Here is, IMHO, the solution to my questions @MrPink13 :
Since the reviewers must have to be incorruptible, we can incentivize a genuine review by :
1 - rewarding the randomly assigned neurons with an important amount of ICP (obviously at least higher than the Avg Daily Voting Rewards), to prevent them to be tented by the choice of letting go the spam to the NNS and earning the voting rewards.
2 - set a second and last layer of reviewers : the reviewer of the reviewers. These last ones would judge retrospectively if the proposal was a spam or not, if the first layer of reviewers filtered/not filtered genuinely. If they did not, the second layer tell it, and the insincere reviewers are individually identified as having let pass a spam proposal. Such a reviewer, identified as insincere, would not asked to be reviewer again (in you system well thought) before an certain amount of time. The more such a neuron would be identified as insincere, the more he would not be eligible to be reviewer again. This second and last layer of reviewers would not be rewarded for their review of the reviewers.
Conclusion : In my opinion, the best solution is the crossing of the 2 aspects, because :
- the higher reward given by the act of reviewing will incentivize average the investors to review genuinely and not be dismissed of being eligible to such rewards
- it will incentivized the biggest investors who could want to create spam or let pass spam (as reviewers) to not succeed and be, in addition, deprived of eligibility, and by consequence of the rewards he would have earned as future reviewer.
Indeed, even in the case where a huge whale would be a reviewer and would want to let pass a spam proposal for the rewards he would get thanks to the voting to come after, it would stay as a minority, so it would not overwhelm the other average reviewers, and the whale would be retrospectively judged as insincere by the second layer and would not have again the occasion of trying to push a spam.
As you understood, this solution relies on and takes advantage of the Avg Daily Voting Rewards as a minimum (currently 1.30 icp) in association with a progressive catharsis of the biggest bag who could try to multiply the spam or let the spam pass :
The average investors are here the engine and the brake of the reviewing. There will always be such an averagenes (only numbers will change), so we can rely on it.
So to recap, your solution, PLUS this add-on is exhaustively operative. The people parties implementation will be the game changer.
I would love hear @jwiegley’ and @dominicwilliams’s opinion about this.