As per the original proposal above, 10 nodes in total. However, we could consider revising this to 10 nodes per cluster.
On a side note, economically, it would likely be best for the node provider to locate these nodes in a single (or few) data centers depending on the number of nodes. Avoiding a set-up with very few nodes in a DC also enhances security because it would allow filling a full rack that is physically separated from others.
C12 (Carbon Twelve) supports the mission to strengthen decentralization across the ICP network, and weâve demonstrated that commitment by operating 8 high-availability nodes across two independent Tier III+ data centers in Paris and Barcelona.
We echo the concerns raised by many other NPs in the ecosystem (especially the well articulated concerns expressed by Tina) and are particularly concerned that some of the proposed standards - specifically the 10-node minimum requirement and mandatory staking of 50% of monthly rewards - could have the opposite of their intended effect.
Rather than broadening participation, these proposed changes risk forcing out smaller, reliable providers who contribute operational and geographic diversity, while consolidating node ownership among a handful of well-capitalized entities. In practice, this could shrink the total number of nodes, reduce global distribution, and undermine the decentralization these proposals aim to enhance.
Staking half of a Node Providerâs monthly rewards for one year is simply unfeasible for most operators who rely on those rewards to cover fixed monthly costs like colocation, power, and bandwidth. For providers like ourselves, node rewards are not speculative - they are operational income. Locking up 50% would strain cash flow, hinder our ability to maintain service quality, and limit reinvestment in infrastructure.
We urge the community to adopt a more flexible, data-informed approach: incentivize geographic spread, allow for diverse provider sizes, and respect the long-term commitments many NPs have already made under existing terms.
We remain committed to a robust, decentralized Internet Computer and look forward to working together toward solutions that strengthen - not narrow - the network.
8 nodes, 5 on critical subnets. Same intro to the forums as George. More red flags than the Double Dare obstacle course.
Makes sense you wouldnât be happy with these new changes.
Whatâs up with these unprovoked claims? Iâm known among the NP & ICP community. Feel free to ask around 
Another benefit is that each NP would have an official neuron which means theyâd be able to signal their alignment with proposals that affect them.
There are plenty of Subnet Management proposals that have been submitted that refer directly to Node Provider and/or operator requests. As a result, reviewers began asking for the proposal summary to link directly to public discussion with the NP in question, as a means of verifying proposal claims.
However, given that forum admins can impersonate any account and modify their comments, we really need an onchain mechanism for this sort of thing. An NP (with their official neuron) voting in favour of such proposals (ideally shortly after itâs submitted, or submitting it themself) would solve this problem and allow for true verifiability (rather than poor manâs verifiability).
I suggested a while back that Node Providers should each have a known neuron for this purpose. The suggestion was seen as a little heavy-handed. I think these slashable NP neurons would address this concern as a nice side-effect.
Hi @bjoernek and rest of the ICP community.
Compulsory staking of monthly rewards could force many Generation 2 (Gen2) node providers to operate at a loss. Their current rewards are calculated at 1.9 times ( instead of 2.5x for Gen 1 ) their capital (Capex) and operational (Opex) expenditures over four years. Any additional mandatory staking would significantly strain their finances.
Even without additional staking requirements, node providers often face low reward payouts for the majority of the year. This is due in part to the declining token price and the 30-day moving average calculation, which further reduces actual income.
Many node providers rely on debts / loans or have other financial commitments. By restricting access to rewards through staking, providers may be unable to meet these obligations on time, increasing legal risks and even the possibility of bankruptcy.
The reward multiplier is set to decrease for future generations of node providers ( from 2.5x for Gen 1 to 1.9x for Gen 2 to 1.?x (TBD) for Gen 3 ). This upcoming decrease will only amplify existing financial challenges and may discourage new entrants, ultimately undermining the networkâs long-term growth and sustainability.
The requirement for each node provider to be hosted exclusively in a separate Tier III or Tier IV etc data center is understandable from a reliability and security standpoint. However, it also carries inherent limitations for the scalability and decentralization of the Internet Computer ecosystem.
