS neuron) and they can spawn neurons from maturity of the SNS endowment neuron (assigning any principal to the child neuron). If anything goes wrong with the SNS, then all the NNS needs to do is revoke the Followee setting for the Manage Neuron proposal topic of the SNS endowment neuron, which it can do since the NNS holds the private key. Since the original stake of the SNS endowment neuron came from funds raised in the SNS token swap, those funds could be easily returned to the neuron fund and the swap participants.

These functional features exist in all neurons today.

[osman]

First İC-x and then Boom dao withdrew the resources in the treasury with a vote. The reason for both is the purchase of services. that is, software service, marketing and advertising service. Apparently, SNS DAO has not established any procedure for receiving service. If SNS dao is also related with these treasure dumping incidents, this is organized theft. If not, SNS DAO should urgently create a service purchasing procedure for its projects. For example, the institution or person that will provide the service locks up tokens equal to 6% of the service fee and puts their proposal to vote. If it passes the vote, it receives 30% of the service fee in advance and after completing the service, it runs the service delivery procedure and receives the remaining service fee after it is accepted from the dao vote. The service provides the necessary service free of charge when used for 1 year. At the end of 1 year, the %6 guarantee is automatically resolved and returned to the service provider.
A procedure similar to this should be implemented urgently.

[wpb]

If I’m understanding your suggestion correctly, and the SNS intends to support development services on maturity from a treasury neuron alone (which would be sustainable funding), then the decentralized neuron mechanism that I tried to describe could be the procedure you are interested in implementing. For every withdrawal for services provided, it would require a proposal to spawn a neuron for the amount of that withdrawal and it would require majority voting by the doxed and elected Followees of the Neuron Management proposal topic of the decentralized SNS neuron to approve that proposal.

If the SNS intends to support development services from the capital in the treasury (which would deplete the treasury over time), then some other method needs to be developed. That could be developed by DFINITY and integrated into the SNS framework or it could be developed by individual SNS teams if canister controlled neurons were permitted (e.g. see the post by @skilesare).

I agree that more controls need to be placed on how and when SNS treasury distributions can and should be executed and there needs to be a sense of urgency about it. I see decentralized neurons and/or endowment neurons as a reasonable quick fix that might make a good permanent fix, especially if they can be integrated into the SNS framework in a trustless way.