Hi all,
FYI after a discussion with @THLO, I did a short analysis on the interplay of the new exchange rate mechanism and financial incentives for spam. In particular I quantified how much ICP an individual (or a group) needs to hold in order to be able to offset the rejection cost of 10 ICP by increased rewards due to submitting one spam governance proposal.
Used input:
- Based on historical data we have on average approx 0.5 governance and 6 non-governance proposal per day (in addition to 144 exchange rate proposals).
- For the staked ICP by the (group of) spamer(s) I assume a dissolve delay bonus of 2.
Outcome
Required ICP to be able to offset
| pre new exchange rate | post new exchange rate | |
|---|---|---|
| weekday | 307,166 | 256,985 |
| weekend | 68,178 | 17,572 |
Conclusion
- The new exchange rate mechanism increases considerable the financial incentives for spamming, in particular on week-ends.
- It would desirable to implement a spam prevention mechanism in parallel with the new exchange rate mechanism.