Absolute Majority Weight Proposal Draft

Governance
1

Proposal

As a solution to the “design flaw” referenced by @bjoernek , in response to the Periodic Followee Confirmation Proposal, I propose two modifications to the “Absolute Majority” functionality within Proposals.

Primarily, I propose that the calculation to determine an Absolute Majority is altered.

Currently, it considers all voting power, and executes an Absolute Majority if 50%+ of total voting power has been exerted on “yes” or “no” votes respectively. I reccomend that rather than considering total voting power - the average total Voting Power exerted on specifically “Governance” proposals, across the last year (“Active Voting Power”), is utilized to calculate the Absolute Majority threshold.

Secondarily, as this implementation would nearly enable DFINITY to enact an Absolute Majority themselves, I propose the readjustment of the Absolute Majority minimum threshold requirement. I recommend the Absolute Majority Threshold is increased from 50%+ total voting power, to a minimum of 80% of “Active Voting Power” - with gradual reductions as we see DFINITYs voting power reduce over time.

Objective

This proposal sets out with the objective to lay the groundwork for the decentralization of the network.

It has been stated by DFINITY that the enactment of the Periodic Followee Confirmation Proposal has been postponed, not only due to resources, but to a “design flaw” within the mechanism.

The foundation cited that the immediate removal of voting power, over code based topics, could lead to insecurity within the network - being the inability to pass network critical updates immediately, without a super majority.

This proposal offers a remedy, which would in turn remove a barrier from the enactment of the Periodic Followee Confirmation Proposal, by removing the necessity to control such a drastic percentage of total supply.

Adjusting the weight calculation of what an Absolute Majority is defined as, utilizing Active Voting Power, rather than Total Voting Power, enables the foundation to gradually relinquish the ~98% super majority they’ve assigned themselves, while still ensuring the security of the network.

By utilizing the average voting power asserted on governance proposals over the last year, the protocol is able to ensure a reliable metric in relation to Active Voting Power, that can’t be skewed by short term variables. This also ensures an accurate representation of what voting power is most likely to look like, after a followee reset - as the governance topic is the only topic to undergo a reset to date.

Through shifting the minimum Absolute Majority threshold, the protocol is simultaneously able to ensure that there is not a central entity, who is able to assert 51%+ control via pre-existing voting power. This safeguards the transition from a Total Voting Power Absolute Majority to an Active Voting Power Absolute Majority, without further jeopardizing the decentralization of the network.

Pros

  • Enables Robust Governance & Updates of the Protocol, post Periodic Followee Confirmation

This proposal ensures that post Periodic Followee Confirmation, the Internet Computer Protocol does not face security issues, aligning with the lack of ability to affect “Absolute Majority” updates. This concern is directly absolved when converting from a Total Voting Power Absolute Majority system, to an Active Voting Power Absolute Majority system. This is due to the fact Active Voting Power is more likely to reassign, or utilize voting power (as shown via the Governance Proposal Reset), in comparison to voting power that is not actively exercised - but rather employed under an indefinite “set&forget” model.

  • Governance Proposals become more than a glorified poll, as they directly correlate to Active Voting Power

To date, there is nothing binding about governance proposals - they do not enact code based changes. Tying the weight of the Absolute Majority indirectly generates a necessity to participate within Governance proposals - being the security of the network.

  • Ensures a super majority can not be achieved with pre-existing Voting Power

By adjusting the minimum requirement to enact an Absolute Majority, the protocol can ensure that the Active Voting Power Governance Mechanism can not be enacted by a single one party’s owned Voting Power.

Cons

  • Reduces the required Voting Power to achieved an Absolute Majority

To achieve an Absolute Majority, at the time of writing, it would require ~222.5M of ~445M Voting Power. Of which, according to the IC Dashboard, DFINITY owns ~94.5M. Meaning DFINITYs personal voting power, translates to 42% of the requirement for an Absolute Majority.

Under the affect of this proposal, an Absolute Majority would require ~184M VP of ~230M Active Voting Power (this is not an accurate representation of annual average voter participation, but rather an example, based off recent proposal outcomes). Of which, according to the IC Dashboard, DFINITY owns ~94.5M. Meaning DFINITYs personal voting power, would translate to 51% of the requirement for an Absolute Majority.

This means that the amount of Voting Power required to enact an Absolute Majority, decreases by about ~40M (10% of total voting power), while DFINITYs ability to enact an Absolute Majority increases by about 10%, under the affect of this proposal.