First, high-quality data centersâthose offering robust power, internet connectivity, and coolingâare relatively scarce. By mandating that no two or more node providers share the same facility and further limiting each provider to a maximum of 42 nodes, we effectively constrain both the total number of providers that can operate and the overall number of nodes that can be deployed. For instance, if there are around 10,000 data centers worldwide, of which only 30% meet Tier III or Tier IV criteria, that leaves roughly 3,000 suitable facilities. With exclusive facility use and a 42-node cap per provider, the potential scalability of the network is inherently limited. Even if each provider operates at full capacity, the total number of nodes would be capped around 126,000 ( even if you consider all DC in the world, this still we be a finite number )âa fraction of whatâs needed to match the scale of major cloud providers like Amazon, Azure, or GCP. The world computer we are building for next decade will not be able to scale this way. As compute-intensive services (such as self-writing internet applications and AI-driven platforms like caffeine.ai) grow in prominence, this structural limitation may increasingly hinder the networkâs evolution.
Second, many smaller countries have fewer than five top-tier data centers, which further restricts the number of possible node providers in those regions. This imbalance directly affects geographic diversity and decentralizationâcore values that are essential for a robust global network.
While I understand the intent behind setting a minimum threshold of 10 nodes per providerâprimarily to simplify KYC effortsâI believe this approach may not be justified in practice.
Firstly, imposing a minimum of 10 nodes, which equates to an investment of over a quarter million dollars, could deter new entrants due to the significant upfront risk and capital requirement. This may inadvertently centralize the network by favoring only large-scale operators. If our goal is to build the The World Computer for the next decade, promoting broad participationâincluding from smaller node providersâis essential to achieving meaningful decentralization even if it comes with a cost of KYC.
Moreover, a fixed threshold doesnât guarantee protection against collusion, which is the fundamental problem KYC aims to mitigate. While KYC can be one tool, relying on node count as a proxy for trustworthiness may be insufficient and possibly counterproductive.
If, however, we are compelled to proceed with this 10-node minimum (which I would caution against), there are important issues to consider for existing node providers who currently operate with fewer than 10 nodes:
Existing long term Data center contracts - There are long term contracts with data centers spanning from 3-4 years. I assume most would have gottan a 4 years contract as that was the initial discussed reward period for gen2 node providers.
Path to Compliance: Will these providers be allowed to scale up by adding more nodes? If so, the capital burden is immediate and significant. Also ICP network will further gain inflation.
Asset Liquidation: If the alternative is to sell their nodes, this introduces multiple challenges:
⢠Small node providers may be discouraged from selling their hardware at a loss, especially because it will not incentivize the buyer NP for the below mentioned reason.
⢠Other node providers are unlikely to purchase these nodes at fair market value because of the reduction factor applied to Gen2 nodes. As node count increases for an individual provider, each additional node yields diminished rewards. This makes it economically unattractive to absorb extra nodes, especially from smaller providers, effectively devaluing the hardware.
This scenario could result in smaller node providers being unfairly penalizedâeither by forcing them to make significant new investments or to accept losses on their hardwareâwhile larger providers consolidate further. Such an outcome would undermine decentralization and discourage grassroots participation, which are both core principles of the network.
It was the original intention:
I would also like to take us in the past and revisit the reason why reduction factor was introduced for rewardable nodes in Gen 2 Node onboarding ( which was not part of Gen 1 Nodes ), the very reason was to have as many as Node providers even the small ones.
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Lastly, I urge the DFINITY Foundation to honor the initial commitments and processes set for Gen2 Node Providers. These NPs have invested substantial time, resources, and trust in the ecosystem. Introducing major policy shifts mid-way creates uncertainty and undermines confidence in the networkâs governance. If such changes must be considered, they should be deferred until four years ( The original estimate for gen2 was to run for next 4 years ) from the date Gen2 onboarding phase concludedârecognizing that the onboarding process itself has already spanned more than a year. Gen2 NPs made financial and operational decisions based on the original structure; it is only fair that the network upholds those foundational commitments.
