Ok, so let’s use your example and assume the average investor earns 3 ICP per day. This is the current voting reward if the average investor has approx 6000 ICP locked in a neuron with an 8 year dissolve delay and votes on every proposal. In this scenario, it takes the average investor 0.5 year to accumulate 550 maturity.
Now let’s assume there are 200 average investors who are willing to contribute all of their maturity to the neuron fund. That amounts to 110k maturity from average investors, all of which took 0.5 year to accumulate.
It’s based on simple math that includes assumptions such as those presented above. The neuron fund is only funded from maturity, which is a time based accumulation.
I’m not sure where you’re trying to go with this (I don’t see how this absolves any of the issues), but 6 Months in comparison to our 8 Year lockup period doesn’t seem that long to me. This is also negligent of the fact that, based off neuron IDs, there are hundreds of thousands of neurons that have existed.
You’re making generalized assumptions of the entirety of the NNS in an attempt to prove your point without information to back the claim - you have no way to know the size of neurons, the number of participants, time staked, etc.
Furthermore, time to accrue maturity does have a part to play in it, but you’re again extrapolating with information you don’t have. It would take a neuron with 100 ICP 1 Day to accrue .068 Maturity (rough numbers), however 10 neurons with 10 ICP would accrue the same maturity within the same timeframe - you have absolutely no way to gauge which of these scenarios occurs other than assuming.
I don’t want to draw too many conclusions, but the jagged nature of these graphs certainly do not look like a bunch of small investors making distributed and decentralized decisions.
That’s fair to point out, these graphs definitely show that there are a few large neurons in there - and I’m not trying to imply there isn’t.
However, I am saying that we have no transparent way to gauge which is which, without making assumptions (similar to followee voting power currently).
We should not be making assumptions in regards to the amendment of security risks & design flaws, taxable events, and other regulatory issues.
In hindsight I’m rather confused as to where this general talking point was intended to go in the first place - I’m not sure why the position size of participants, or how long it takes them to accrue maturity would be relevant within the context of front running, liquidity availability, proportional contribution, tax evasion, the portrayal of an investment opportunity, or the inability to robustly manage personal assets.
Concerning Governance Poll 123269 - (#NeruonFund) put forward by @accumulatingicp After surveying the dev board we have received only adopt or abstain responses. ICDevs will vote to adopt with the understanding that this is a motion poll without any governance authority or action demanded. This is an opportunity for discussion, optimization, and organic adaptation which should be expected as we build these systems.
Statement of fact without commentary: Our board is made up of some of the highest contributors and most time-invested members of the community who all are pursuing building applications that may be DAOified and need to do fundraising one day. We could not find a single vote that wanted to affirm the Neuron Fund in its current form.
Commentary: The fund currently seems to be operating in a ham-fisted manner. The all-or-nothing nature of contributions to SNS sales is odd and oversight by the NNS in general seems counterintuitive to DAO philosophy where those with skin in the game make decisions. It is generally felt that the presence of the community fund is creating a race to capture the earned maturity leading to a lack of quality and thoughtfulness of projects pursuing SNS launches. We offer the following gradient of solutions from most drastic to least drastic, non-exclusive:
Fork by awarding all ICP-based neurons a mirror amount of sICP(balance + maturity) in an sICP SNS. This DAO can take over SNS-based votes and be given authority over the SNS Subnet, WASM oversight, and awarding of NF. This would allow ICP holders and organizations like ICDEVs that do not want SNS oversight to sell their sICP to those that do want this responsibility. This increases the alignment of those wanting to focus on governance with the Neuron Fund. The utility of this DAO is its oversight and filtering of wheat from the chaff.
Make the Neuron fund awarding a separate vote. Only let NF Members vote on awarding it.
Make the Neuron Fund contribution proportional to the fulfillment of the SNS sale goals.
Given DFINITY has voted ”no”, yet has recognized the abundance of design flaws within the Neuron Fund, does DFINITY have a plan & timeline to amend the following attack vectors, or will these be left to be exploited, @bjoernek ?
Front-running
Liquidity Availability
Proportional Contribution (timeline?)
Tax Evasion (yes, i know it’s a feature, not a design flaw, but transparency is required for those who would like to accurately report their taxes)
Probably a good idea to start looking into refreshing the SNS. Since in the current model people are already having trouble raising money and investors are starting to notice issues.
Do we really want to wait until everyone think it’s a failure and fixing it is basically impossible because all trust is lost?
