Good points, but node providers will need to go through strict KYC and audits. Part of the ICâs deterministic decentralisation concept depends on the idea that node providers can be held legally accountable for any attempts to do damage to the IC (which is why they need to sign a statement to ensure they understand this point - as far as I understand it). If that statement is considered legally binding, there could be another one that ensures that the NP understands they are committing to a minimum timeframe maintaining nodes for the IC (if theyâre claiming for a subsidy).
I think there are also other ways of mitigating this risk:
- A vesting period where the investment is eventually paid off (representing an exit for the investors, and limiting the timeframe where thereâs cut and run risk)
- How much stake does this individual have in the IC (proper ICP stake), and how long are they staked for?
Another way of approaching this is that thereâs talk of requiring node providers to build up mandatory ICP stake in the future (to help mitigate other existing risks). The suggestion is that these stakes should be slashable in the event of clear wrong-doing. Perhaps this sort of fund raising / investment approach could be used to help bootstrap those NP stakes.
If node providers are receiving a reasonable portion of their rewards from governance, rather than just infrastructure provision, there would be a number of benefits:
- Greater resilience to fluctuations in ICP price. This would reduce the pain when the ICP price is steadily falling (with NP rewards lagging behind due to the 30 day moving average). Governance rewards are more stable in this respect.
- Thereâs no cut and run risk with staked ICP
- This would significantly increase trust across the IC as a whole