Hello ICP Community,
Data Center Advantage
A significant advantage the Internet Computer has over other Web 3 networks is the placement of ICP network nodes in secure, reliable, top-tier data centers with stringent SLAs. Hosting network nodes on computers residing in homes and random business locations using less reliable transport does not support the level of service and security required to compete against most Web 2 firms. This was a primary reason I participated in the ICP node program as ICPâs decentralized network can match or exceed the performance of centralized Web 2 networks allowing ICP to compete for and win business.
Data Center Economics
Procuring this guaranteed level of security and performance in reputable data centers requires node owners to execute term contracts for space, power, backup power, transport and IP services and purchase term server warranties.
Having worked in the telecommunications and data center industries for more than 25 years, I can tell you that leasing infrastructure and operating and administering nodes in high-quality data centers is expensive, time-consuming and can be complicated. These challenges are compounding every day as data center vacancies reach all-time lows and data center leases and transport rates continue to climb. In certain data center markets, service rates are climbing at +30% a year.
Given these realities, moving nodes to other data centers today is impractical, if not impossible, to accomplish quickly and cost effectively. Not to mention the high cost of moving the nodes. Who would pay for this?
Node Program Participation
As an ICP node owner, I made long-term financial, time and resource commitments based on the offer and terms presented and agreed to with the understanding that the rules, terms and financials would be stable. Now, Dfinity is proposing substantial changes to both the data center ownership rules and the financial reward polices placing new parameters around node ownership and logistics and potentially forcing node owners to stake a major portion of the monthly token awards for a significant period of time.
I did not consider the potential for changes, not to mention such far-reaching ones, when making my decision to participate. I made life plans and financial commitments based on the original Dfinity proposal. I believe making changes to the program now will deter others from participating in future Dfinity/ICP node programs due to the clear lack of predictably. This is a dangerous precedent to set that will diminish Dfinityâs credibility in the Web 3 universe. Dfinity should consider these facts and the ramifications as they formulate any existing node program policy and rule changes going forward.
Conclusion
In summary. I believe in and support the bright future for Dfinity, ICP and the Web 3 ecosystem. Dfinity and ICP have created great technology, a great network and a large and vibrant ecosystem to support long-term grow and prosperity. I want to continue supporting the community and the vision as a dedicated node owner, but altering the current node programs and changing existing policies will negatively affect this sentiment. Quite frankly, just the thought of it scares me.
Dfinity should focus on helping to grow the business, application base, and user community instead. That is the key. Node owners have made significant commitments that were based on expectations set by Dfinity. Change the policy for future node programs if you must, but for the benefit of the ICP network and community as a whole, leave the existing node programs alone please. I hope this is helpful.
@bjoernek My apologies, had a busy week. Looks like weâve received quite a bit of feedback on this topic already. If thereâs more to be discussed, Iâll bring it up during the NP workgroup in April. I also saw that @Lorimer has been doing some solid work around this that I still need to dig deeper into.
I want to share one more piece of context â for both NPs and non-NPs, technical and non-technical folks:
| Chain | Hardware Model | Opex (Est.) | Rewards (Est.) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Solana | Generic hardware (OPEX) | ~$5,000 USD max | ~$35,000+ USD |
| Aptos | Generic hardware (OPEX) | ~$1,500â$2,000 USD | ~$7,000 USD |
| Celestia | Generic hardware (OPEX) | ~$1,000 USD max | ~$7,000â$9,000 USD |
This isnât a complaint or finger-pointing â just sharing straight facts for folks who might not know. weâre essentially trying to merge two different business models:
I believe that making the proposed adjustments to the existing program will negatively affect the attitude of loyal ICP users. I donât think this will contribute to the token price increase or solve any other major issues of the project, but it will cause inconvenience to dedicated supporters and may even reduce their already not very large number.