Resources

DFINITYs Periodic Followee Confirmation Concern can be found here;

The original Periodic Followee Confirmation forum post & discussion can be found here;

The follow up Periodic Followee Confirmation forum post & discussion can be found here;

Proposal Written by accumulating.icp

I’d like to emphasize that this is the draft proposal, therefor I am open to discussion, revision, and feedback regarding the proposal. This will be proposed one week after the start of dialogue on forums.

3 Likes
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This proposal does not seem like the right course of action at this time. While I do think that default following has a stifling effect on decentralization in some ways, there are big gaps that need to be addressed before we should remove default following. It probably needs to be a more wholistic plan and I think the only entity that will be able to develop a plan that the community will accept is DFINITY. They have been the only contributor to the IC that has taken action that has resulted in decentralization so far and I think we should rely on them to develop a strategy that continues the progression toward decentralization without constraining them on how to achieve it.

In my opinion, a big gap that exists is that there are no incentives for people and organizations to get involved at the protocol level in proposal topics other than the Governance and the SNS & Community Fund topics. We need competency groups that can specialize in specific proposal topics, but there is simply no incentive to engage in that way. Once they exist, then the concept of decentralization at the protocol level starts becoming more meaningful. Decentralization of the Governance topic made sense because there were groups (e.g. ICDevs.org, ICPMN (now synapse.vote), and cycle_dao (now Arthur)) that were ready to offer options that people could choose. Of course, additional options now exist for the Governance topic. There are no options for other topics. Decentralization should occur because the community steps up and earns it, not because DFINITY simply relinquishes the total voting power that they can currently trigger.

Sure, an argument can be made that we can take away default following and then people can actively choose to follow DFINITY, but does that really change anything that achieves decentralization? In fact, if both elements of this proposal are implemented as currently written, then it will make ICP look more centralized around DFINITY because their apparent voting power will be much bigger. Can anyone really pass the red face test explaining how ICP is decentralized when 51% of NNS voting power belongs directly to DFINITY? At best, that will just cause more complaining by the community and raise red flags for outsiders. I would much prefer that we not mess with the definition of Absolute Majority at all.

I think a better way to address the need for speed for security updates is to create a new proposal topic called Security Updates and copy to it the current Followees from the “All Topics Except Governance, SNS & Community Fund” catch all category. DFINITY could use that category as needed for security updates that need to be implemented faster than the typical 4 day voting period. It may not be quite this simple, but anything that flags a proposal as a security update and enables DFINITY to execute the proposal immediately would work.

All that said, at this point I think it is best to wait for DFINITY to develop more comprehensive and vetted strategies that enable decentralization to progress forward. Periodic confirmation of neuron followees originated from a desire to solve a major NNS spam problem. I think the idea resonated with a lot of people because it was further justified as a mechanism to advance decentralization. However, it was not a fully vetted idea, and it was quickly recognized after the proposal voting ended that it has negative security implications. I’m more inclined to submit a NNS proposal that rescinds the periodic confirmation of neuron followees proposal than I am to change the definition of Absolute Majority as a solution to the design flaw. I would rather DFINITY come up with a better plan and I’m very curious if the majority of the community would still support the original proposal today since a lot has changed since then.

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I find this set of statements to be ironic, given I’ve offered to write the code for both proposals - to be turned down. At this point, it quite clearly is not about a lack of “competency groups” , but the lack of desire to pursue.

Furthermore, I’m not sure how you expect other groups to begin contributing, if your response to contributors is “well, only DFINITY can contribute in a way that the Community will accept”. You’re the one setting up the barrier for other contributors to this blockchain by doing so.

I’m doing this for free. My incentive is the decentralization of the network, and its longevity. Are my contributions only acceptable if I’m paid via an NNS treasury?

Given that this 98% super majority was self assigned, yes, by ensuring people periodically reaffirm their voting power, that is directly contributing to the decentralization of the network.

I reccomend you re-read this proposal thoroughly.

This does not affect the execution of proposals outside of an “Absolute Majority” scenario.

The foundation would not own 51% of voting power within this scenario. They’d own 51% of what’s required to execute a super majority, in comparison to the current 42%.

That’s certainly a huge loss for decentralization, when considering they already have 98% super majority control. Not 98% of what’s require for a super majority - but 98% super majority control.

There’s a difference.

