As a solution to the “design flaw” referenced by @bjoernek , in response to the Periodic Followee Confirmation Proposal, I propose two modifications to the “Absolute Majority” functionality within Proposals.
Primarily, I propose that the calculation to determine an Absolute Majority is altered.
Currently, it considers all voting power, and executes an Absolute Majority if 50%+ of total voting power has been exerted on “yes” or “no” votes respectively. I reccomend that rather than considering total voting power - the average total Voting Power exerted on specifically “Governance” proposals, across the last year (“Active Voting Power”), is utilized to calculate the Absolute Majority threshold.
Secondarily, as this implementation would nearly enable DFINITY to enact an Absolute Majority themselves, I propose the readjustment of the Absolute Majority minimum threshold requirement. I recommend the Absolute Majority Threshold is increased from 50%+ total voting power, to a minimum of 80% of “Active Voting Power” - with gradual reductions as we see DFINITYs voting power reduce over time.
This proposal sets out with the objective to lay the groundwork for the decentralization of the network.
It has been stated by DFINITY that the enactment of the Periodic Followee Confirmation Proposal has been postponed, not only due to resources, but to a “design flaw” within the mechanism.
The foundation cited that the immediate removal of voting power, over code based topics, could lead to insecurity within the network - being the inability to pass network critical updates immediately, without a super majority.
This proposal offers a remedy, which would in turn remove a barrier from the enactment of the Periodic Followee Confirmation Proposal, by removing the necessity to control such a drastic percentage of total supply.
Adjusting the weight calculation of what an Absolute Majority is defined as, utilizing Active Voting Power, rather than Total Voting Power, enables the foundation to gradually relinquish the ~98% super majority they’ve assigned themselves, while still ensuring the security of the network.
By utilizing the average voting power asserted on governance proposals over the last year, the protocol is able to ensure a reliable metric in relation to Active Voting Power, that can’t be skewed by short term variables. This also ensures an accurate representation of what voting power is most likely to look like, after a followee reset - as the governance topic is the only topic to undergo a reset to date.
Through shifting the minimum Absolute Majority threshold, the protocol is simultaneously able to ensure that there is not a central entity, who is able to assert 51%+ control via pre-existing voting power. This safeguards the transition from a Total Voting Power Absolute Majority to an Active Voting Power Absolute Majority, without further jeopardizing the decentralization of the network.
- Enables Robust Governance & Updates of the Protocol, post Periodic Followee Confirmation
This proposal ensures that post Periodic Followee Confirmation, the Internet Computer Protocol does not face security issues, aligning with the lack of ability to affect “Absolute Majority” updates. This concern is directly absolved when converting from a Total Voting Power Absolute Majority system, to an Active Voting Power Absolute Majority system. This is due to the fact Active Voting Power is more likely to reassign, or utilize voting power (as shown via the Governance Proposal Reset), in comparison to voting power that is not actively exercised - but rather employed under an indefinite “set&forget” model.
- Governance Proposals become more than a glorified poll, as they directly correlate to Active Voting Power
To date, there is nothing binding about governance proposals - they do not enact code based changes. Tying the weight of the Absolute Majority indirectly generates a necessity to participate within Governance proposals - being the security of the network.
- Ensures a super majority can not be achieved with pre-existing Voting Power
By adjusting the minimum requirement to enact an Absolute Majority, the protocol can ensure that the Active Voting Power Governance Mechanism can not be enacted by a single one party’s owned Voting Power.
- Reduces the required Voting Power to achieved an Absolute Majority
To achieve an Absolute Majority, at the time of writing, it would require ~222.5M of ~445M Voting Power. Of which, according to the IC Dashboard, DFINITY owns ~94.5M. Meaning DFINITYs personal voting power, translates to 42% of the requirement for an Absolute Majority.
Under the affect of this proposal, an Absolute Majority would require ~184M VP of ~230M Active Voting Power (this is not an accurate representation of annual average voter participation, but rather an example, based off recent proposal outcomes). Of which, according to the IC Dashboard, DFINITY owns ~94.5M. Meaning DFINITYs personal voting power, would translate to 51% of the requirement for an Absolute Majority.
This means that the amount of Voting Power required to enact an Absolute Majority, decreases by about ~40M (10% of total voting power), while DFINITYs ability to enact an Absolute Majority increases by about 10%, under the affect of this proposal.
DFINITYs Periodic Followee Confirmation Concern can be found here;
The original Periodic Followee Confirmation forum post & discussion can be found here;
The follow up Periodic Followee Confirmation forum post & discussion can be found here;
Proposal Written by accumulating.icp
I’d like to emphasize that this is the draft proposal, therefor I am open to discussion, revision, and feedback regarding the proposal. This will be proposed one week after the start of dialogue on forums.