I also think we should not lose sight of the actual problem that we are trying to fix and if it is an urgent problem or not. What problems have we identified: Some gaps in the current node provider onboarding process have been identified, and we have learned that the Dfinity designed Gen2 node rewards structure has led to some unintended outcomes based on the incentives that it sets. We have also identified node providers that are working together in some capacity which we now refer to as âclustersâ.
Given that the DRE tooling now already takes âclustersâ into account as well as data center ownership, any potential risk arising therefrom is already mitigated and I donât see a reason to take any further steps hastily. We should rather think it all through very well in terms of:
What I donât see as appropriate action is to put forward any hasty proposal about staking right now or a new minimum number of nodes per data center, even if the implementation wonât be until some time, and there are still so many things to consider, especially for current node providers who did not make a business model with these sort of parameters. Especially if this would come with a long implementation period and there are still so many moving parts, then no need for a proposal on this right now. Letâs properly discuss taking into account all the great points mentioned on this topic and then put forward a proposal down the road in connection with whatever strengthened and revised Gen3 node provider process there will be - which is not yet clear at this time.
Hey @snoopy your summary seems accurate and practical to me. I agree with your recommendations.
At the very least I believe slashable NP neurons should be implemented as soon as feasable, and existing NPs could choose how much of their rewards are allocated to that stake (allowing them to opt out).
This allows the idea to move forward but without going back on existing terms, while also allowing NPs that want to participate in this already, to participate.
An incentive to participate early is that itâs easier to acrue a substantial stake while ICP is at a low. 4 years down the line itâs likely to be significantly harder / more costly.
@catpirate32 I deleted your post because it included
Oh wait. I donât agree with Snoopyâs opinion. I changed my mind.
And the responses to that post were of questionable productivity, so I auto-deleted the replies to the post too. Maybe I should have checked what other posts would be included in that.
Please stay on the subject matter everyone.
Hi all,
summarizing my current view on the status of the node provider discussion:
To further progress on topic A, we have just shared a suggestion for a detailed list of questions for the node provider ownership assessment. Please have a look and let us know your thoughts!
Hey @bjoernek thank you for these thoughtful proposals and to everyone else for the responses and discussion so far.
If I understand you correctly, you are advocating the following process:
determine a set of standards with respect to ownership and operational independence
collect data from existing node providers to determine compliance with these standards
establish audit procedures to verify the data provided
address the most critical concerns first, such as where node providers are interdependent
determine the priority and timeframe for node providers to meet the remaining standards
Given this, the following feedback is given with the security of the IC in mind and not regarding the particular situations of the current node providers.
I fully support this. Node providers are being remunerated by the NNS to provide independently operated node servers. Each node provider should be able to guarantee to the NNS that their node servers are installed, operated and maintained independently of any other node provider.
A node provider must not provide node maintenance services for another node provider. If two or more node providers share the same employee or contractor for maintenance of their nodes this implies they are not operating independently of each other. If two node providers give physical or remote access to their node servers to the same person or entity then they are placing their combined node servers within the same trust domain. A node provider must be responsible for knowing if an employee or contractor has worked for another node provider and declare this.
Node maintenance services are distinct from those offered by data centre âremote handsâ. Also, these standards do not prohibit us from supporting each other (e.g. making suggestions about how to fix a reported problem or explaining a process) and collaborating on non-intrusive support services such as remote node monitoring, but it should never involve gaining physical or remote access to each otherâs nodes.
Yes, I think these enforcement mechanisms would be appropriate and effective.
_
Tier certifications may be a good proxy for data centre security and Tier III and Tier IV data centres should be looked upon favourably, however after reading about the Uptime Instituteâs certification standards it is not clear what physical security they ensure. I think we should explicitly ask node providers to detail the levels of physical access security enforced at their data centres. A minimum standard should be three levels of access controls (using RFID / biometrics) at the facility, room and rack access points. It should be very difficult for an unauthorised person to gain physical access to IC node servers.