So your solution, to proposed gradual decentralization, is to allow them to retain 98% control under the name of security? It still leaves us in the scenario of, how do we ever ensure the decentralization of this voting power, that they’ve assigned to themselves. This is working backwards in my opinion.

As stated in the previous dialogue - while that may have been your agenda, it’s intellectually dishonest to deny the true benefit of this proposal, and the reason it resonated with so many; being the decentralization of the 98% indefinitely assigned voting power to DFINITY.

As stated, I am more than happy to work through these security implications with the community & foundation - hence why this draft exists to begin with.

Indefinitely self-assigning 98% of voting power has no justification & I am willing to work through these barriers.

I am curious if there are any legitimate concerns regarding this solution - because as previously stated, I don’t think you read it thoroughly, which skewed your perception of functionalities.

Is that not what I’m doing, Wenzel? Surely, we also see the irony in saying we have to “earn” decentralization in a blockchain - when the voting power was self assigned to begin with.

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Why do I have to See this Wenzel guy reply to all posts on Behalf of DFINITY when half of the proposals they have submitted isnt even implemented yet. Where is the moderator of this forum and spokesperson for dfinity?

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What makes you think I am replying on behalf of Dfinity? My comments and opinions are my own.

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I’m acknowledging that you replied to me, but to be honest I’m not interested in arguing with you. I respect your opinions. I have expressed my opinion on this proposal and don’t feel the need to say anything else at this time.

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If you aren’t interested in a conversation revolving around constructive criticism, I would appreciate if you did not push half cooked notions to then say “I don’t want to continue this conversation” when you’re corrected. Thank you.

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I’m acknowledging that you replied to me again, but I’m still not interested in arguing with you. I respect your opinions. Nothing you said corrected my arguments or inspired me to expand further on my opinions. I read your proposal, understood it fully, and provided my response in detail. I stand firm in my position. I’m sorry if you can’t accept it, but that’s you personal problem. It would be nice if we can agree to disagree and leave it there. I will vote no to your proposal.

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I’d like to remind you, you came to a forum post I created, and shared half-cooked ideology in a passive aggressive manner.

I haven’t been arguing at all, but rather correcting what I can only call “assumptions”.

I’m genuinely starting to wonder if we read the same forums…?

  • You clearly did not understand the proposal based off the fact you think it enables DFINITY to enact a super majority with VP they own - it does not.

  • You continuously portray that DFINITY is the only one who is capable of committing code based changes - as I have offered to do it.

  • You claim there is no incentive for people to get involved with governance - as the incentive is the success of the protocol.

  • You think that having neurons reaffirm that they’re comfortable with where their voting power is allocated, does not contribute to decentralization - as it was self-assigned by the Foundation, to the Foundation, in most instances.

There’s a reason I quote what you say when I respond. I am curious how these are not corrections…?

I’m glad you stand so firm on your position! However, that doesn’t change the fact that you have not articulated a credible reason, regarding your distaste for this proposal.

I assure you, I am in no way offended that I don’t have your support - this is not something that is new to me. However, I do find it ironic that you try to frame it as though I am. I could have sworn you always say that I’m the one trying to “draw narratives”…?

The extent of our dialogue has quite clearly been you voicing your concerns, to which I have responded. If you’d like to show why you don’t think my response has adequately addressed your concerns, you are more than welcome to - I would honestly appreciate it. The purpose of this topic was to generate a dialogue on the pro’s & cons of this proposal.

But again, if you’re going to push a half-baked ideology, to then say “I don’t want to talk anymore” if you’re corrected, please do not comment on my topics at all. Thank you.

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I believe my opinions are well informed and adequately detailed, but I respect your difference of opinion. Let’s agree to disagree. I do not intend to be passive aggressive, so I apologize for making you feel that way.

It’s really not your place to correct my expressions of opinion and ideas unless they are factually incorrect, but you are certainly welcome to disagree with my opinion and state your reasons. I don’t intend to argue about it.

I understand that you believe that my arguments are not credible. You are entitled to your opinion. I do not find your proposal distasteful, but I do disagree with it as I originally described in detail.

I’m glad you are not offended because I’m not trying to offend you. My apologies if I am coming across that way to you.

If a person sees your original post and my original response and didn’t have to plow through all the BS that comes afterward, then I think it would appear that we are just two people who have clearly expressed ideas that happen to be different. There is nothing wrong with having different opinions and showing mutual respect in the process.

