@wpb is there any feature that would allow us to know when a proposal is live so we can vote quickly or remove a follow beforehand if we wish to have full control over our vote?
This post references two push notification options. These are the only options I know at this time.
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Regarding the last paragraph, it would be nice if the NNS app had official up-to-date links to tutorials and how-tos directly in the app. This reduces the possibility of someone going to an external site, and then say staking changes and they end up being confused when they come to the actual NNS app. Those guides will still exist, but itâs always nice to have an official link to documentation in the app to settle any discrepancies.
This is as simple of a change as including a link on the neuron tab or voting tab, etc. to an official dfinity.org page or DFINITY maintained medium article/YouTube video. Maybe even a FAQ tab in the NNS. Iâm not a UX designer so I canât speak to the specifics, but hopefully this clarifies my more general ask.
Crypto has a ton of scammy how-to type of sites, we just want to make sure that people coming to the NNS have access to up-to-date, factual information - this will decrease bounce rate, increase understanding, and drive adoption (and staking)
Iâm glad you mentioned this. Iâd like to propose a topic for discussion on this point.
It is apparent to many in the community, after this educational exercise, that the submission of governance proposals provides significantly higher maturity rewards when there are less voters. This introduces a vulnerability, as mentioned, whereby a neuron that aims to earn more than 1ICP per day (the cost of a proposal), they could indefinitely boost earnings through daily governance proposals. The proposals would not need to be approved to earn the 20 weight maturity.
To combat this, a rejected governance proposal should have a much lower weight. At least as low as a regular proposal: 1. Which would lower rewards earned by those rejecting the proposal, keeping the network safe; but also eliminating the vulnerability.
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It will incentivise the voters to accept proposals rather than reject, no matter what the proposals are.
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I am afraid that such a model would motivate people to vote « yes » to every governance proposals, just to not miss out the highest rewards. As long as the rewards are equal, rejected or not, people can vote freely, but by weighting differently the execution or the rejection will turn into a incentivizing to vote « yes », whatever the matter of the proposal. They would develop the habit of just voting yes, sometimes by going against their own negative advice, just to maximize the rewards, sometimes by not even reading the proposal. It could be eventually very risky, because it is possible that people would always vote yes, even if a nefarious proposal occurs. Let us be very careful here.
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@romain we have already created a system that incentivizes people to create dummy proposals just for the sake of increasing rewards. By introducing this change I think we will be giving stakeholders a tool to combat spam proposals without increasing the cost to submit a proposal.
I agree that some stakeholders will vote yes simply for rewards but I doubt major voting neurons will.
If this change is not sufficient I would ask for an alternative. Perhaps we should roll this change back all together.
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This is why I may be look like crazy, but I am believing that the previous system, where all proposal were equally weighted, should be set up back. What do you all think about this ?
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That might be the route to go down. But Iâd still like to give @weedpatch2 proposal a shot first. If we can keep the new weighting while maintaining the integrity of the system it would be a win/win.
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Never underestimate the unintended consequences. But if there are potential voters who do not vote, why should voters who do vote be penalized? Your contention, that a rejected proposal is worth less, does not play out in real world. The proposals would then be worded so that a rejected proposal could also be detrimental, no?
Do you believe most voters actually vote manually or just follow a registered neuron? If itâs the latter, what makes those people any different than the people who were voting through liquid democracy before the recent change to remove Dfinity as the default followee?
Personally, what I see playing out right now is that a bunch of stakeholders got rugged by an NNS change and now everyone wants to bank extra rewards while the victims are left unaware.
What if someone only merges maturity once a quarter or once every 6 months? Why should they be left out simply because they donât log in as often as someone else?
At first I liked this idea of weighting rejected proposals less than approved proposals, but as others have already pointed out, it will incentivize people to vote yes to all governance proposals. Hence, that may not be the right deterrent from making proposals that donât bring value.
Iâm also not a fan of increasing the cost to make a proposal because it seems that would move us away from the goal of decentralization. Using proposal price as a deterrent prohibits smaller investors from participating.
I think we need a weighted proposal system to incentivize the IC community to step up and make proposals that they believe would improve the system. Virtually all proposals other than the current daily governance proposal campaign have been initiated by Dfinity and I suspect everyone would agree that more community engagement in this area is important to decentralization.