Balancing administrative overhead is sensible and will be more important as we scale. This is only relevant to new node providers as the KYC process will be required for all current node providers regardless of how many nodes they have. Requiring existing node providers to onboard more nodes does not reduce administrative overhead.
Requiring a minimum of 10 nodes per provider may lead to secure node server management. More specifically, when node providers have a larger number of nodes they are more likely to lease a secure rack directly from a data centre, as was always assumed in the topology model. This offers a higher level of physical access security than leasing rack unit space through a separate co-location provider and/or sharing a rack with others. We should probably just cut to the chase and require that IC nodes be placed in locked racks leased directly from data centres. If node providers with 4-6 nodes are housing those nodes in locked racks (or half-racks) that are not shared with other entities then I see no benefit from a security point of view of requiring them to purchase additional nodes.
Our high-spec, decentralised and secure infrastructure is one aspect of the IC that really does set us apart from other blockchains and the âalien techâ that sits on top of it warrants a rock-solid foundation. Explicitly stating and enforcing the ownership and maintenance independence standards is essential for the reputation and promotion of the Internet Computer. In the future, significant users such as enterprise and government organisations will be keenly interested in the infrastructure security specifications that we enforce. The security and integrity of the IC are part of the product and may make or break future contracts for services with these organisations.
I would not support this measure because it is not necessary for the security of the network.
The IC node provider model supports high-spec hardware provision in high-security data centres situated around the world, provisioned by fully identified, operationally independent entities. Itâs brilliant. The problem has not been the model, rather it has been the implementation of the model. For this, we are collectively responsible (all node providers, Dfinity and the NNS voting community in their role as enforcer).
Our model includes the following enforcement mechanisms:
Reward reduction for poor node performance
Reward reduction for failure to comply with expectations
Node off-boarding
Revoking of node provider status
Legal actions and consequences
The first enforcement mechanism is in the process of being implemented and will be invoked as needed every month.
The next three have always been in place to my knowledge, but at the completion of this current process of explicitly documenting the requirements for node provision and the consequences of non-compliance, these mechanisms will be unambiguously recognised by the community as enforceable.
I generally donât speak on behalf of other node providers but I am confident enough of this: node providers know that these three enforcement mechanisms are adequate to ensure compliance with requirements. This doesnât seem to be as obvious to everyone in the community, perhaps because they donât have the lived experience of the risks that we take on without a signed contract guaranteeing revenue. If you tell me that my rewards are going to be reduced or cancelled next month you have my full attention. I will prioritise compliance with the rules because I am party to long-term contracts and my bills are going to keep arriving. If there is a risk that any of my nodes will be off-boarded then I will scramble to do whatever you are asking, because thatâs a permanent reduction in income. If it came to revoking my node provider status then thatâs game over. These threats provide incredibly powerful incentives to comply because of the world of pain that they can inflict on someone who has committed to large capital costs for hardware (not easy to resell), has long-term data centre contracts with onerous break-clauses and overheads. Node providers may also have employees and/or rely on node provider rewards for personal income. There is simply no need for staking to ensure compliance with requirements; immediate rewards reduction and off-boarding are more effective.
The last enforcement mechanism is legal action against the node provider. This is an effective protection against malicious behaviour by node providers because we are not anonymous; we are fully identified as legal persons in our country of residence. This places us in a different situation to validators on POS networks.
If a node provider is complicit in an attack on an IC subnet then they will be identified. To be enticed into malicious action the potential payout would have to cover loss of hardware (which would be irretrievable) and all future node rewards in addition to hefty compensation for the consequences of breaking the law. To avoid civil damages and criminal legal actions they would have to flee to a new life in another country where there is no extradition treaty with their home country. To tempt any one node provider into such a malicious act would require the promise of many millions of dollars and a thorough disregard for their own future. Multiply this by the number of node providers who would have to be convinced to follow this path to execute a 51% attack (minimum 8 for an application subnet, 18+ for a system or fiduciary subnet) and you begin to understand the size of the criminal operation required and inherent risk of failure to successfully coordinate such a criminal action against the Internet Computer. This doesnât even consider the very high level of technical expertise and military precision of coordination required to execute such an attack successfully. In combination, the technical security of the IC-OS software installed on the node servers, the physical security of the node hardware in datacentres and the ever-present threat of legal action against fully identified node providers are highly effective deterrents to coordinated malicious behaviour. They also come at very low cost to the NNS. In comparison, the additional staking rewards that would have to be minted by the NNS for all registered node providers if their individual stakes were set to a sufficient size to offer an equivalent deterrent effect would be highly inflationary.