Is it really that difficult to understand why I’m not interested in debating you further on this topic? I don’t think many people find it intellectually honest and productive to engage in a discussion where you attempt to “correct” their opinions and accuse them of having “half-baked ideology”. I recognize that you are attempting to be much more thorough and detailed in your posts on the forum than you have in the past, which I appreciate, but you are still very aggressive and condescending to people who express an opinion that differs from yours. I’ve grown wary of this style of engagement and will attempt to diffuse it moving forward, but that does not mean that I won’t comment when I have something to say. However, I promise that I will continue to be objective and civilized in my participation.

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That is fair, we’re all entitled to our opinions and I can respect that. I agree that we will most likely end up agreeing to disagree, however, I was hoping to see your opinions expanded on further, upon my original response.

Good ser, I have provided examples in which you were factually incorrect. I have also provided opinions & reasoning alongside them. I’d be happy to continue this conversation in a productive manner if you’d like to address them.

That is fair, but I don’t believe your original response accurately represented the resulting effects of this proposal at all. This proposal would not result in DFINITY owning 51% of voting power. This proposal would not change anything other than the calculation of an Absolute Majority. This proposal would leave DFINITY with 51% of what’s required to enact an Absolute Majority. To reiterate again, this would not affect voting power outside of Absolute Majority scenarios. This is in comparison to the 42% of required VP they currently own, and 98%+ of total VP they control.

God bless you ser - my apologies as well, as the inverse applies. I think at the end of the day we all have the same goal, with drastically different views on the best way to achieve it - which is bound to result in some conflicts. Glad to have 'reset" this conversation.

Good ser, I responded to your critiques with factual information (and maybe a bit of sarcasm :grimacing: ), to which you said “I don’t want to talk about this anymore”. I agree that mutual respect should be shown within this process, but I also believe that it is shown through due diligence, and the ability to acknowledge you may be wrong. I’m not trying to correct your opinion, but rather what you are presenting as fact. Hence the “Half-Baked Ideology” comment, as your original comment does not accurately reflect the results of this proposal. Nonetheless, I appreciate that you took the time to write your original response.

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I appreciate this response. It seems respectful and civilized without ad homonym, sarcasm, or a condescending tone. Thank you.

Since we seem to be in agreement that we have achieved a reset in this conversation, I’d be willing to respond to your questions. Please compile and post your questions one more time in an objective format and I will respond. In your current bulleted list, please expand on bullet 3 so I better understand your question.

I think our conversation beyond your OP and my first response will be a distraction to anyone coming to do research on the proposal when you post it to the NNS. It might be helpful if all these off topic posts are less visible as people scroll. Perhaps each of us should flag each others comments as Off Topic and tag Diego asking him to hide or delete (you decide). I would rather your proposal get a fair shake on the merits instead of being undercut by so much off topic information. WDYT? It’s also ok for all of it to stay if you prefer.

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Good morning Wenzel,

I appreciate that you’re willing to expand further upon this topic. The following list is comprised of what I believe to be the primary “misconceptions” within the original response, alongside my response to them, in an effort to “restart” this conversation productively (please excuse the lack of direct quotes - all topics have been quoted in previous posts);

  • “DFINITY is the only competent contributor to the Internet Computer - therefor we should just let them do it”

In my opinion, this is a mis-categorization of the scenario - there are many competent contributors to the Internet Computer. If this weren’t the case, we wouldn’t see so many grants from DFINITY to open-source infrastructure within the ecosystem. While there aren’t foundation alternatives yet, there are development teams, and individual developers, who write reliable code, within this ecosystem. I believe it is intellectually dishonest to say DFINITY is the only one who can, and should be contributing to code based changes via the NNS. As independent contributors is something we’ve been striving for, we should not be setting up barriers for them to begin contributing.

  • “There is no incentive for other contributors to the Internet Computer”

I would again call this a mis-categorization of the situation. As an ICP holder & neuron owner, you are inherently incentivized to contribute to the governance of the protocol, in any manner you deem beneficial to the Internet Computer. While obviously not everybody has the knowledge to develop code based changes for ICP, there are some that do - the IC is written in Rust, which is an extremely well documented language.

I am offering to write not only the Periodic Followee Confirmation Proposal code, but the code for the Absolute Majority Calculation & Minimum Threshold shift as well. I am not requesting anything on behalf of completing this work, as I believe it’s something that will benefit the Internet Computer, and in turn my neurons & holdings in the long run.

