Thoughts on Risk-Conscious Means of Neuron Transfer

[MichaelAnnh]

@ayjayem Your post is great to read.

@ayjayem

The general issue arises from the very fact that neurons currently follow other neurons. So to address this, what if neurons followed not neurons , but instead Internet Identities ?

After all, this would correspond conceptually better to reality: voters want to follow other voters, not those voters’ stakes (neurons). And it would mean that people couldn’t buy votes by buying neurons, because followers would now attach to Internet Identities - not neurons (see Note 2 for brief further discussion on this point).

I think that approach is pretty great. I’d actually like to follow an internet identity (possibly even linked to a face or with a name in the forum), than just a stake.
I’ve argued about introducing following fees as a possible reward people for providing voting neurons, or with your approach voting identities.

@MichaelAnnh

=> If that is translated, it would mean that the neurons we’re following should collect fees. If someone with a high stake wants to collect additional income, he should advertise his neuron and make others follow him. Would that be an approach suitable for Dfinity?
Via this he could earn without giving others a liquidity disadvantage, he could pay for additional security, and it would lead to more decentralization of the IC, since direct participation in governance becomes rewarded more. Of course he’d also have to work for his earned ICP, that’s what I see as an absolute win for all.
Work more => earn more instead of have more => earn more

@MichaelAnnh

I get your concern. You’re basically saying that price dumping in voting fees might counteract the decentralication which was initially intended. So it might become a tool which adds to unfairness like the 1ICP treshold.

Just a few thoughts:

Why do you assume everyone would follow Dfinity it they had alternatives? Of course most devs and Dfinity are practically in one boat, but in spite of that, I’d prefer voting for a dev directly.
Let’s take @lastmjs for an example. I listened to his podcasts, read his stuff on Twitter, etc…
If he’d set up a voting neuron and he’d take 5% from followees , I’d do it, because I’d know that he’d vote in my interest (since I agree to his views). Would you vote for a party/politician you don’t agree with, just because they offer you more (I don’t want to say that I don’t agree with Dfinity)?

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Following internet identities + voting fees could give ICP additional security in terms of avoiding governance attacks. People could be incentiviced to participate in governance, strenghten decentralization and also have something to lose/fight for (voting fees). This could also make buying/selling of a following neurons/internet identities less likely. Let’s assume I put much work into establishing a serious id which people follow. Why should i suddenly sell it to the next best bidder and risk people to hate me for that?
The buyer would exactly have one bad vote before people unfollow the id + they’d also possibly cruzify me for doing that to them.

Did anyone see the controversy created by a Uniswap vote? As soon as an identity (possibly even showing a pseudonym in the forum, or a face, which the id holder provided by free will to advertise his neuron/id ) would be linked to that vote, there would be much more controversy and attention.
This is another form of accountability (personal) which could be incentivized.

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@ayjayem

a. Support official neuron transfer with penalties…
— increasing in dissolve delay.
— redistributed to existing stakers in proportion to remaining stakers’ dissolve delay.

I think this is a really interesting way to go. It wouldn’t be restricted, but people would face a loss and so they’d have financial accountability as soon as they stake. @namyIC provided it in the thread.

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@ayjayem

In theory, one could still sell his Internet Identity; but it is perhaps possible to make Internet Identity sales impractical, by for example ensuring that Internet Identity seed phrases cannot be deleted, such that an Internet Identity seller is unable to prove that he no longer has access to an Identity that he has sold, thus making sales much less likely in the first place.

I personally started to become interested in ICP because of its unique handling of internet identites. The more I deal with it, the more I’d actually dislike permanent seed phrases. How do others see that?