I agree 100% with you, like almost every time by the way.
About people wanting to use the II, bu wanting to avoid the use of a recovery phrase touching Internet, here is the recap of the discussion, because it answers to your question :
Here is what Jordan wrote back then :
And this :
And @bjoern answered this, which answers to your question :
I wish I had known/understood this back in 2021. I feel like the marketing/eduction around II vs hardware wallets wasn’t really present, or at least I missed it. Seems to me that most of the lay people in the community believe (believed?) II to be extremely secure. It’s only after digging in that we discover these flaws.
Let me clarify. Authentication with II is still fundamentally more secure than browser-based wallets like Metamask or Plug, because the cryptographic key resides in a secure hardware chip and outside of the realm of the browser or even the computer’s main memory. It is, however, also fundamentally less secure than a hardware wallet, since the hardware wallet will allow you to inspect the transaction. With web authentication, you as a user must be involved (e.g. fingerprint or face scan), but you don’t see the transaction details.
Let me put out some numbers. Here are values that I would feel comfortable with managing in different ways (these are based on my personal risk profile, everyone will have different limits):
- Browser wallet (e.g. Metamask/Plug) on my own general-purpose devices: $100s, for short time maybe $1’000s.
- Internet Identity on my own general-purpose devices: $1’000s, for short time maybe $10’000s.
- Browser wallet or Internet Identity on a “clean” device that I only use for one specific application that I personally trust, and where the front-end is decentralized (e.g. nns.internetcomputer.org) and that I never connect to public networks: $10’000s and maybe a bit more if I am paranoid about keeping the device clean.
- Hardware wallet (which I never connect to a device I don’t own): $100’000s.
- Custom cold-storage/air-gap setup: Anything beyond.
So I did not want to suggest that Internet Identity wasn’t secure – quite to the contrary! I personally think it has the best trade-off between security and usability for day-to-day use. I just want to encourage the use of “non-day-to-day” methods for cases for large amounts of tokens.
So, as we must use the recovery phrase rather than FIDO : or we improve the security of the II seed phrase generation, or we put only few ICP on the wallets not protected by a Ledger Hardwallet used as hotkey. So when you ask :

Would you say the security is equivalent using II with a FIDO device as a recovery method vs. using the ledger as a hotkey on the II?
As you can see, it is not equivalent in term of security. For big amounts, the Ledger must be used as hotkey.
But as you can see, with what @bjoern writes, the problem for the NFT owners stays entire, this is why I was asking this :
I wish I had known/understood this back in 2021. I feel like the marketing/eduction around II vs hardware wallets wasn’t really present, or at least I missed it. Seems to me that most of the lay people in the community believe (believed?) II to be extremely secure. It’s only after digging in that we discover these flaws.
Let me clarify. Authentication with II is still fundamentally more secure than browser-based wallets like Metamask or Plug, because the cryptographic key resides in a secure hardware chip and outside of the realm of the browser or even the computer’s main memory. It is, however, also fundamentally less secure than a hardware wallet, since the hardware wallet will allow you to inspect the transaction. With web authentication, you as a user must be involved (e.g. fingerprint or face scan), but you don’t see the transaction details.
Let me put out some numbers. Here are values that I would feel comfortable with managing in different ways (these are based on my personal risk profile, everyone will have different limits):
- Browser wallet (e.g. Metamask/Plug) on my own general-purpose devices: $100s, for short time maybe $1’000s.
- Internet Identity on my own general-purpose devices: $1’000s, for short time maybe $10’000s.
- Browser wallet or Internet Identity on a “clean” device that I only use for one specific application that I personally trust, and where the front-end is decentralized (e.g. nns.internetcomputer.org) and that I never connect to public networks: $10’000s and maybe a bit more if I am paranoid about keeping the device clean.
- Hardware wallet (which I never connect to a device I don’t own): $100’000s.
We are currently designing a scheme that allows any canister on the Internet Computer to use the ICP hardware wallet app for securely displaying and signing transactions, and that would work as follows:
- The canister developer specifies for each pair of (canister id, method name) a schema for rendering the parameters. That would likely be a transaction name and a structure that specifies for each field of the Candid argument whether it should be displayed and the title that should be used. (We need to devise a format for this, this actually is the main open design task.)
- The canister then signs said schema with the IC’s threshold ECDSA signature method.
- The dapp front end sends the unsigned transaction along with the signed schema to the hardware wallet.
- The hardware wallet derives the canister’s ECDSA public key from the IC’s ECDSA root public key and the canister id, and verifies the signature on the schema. It then uses the schema to display the transaction to the user, and signs the transaction when the user approves.
Hi @bjoern, hope this message finds you well. Any ETA of this wonderful feature ?
CONCLUSION : If we want to use the II, the Ledger as hotkey is a necessity for big amount of ICP, but this does not solve the problem for the NFT.