Having node providers who are fully identified provides a high level of protection against malicious behaviour. We are not anonymous hackers or unidentified POS validators. We canât get away with theft or a damaging denial-of-service attack without being identified. The consequences for us would be dire, both legally and reputationally.
Some of the expenses node providers may incur beyond the base CAPEX and OPEX are listed below. This is not an exhaustive list and some points have been covered well by other node providers.
Income tax: Here in Australia we pay 25% corporate tax rate, which is typical of many other countries.
Inflation: Increases in ongoing operating expenses over time.
Payroll: Employees, contractors and directorâs fees. Relevant for node providers without the technical expertise to maintain their own nodes, but also for those who wish to bring additional expertise to the IC or to fund their own involvement and contribution to the ecosystem.
Additional hardware for the benefit of the ecosystem. This is not an expectation on node providers but we, for example, have an additional Gen 2 specification server running in our data centre that is used for testing. We do not receive rewards for it.
Total expenses will differ between node providers but in most cases their free cashflow will be much less than 50% of their total rewards. Requiring node providers to stake more than their free cash flow will have direct negative financial consequences on their business.
The idea of voluntary staking, where node providers with larger stakes are treated favourably in the future and their nodes allowed on higher security networks may have unintended outcomes. Providing a mechanism to essentially buy future node allocations or inclusion of nodes in higher security subnets would increase rather than decrease security risks for the Internet Computer.
There are obvious disadvantages to introducing node provider staking for the IC such as the complexity introduced by the mechanism, the cost of implementation and ongoing operation, including the minting of staking rewards. We would require delegated staking to achieve a staking balance that would be sufficient as a deterrent for malicious behaviour and the rewards would have to be greater than governance rewards for anyone to assume the risk inherent in delegating their stake to a single node provider. We would then have two competing staking mechanisms. The proposed node provider staking would be very costly to the ecosystem, could compromise the operation of existing node providers and would not achieve the intended protection.
Hey @icarus this is very thoughtful feedback. I learned a lot and appreciate you sharing.
@icarus I partially disagree with the idea of preventing node providers from contracting professional services from one another.
Currently, there are no official maintenance partners for the ecosystem. In the software industry, we often see official channel partners that undergo a certification process, which includes establishing and auditing a channel partner and its staff to the highest standards and ethics for the benefit of the community. Without an official channel partner, each node provider is left alone to provide maintenance services.
I feel we should encourage the creation of official channel partners (maintenance providers). That can be used as a time and material or an ongoing contract resource. Other Web3 projects have this already.
Supply Chain Risk & Delegation
One of the focal points in the decentralization discussion is how to manage supply chain risks â both in terms of hardware/software and human services â without stifling the practical operation of the network. Itâs important to distinguish legitimate delegation of tasks from improper collusion or concentration of power. In a decentralized network, node providers may still need to rely on various third parties: hardware vendors, data center operators, internet providers, and yes, maintenance service companies. These relationships form the supply chain of ICPâs infrastructure. The goal is to avoid single points of failure or hidden control within that supply chain.
Delegation vs. Collusion: Delegation means a node provider entrusts some aspect of running their node to another party, but the node provider remains the responsible entity. Examples include hiring a local technician to be on-call for data center visits, or using a service to monitor node performance and alert the provider of issues. Such delegation can be perfectly legitimate â in fact, it can improve decentralization by enabling individuals who are not experts in every aspect (networking, hardware, DevOps) to still run a node by outsourcing some work.