Incentivization does not always need to come in the form of immediate monetary gain.

  • “This proposal gives DFINITY 51% of Voting Power”

If the second half of this proposal did not exist, that would nearly be the case. However, the second implementation, in which the amount of “Active Voting Power” (rather than the current, “Total Voting Power”) required to enact an Absolute Majority, is increased to 80%, prevents this scenario from occurring.

This is depicted within the following math;

Current Absolute Majority
There is currently ~445M Total Voting Power
DFINITY owns ~94.5M Voting Power

~445M VP * .501 = ~222.94M VP Absolute Majority Threshold

~94.5M VP / ~222.94M VP = 42.3% Required VP to enact Absolute Majority owned by DFINITY

~94.5M VP / 445M VP = 21.2% Total VP owned by DFINITY

Adjusted Absolute Majority
There is currently ~230M Active Voting Power
DFINITY owns ~94.5M Voting Power

~230M VP * .801 = ~184.23M VP Absolute Majority Threshold

~94.5M VP / ~184.23M VP = 51.3% Required VP to enact Absolute Majority owned by DFINITY

This results in a +9% difference in DFINITYs current ability to enact an Absolute Majority, with the trade off of enacting the Periodic Followee Reset - which removes DFINITYs current indefinite self-assigned 98% super majority. In my opinion, this is the best of both worlds & gives both parties what they need. DFINITY needs to be able to feasibly execute time-sensitive proposals - while the Internet Computer, if we want to continue to proclaim it as a decentralized blockchain, needs a followee reset.

I’d like to also reiterate, that this would not affect the execution of a proposal outside of an Absolute Majority scenario. Meaning, if a scenario has, for example, 4% yes votes, 3% no votes - this system would not be applied, as there is no execution of an Absolute Majority.

  • “Periodic Followee Confirmation only intends to address spam proposals, not decentralization”

Can you please explain to me how exactly this addresses spam, at all? If people are incentivized by spam, then resetting their followees doesn’t do anything - because they’re paying attention to the NNS to collect their spam rewards.

It seems clear to me that the one and only advantage of this proposal, is the decentralization of the network through the reaffirmation from neurons, that they’re satisfied with the performance of their followee. This is something that is desperately needed, and utilized in every other form of “governance”, in which a leader is voluntary selected by the people.

  • “We can just make a new topic, copy followees, then reset old topics”

In my opinion, this doesn’t solve anything regarding decentralization, as it leaves us in an identical scenario in which DFINITY has a self assigned super majority - with no plans to see it decentralized.

The combination of the Periodic Followee Reset Proposal & Absolute Majority Adjustment Proposal lay the groundwork for the gradual decentralization of voting power, as neurons see other parties & contributors who align with their vision over the long term.

The combination of these proposals aims to ensure that neurons are reaffirming “Yes, “…” is the best choice for me” - rather than utilizing a set&forget mindset to collect yields, as the grand majority do.

By reserving DFINITYs 98% super majority, under the name of “security”, you set the precedent that they’re the only ones who can identify security concerns, and make informed decisions to act upon them.

Rather than grand-fathering DFINITY into a super majority, they, like everyone else, should have to consistently show their followees that they are not only a reliable, but the best named neuron available for them.

I also struggle with the comment in which you say decentralization must be earned, not relinquished - however I don’t believe that needs its own explanation.

Thank you for continuing this discussion, as I believe this is a valid solution regarding the “design flaw” suggested by DFINITY, within your original proposal.

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No problem, thanks for compiling your list of questions again as requested.

I think you are miss-quoting me on this one. There are definitely many competent contributors to the Internet Computer at the application level and developing critical infrastructure, but that’s not relevant to the point I was making. I suspect this is the section you were trying to reference…“…there are big gaps that need to be addressed before we should remove default following. It probably needs to be a more wholistic plan and I think the only entity that will be able to develop a plan that the community will accept is DFINITY. They have been the only contributor to the IC that has taken action that has resulted in decentralization so far and I think we should rely on them to develop a strategy that continues the progression toward decentralization without constraining them on how to achieve it.” That’s a different message than your summary quote.

This comment is rooted in my observation that people and organizations have not made any attempt to contribute at the protocol level as far as I know. I believe it is because making that kind of contribution is real work that would take resources away from their core projects.

I think this is great and would like to see this kind of contribution coming from the community. It just hasn’t happened yet and I don’t see it as a sustainable model for reasons described previously.

