To clarify, I am not an early investor. I learned about ICP the week before the genesis launch. I think I’m much closer to being a shrimp in the ecosystem than I am to being a whale, but I suppose that is relative.
Also to be clear, my proposals are my proposals and are funded by me. They are not ICP Maximalist Network proposals and are not funded by that organization.
Yes, but he is also taking the crowdfunding approach…which I think is reasonable. If you have a good proposal, I don’t see anything wrong with getting a group together to fund it. Also, it is only a cost if it is rejected. So submit something that has a low probability of being rejected and share the risk with others. I’m sure there are whales that would be happy to fund a proposal that has a chance of passing. Perhaps not the one that @skileshare is submitting since this one is to remove proposal weights, but there are many proposals that will be able to move forward even with high proposal reject cost because whales would be happy to fund them.
@skileshare ran into a whale (or a group of whales) in the community that believed he did not deserve to be a named neuron because of past relationships and activities. I have no idea if there was validity to those arguments, but a very small percentage of the voting power was participating in governance proposals at the time. Hence a small group of whales were able to successfully block the ICDevs nomination two times. It wasn’t until proposal weights were implemented before ICDevs was approved. It happened because proposal weights incentivized a lot more people to participate in governance. There was finally enough voting power that no one group or person was able to control the vote outcome. Dfinity was also in a position where they could vote with their own convictions without casting absolute majority. They voted in favor of the ICDevs proposal, but they didn’t need to in order for it to pass. It was already going to pass. The irony is that proposal weights has brought so much improvement to the decentralization of IC governance, yet removing proposal weights is identified as a solution to the problem with spam. Yes it created a spam problem, but there are so many better ways to solve this problem than giving up on proposal weights. Proposal weights has moved us much closer to decentralization.
I believe this information has been volunteered in various locations previously. It can be observed by watching the vote results of any given proposal using the information available for each proposal on the dashboard.
ICPMN + cycledao + ICDevs = 11.3% when ICDevs and cycledao were following ICPMN
They are no longer following ICPMN.
ICPMN = 2% when we vote before ICDevs and cycledao
ICDevs = 1.85% when they vote before ICPMN and cycledao
cycledao = 4-5% when they vote before ICPMN and ICDevs. This data was from mid Feb and may have changed. There haven’t been any recent examples of cycledao voting first.
There are a lot of neurons who follow multiples of these three public neurons. Hence, those neurons don’t cast votes until their Followees reach Absolute Majority as defined by NNS governance.
AFAIK, Dfinity shared the neurons that are supplying the voting power that they apply when they vote. This is not the same as sharing who at Dfinity is voting. I don’t know who is voting.
We don’t actually know. We can guess from how much things move when we vote, but that is complicated by changing folle patterns. You can’t call a function and get that info.
Two new pieces of information can be observed right now.
Cycledao is the only public neuron that just voted Yes on proposal 56592. They cast 6.1 % of total voting power at the 04/24/2022 16:18 mark. It is a spam governance motion proposal made to look like a subnet update proposal. It was submitted by neuron 13897053307110729737, which has submitted many garbage proposals in recent past like 54693, 56295, and 56591. This is not @ysyms. The person controlling neuron 1389… has not identified themselves AFAIK.
Cycledao and ICDevs just voted No at the same time on proposal 56593. They cast 8.6 % of total voting power at the 04/24/2022 16:14 mark. It is also a spam governance proposal, but it was submitted by @ysyms and did not try to pretend to be another type of proposal.
Wenzel thanks for providing the blog post link above, and for this recent voting data. Really neat to piece apart.
I agree that it’s near impossible to dissect followee voting power completely, but we can at least gauge a lower bound on followees. After the ICA/DFINITY default followee change earlier this year, one can guess that a significant portion of voting power defaults to the 3 named neurons - cycledao, ICDevs, and ICPMN.
We can deduce that for 6.1% of the voting power, that cycledao was the deciding vote and at the very least follow cycle dao (and potentially 1 or more other neurons who had already voted Yes). Cycle Dao could have much more than 6.1% that list it as followers, but this puts a lower bound on the the voting power that has them as a default followee.
We can deduce that for roughly 1.8% of the voting power, ICDevs was the deciding vote for neurons
that follow either just ICDevs, or ICDevs + cycleDao + any other default followees, but that the votes of those two neurons pushed them over the 50% threshold. Not bad considering they were added much later to the list of named neurons.
Much beyond this are purely assumptions, which will only become harder to show as more named neurons get added to the list.
Since the periodic confirmation of neurons proposal did pass but hasn’t been executed yet, I would love to see what happens to the voting power of the ICDevs neuron compared with ICPMN and cycledao after the reset. That should also give some perspective regarding if NNS voters are specifically certain neurons to guide their votes, or if they are just looking for an averaged backup to represent their vote if they wish to be passive/miss a vote.
Anywho, I got us off topic with a few selfish information requests, which @wpb graciously obliged. I’ll bow out for now.
I would like to propose a simple and definitive solution to the spams issue.
There are so many threads proposing a solution (maybe have one similar, I don’t know) that I would like to get the feel here first and if positive, have a thread by itself to maximize the proposal.
The base criteria of this proposal:
Keep it simple as far as understanding and operating the process
To be an efficient and final solution to spams
If need human participation, all neurons could participate and not only random neurons to keep decentralization at his best
I am against using the word SPAM anywhere in the NNS
Proposal:
1- The community would establish some “Valid proposal” criteria first for the governance proposals only (could be extended to other topics later if needed but I doubt)
2- The would be a 2 stages voting where the first stage would vote as if the proposal meet these criteria of a “Valid Proposal”. The 1 stage voting would last 24 hours, would not produce any rewards and the goal is to qualify the proposal only.
3- Soon as majority pass , the proposal is or either release for formal voting or rejected and ignore by the NNS
Example of those criteria could be:
The proposal has a meaningful use to the network
The proposal is in the right category of topics (So the Subnet upgrade in the Governance would be reject)
Although you may not be in favor of this proposal, you agree that the proposal is a legitimate proposal
The primary goal of the proposal is not to receive more rewards
Then the first stage voting would be: Do the proposal meet all the criteria? (or not)
If one criteria is NO, then you would vote NO to reject the proposal at stage 1.
I would recommend we have between 4 and 6 criteria maximum, to keep simplicity. This could be upgraded later on if needed. Important to say that we would NOT vote on if the proposal is a spam or not, but vote if the proposal meet the requirements of a legitimate proposal.
It would require some programming and some time but we cannot avoid this. It would be done forever.
If this make sense to some people here, we could start a new thread. If not, fine, we will keep trying solution to remove spams. I really think it is important to remove spams for the reputation of this great blockchain network.
I consider " the ability of an individual to petition the government to address a perceived wrong OR improve the government as well as the capability of the government to be transparent in it’s decision making process to such petition pre-facto" to be an fundamental right in a thriving modern democracy. EDIT: This is the free speech that i am referring to.
Of course you can see how this translates easily to NNS.
I don’t like making more work when I feel we don’t need to change anything and let the NNS simply to do the work:
Every spam proposal I see within the NNS has a proposer number that is replicated over other different proposals that is a unique number given to the proposer.
I would suggest that we add another filter to the NNS that adds a proposer number to the filter list when a proposal is rejected with a percent greater than some number.
A proposer is taken off the filter list after a time period to be able to submit again.
During a timeout the proposer is not disadvantaged from voting.
I would also suggest that the time period be increased after a certain number of rejections that are also increased by the number of rejections thereafter.