Collusion, on the other hand, implies secret or illicit cooperation that undermines the networkâs decentralization.
Or if a single company operates nodes under multiple identities, thatâs effectively a Sybil attack on the node provider registry. The line can blur if, say, one maintenance company has admin access to many different providersâ nodes â that could appear like a single control point (a potential collusion risk) if not managed properly.
The forum proposals explicitly address this by requiring transparency. Node providers ought to disclose any external entity they contract for maintenance. However, this disclosure must be well protected to balance and mitigate operational security risks, including leaking personally identifiable information and critical maintenance staff. The criterion that maintenance arrangements be independent and non-overlapping between providers means, for example, if Provider A is using Company X for maintenance, Provider B should not also use Company X (unless A and B are the same org, in which case they should merge). This doesnât ban delegation; it just tries to ensure no one maintenance company becomes the de facto operator for many nodes. The rationale was to avoid covert concentration of control â i.e., multiple node providers unknowingly relying on the same underlying team.
The trade-off: if too many rules constrain how providers get help, it undermines the ecosystem uptime (since not everyone has a personal expert team) and business contingency operations.
Standardized Framework vs. Ad Hoc Bans: By adopting a standardized security framework, the community can objectively evaluate whether a node provider (or their chosen vendors) meets the requirements. This avoids singling out companies without evidence. For instance, if a company offers âNode Management as a Service,â does this arrangement meet our security controls? Are there proper contracts and accountability in place? Are the maintenance activities logged and auditable? If yes, it shouldnât matter who does the work. If no, then any provider in a similar violation should be flagged.
Key Takeaways:
⢠Certification and Auditing: Implement a robust certification process for maintenance providers, ensuring they adhere to strict security and ethical standards. Regular or continuous audits can maintain accountability.
⢠Diversification of Services: Encourage node providers to engage with different certified maintenance partners, preventing over-reliance on a single service and promoting a decentralized support network.
Parting Thoughts;
Information assurance encompasses protecting and managing dataâs confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and non-repudiation. In the context of the ICP network, transparency and accountability are instrumental in achieving these facets.
At first, I thought the goal was transparency and accountability, but then I realized no, thatâs wrong. The goal is simply information assurance of the ICP network. Itâs essential to recognize that these are means to an endâspecifically, ensuring data integrity and the networkâs overall security.
The ICP employs advanced cryptographic techniques like chain-key cryptography to maintain data integrity and authenticity. These mechanisms ensure that data remains accurate, consistent, and tamper-proof across the network, independent of individual node operatorsâ actions.
However, the focus on human-centric accountability measures, like public disclosures and potential punitive actions against node providers, can sometimes overshadow the primary goal of maintaining robust data integrity. While itâs crucial to prevent collusion and ensure decentralized control, itâs equally important to avoid creating an environment where the emphasis shifts from technical assurance to policing individual actors.
In essence, the networkâs design should prioritize mechanisms that inherently guarantee data integrity, reducing the reliance on human oversight and intervention. By doing so, the ICP can maintain its decentralized ethos while ensuring the reliability and security of the data it processes.
Key Point: Build better software, not punitive measures.
Yes, there are red flags you could interpret as slippery slopes if youâre cautious about governance capture:
âAt first I thought the goal was transparency⌠then I realized⌠the goal is information assurance.â
â This argument risks downplaying the value of governance visibility â which is crucial in a decentralized network.
âAvoid shifting from technical assurance to policing individuals.â
â A decentralized system must monitor human actors; thatâs not âpolicing,â itâs governance.
âDelegation can improve decentralization.â
â True in some cases, but it can also mask centralized control via third-party operators, which is exactly what the anti-collusion measures try to prevent.
So is this destabilization?No â not directly.
But it is a narrative shift that â if adopted uncritically â could lead to:
So youâre right to be suspicious, not of the personâs immediate intent, but of the long-term effects if their philosophy becomes consensus without hard guardrails.