If the Governance topic serves as an example, we saw 40% total voting power participation on Governance proposals within 1 weeks after proposal 34485 was implemented (which was the change that incentivize people to quickly take action on their Followee selection). Then it took another 15 months to move from 40% to approx 52% participation on Governance proposals. If DFINITY directly owns 21.2% of total VP today, then 40% total VP cast on proposals translates into 21.2% / 0.4 = 53% voting power according to your proposed definition. I agree these are loose approximations and more people will eventually configure their Followees again. The point I was trying to make is that DFINITY voting power will appear to go up significantly and it will lead to more community discontent. Even if we change the threshold, it’s just not good optics. I don’t think the change is worth it at this time and believe there are better ways to accomplish decentralization goals.

Spam existed because there was an imbalance between voting participation rates on Governance and voting participation rates on all other topics. At the time, the entire daily voting reward pie was divided among all neurons that voted. Periodic followee confirmation would have likely removed the imbalance and rewarded only neurons that were making an active decision to participate in voting on all proposal topics. All neurons owners could make that decision, but everyone would have to take action. The entire daily voting reward pie is no longer divided among voting neurons, which also has the effect of disincentivizing spam without affecting voting rewards for people who are passive about governance participation.

I still agree with this idea (as stated in the original periodic confirmation of neuron followees proposal), but I’ve come to believe that we need two changes to happen first…incentives to participate in the IC at the protocol level and competency groups who pursue those incentives and achieve building a reputation as viable choices along side with DFINITY. I understand if people disagree, but that’s where my head is at now.

The intent of that idea is for it to be used only for security updates that require immediate action. All other proposal topics would be submitted under normal proposal topics with the standard 4 day voting period. The idea is targeted at eliminating the critical update “design flaw” that would be produced if periodic confirmation of Followees were implemented as originally written.

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I don’t believe I’ve misquoted you at all - even with your expanded response, it doesn’t not change the fact that there are other contributors to the Internet Computer.

It is intellectually dishonest, and sets barriers for alternative contributors, when you say “DFINITY is the only one who should be doing this”.

I am offering to delegate my resources, from my projects, to see out the enactment of this code. I have offered to write the code for both proposals.

You are actively trying to dissuade me, under the premise that the foundation should do it.

This exact scenario has nothing to do with lack of desire or resources - I have offered to provide both.

It is happening as we speak and you are actively discouraging the code from being written, as it’s something that should be left to DFINITY.

You might not see it as a sustainable model, but that is how governance works; you stake, you contribute beneficially to governance, you see the value of what you’re governing increase.

The incentivization is the longterm success of the protocol.

No offence, but I still don’t think you understand how this proposal works, I’ll break down the numbers you have provided;

There is currently ~230M Active Voting Power
DFINITY owns ~94.5M Voting Power
You claim 40% of Total Voting Power Turnout

~230M VP * .801 = ~184.23M VP Absolute Majority Threshold

~445M VP * .4 = ~178M Alleged VP Turnout

~94.5M VP / ~184.23M VP = 51.3% Required VP to enact Absolute Majority owned by DFINITY

~94.5M VP / ~178M VP = 53% of voter turnout owned by DFINITY

I’d also like to reiterate this proposal does not affect the execution of proposals outside of super majority scenarios.

Meaning they have 53% of we have historically seen as voter history, initially, and 51% of what’s required to enact an absolute majority. Not 53% total voting power.

I can see what you’re saying, in which if the voting power remains within 180-230m, DFINITY would in theory hold 50%+ of voting power that is utilized. However an implementation as such, as you’ve denoted, would require extensive “notice” in various ways to neuron owners. Ideally, with the risk of losing rewards due to not voting, this would spark greater voter participation than we see in the Governance Topic today.

However again, I’d agree it comes down to well how the confirmations are “advertised”.

Under the effects of this proposal, DFINITY would gain ~+9% ability to enact an absolute majority, at the trade off of losing an indefinite 98% self assigned control of the entire voting power.

I would personally argue this is much better for optics.

How exactly would this have removed a imbalance?

What you’re describing is a way to increase rewards, from what I’m reading.

If the rewards are divided amongst all neurons that vote, and you are trying to remove neurons from that pool - that just inherently increases your own rewards, and in turn the rewards of those spamming.

I say again, if people are actively contributing to and benefitting from spam, resetting their followees does not circumvent them, but rather benefit them - as they are actively paying attention to the NNS to vote for & receive their rewards.

I understand you believe that this is something that should be a paid position - everyone will have an opinion, and as I have stated, mine is that the incentivization is the growth & development of the protocol.

However, just because you believe that this should be something that is financially incentivized, does not mean you should circumvent the contributions of those who do not (you have told me to just wait for DFINITY to do it on numerous occasions).

Given that this proposal doesn’t address spam, but rather enhance the outcome of it - the sole benefit of this proposal is increasing the decentralization of the network. By grand-fathering DFINITYs 98% Absolute Majority, with no means to see it decentralized, it directly contradicts the main benefit of this proposal.

Furthermore, do you believe security concerns only come from DFINITY proposals? If someone were to make a proposal to disburse all neurons - DFINITY would view that as a security concern - but it wouldn’t fall under their “Security Topic”. This is just one of many examples.

This is again enforcing the idea that DFINITY is the only competent contributor to the Internet Computer.

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Going to tag @bjoernek & @diegop in an attempt to get the foundations opinion on this proposal - I am not suggesting an addition to your work load, simply a change to the protocol, in which I will provide the code based changes for. I appreciate any feedback.

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Well, I mean, you are claiming you quoted me and I’m telling you that you didn’t quote me accurately and you insist you didn’t misquote me while telling me I’m intellectually dishonest. Hmmm.

I don’t really know how to help you if you don’t understand this concept. I don’t believe it’s that complicated and it was discussed in detail on the forum before the periodic confirmation of followees proposal was submitted to the NNS.

You may be conflating a few ideas. If you want to code up a change that you feel passionate about, then go for it. I agree having passion for an idea is motivating to perform work as a volunteer. However, before removing Followees for the All Topics catch all category, I think credible options need to exist for people to select other than DFINITY, which will only come if there are incentives to participate at the protocol level. This will take time. For example, Replica Version Management is a relatively new proposal topic that DFINITY set up to enable the community to review and approve IC-OS changes. They are making a concerted effort to enable the community to decentralize decisions on that proposal topic, which falls into the All Topics catch all category. If you want to decentralize decision on that topic, who would you choose? DFINITY is certainly a valid choice. Are there others? Are those other entities known yet? What would cause people to spend time each week building the replica and reviewing the changes outlined in the Release Notes of those proposals? I’ve reached out to many developers trying to get people involved and most agree it’s important but don’t want to make a commitment to performing that work. I would rather see us achieve decentralization on that proposal topic, and others that fall into the All Topics catch all category, before resetting default Followees. In my opinion, implementing periodic confirmation as is doesn’t achieve decentralization…it just takes voting rewards away from passive investors and does nothing for active participants.

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Thank you for tagging me. I have been actively following this thread and I am currently in the process of reviewing the topic with several colleagues. I appreciate your patience and we will respond in this thread as soon as we have gathered our thoughts.

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As stated, everything referenced has been quoted in previous posts, therefor you did not get exact quotes in the last post. I did not think it was necessary to have to reiterate the talking point to such a degree, however I will.

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Therefor, my original response stands. There are other development groups within the IC, that have contributed reliable code to the ecosystem. While DFINITY may be the primary contributor to the IC as a network itself, that doesn’t mean you should set up barriers for contributors to begin.

I understand the implications of the ideology you’ve proposed very well - you want to take rewards from those who don’t notice (as they’ve been cut from the reward pool), to increase the reward pool of those who do vote.

If you can’t “pass the red face test” in explaining how it’s something other than this, clearly the ideology wasn’t that compelling to begin with.

This proposal isn’t advocating for the immediate decentralization of the voting power - but rather the groundwork to be laid for it.

While I can respect that you’d like there to be other groups than DFINITY to assign voting power - that isn’t the objective of this proposal, and will be the responsibility of Named Neurons over time.

For example, considering you feel so passionately about it, you could pursue code base topics with Synapse.

The purpose of this proposal is to ensure the reaffirmation from Neurons, “Yes, (In this instance, DFINITY) is the best followee for me to allocate my voting power to”.

Being that there aren’t any other known code based contributors, obviously DFINITY is going to be the first choice for the grand majority.

But to reiterate again, it’s about the gradual decentralization of voting power as neurons notice other Code Based Named Neurons that align with their stances & vision.

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Thanks for the reply @bjoernek . I’m glad to hear you are following the topic & I’m looking forward to the feedback.