As a reminder, this daily governance proposal campaign has a functional purpose, which is to increase awareness, educate the community, and help facilitate an increase in governance participation. I would rather a large portion of the voting body configure their neurons during this campaign when the results of the votes do not matter than waiting until a major proposal comes along and only a small portion of the governing body is participating.
This daily proposal campaign will not continue past the 30 days that was originally outlined. Others are welcome to make governance proposals and I highly encourage those proposals to be actionable and well deliberated on the forum. It remains to be seen if we will have a problem with proposals that do not bring value, but if we do I think we should deal with it at that time.
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ICP tokenomics has never been presented as a passive investment. Voting rewards are intended to incentivize participation. Some people will want a more passive approach and will get the lower voting rewards that come from their current neuron configuration to vote on routine business only. Others will want to maximize voting rewards by voting on everything. Either way, only active participation is rewarded at whatever level is chosen.
I donât think this change in proposal weights and following map can be characterized as a rug pull. This change was first presented in the forum at the end of November and deliberated for 2 weeks. The NNS vote on proposal 34485 was overwhelmingly in favor. This daily proposal campaign started 15 days before the change was implemented. The change was widely communicated on all social media platforms.
Hence, in my opinion, all reasonable attempts to communicate his change have been made and it is up to each individual neuron owner to pay attention and respond accordingly. This includes voicing an opinion of opposition to this change, which so far has not happened. It would be helpful if anyone in opposition would speak up so everyone can take their user experience into account.
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The tokenomics are actually designed that way. Thatâs how liquid democracy works. The people who are being rewarded now are not doing any more work than the people who are no longer getting rewards. There is zero extra effort involved in following ICPMN or Cycle_DAO versus following Dfinity after Genesis and doing so does not suddenly qualify you as an âactive voterâ.
Trying to argue that these people arenât âactive votersâ simply because they donât live on social media or on these forums is wrong IMO. These people committed funds to the network; therefore, they have done their part to contribute. The system offered them the option of earning rewards through liquid democracy and thatâs what they did. They shouldnât be punished just because they choose to not live in the crypto sphere.
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#1 - I love that these conversations are occurring and that they are occurring in public. Civil discussion only strengthens the governance of the IC. I really think the NNS community is laying the ground work for how a DAO should operate. Thanks for bringing your opposition to this forum!
#2 - The discussion may benefit from a framing of âprior to the changeâ and âpost changeâ. What I mean is that prior to the change almost every neuron was following dfinity of ICA by default (this default was setup mid-2021 when a lot of users were complaining about not getting rewards for failing to vote), which posed problems for liquid democracy. However, by removing that default, it has forced every neuron owner to make a choice on next steps (follow another neuron or vote manually). The change resolved the issue of the default dfinity/ICA follow. However, âpost changeâ it does seem reasonable that people should be able to follow dfinity/ICA for governance topic, should they choose to do so (particularly since both have started voting on governance topics again). Doing so would be an active choice at this point. Perhaps a suggested next step would be to add back the dfinity and ICA neurons to the named neuron list for goverance topics?
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I donât think those who did not switch followee are punished. They simply did not get the bonus.
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Thanks for the reply Kyle!
I just want to clarify. I am not arguing against the change to remove Dfinity as the default followee. I think that was a great move for decentralization of the NNS. Iâm arguing against the extra weighting of governance proposals. At the very least I would like to implement some lever (like the .1 reject weighting) that the community can pull if the system is being abused.
Because of the way these changes were rolled out I donât think anyone understood their combined impact. Since both changes went into effect there has been a massive spike in daily maturity for anyone who has been voting manually or voting through liquid democracy (following ICPMN or Cycle_DAO).
But, as you know, these rewards are not coming from thin air. This change in maturity means there are other stakeholders who are now getting significantly less rewards because they were following Dfinity prior to this change.
I commend @wpb for his education campaign and I think it has been very successful at raising awareness for people who actively merge maturity in the NNS or are active on Twitter, Telegram, and on these forums.
However, there is clearly still a group of stakeholders who do not know about these changes and I donât think itâs fair to tell them tough luck.
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Itâs not a bonus. Thatâs what Iâm trying to point out. Itâs a redistribution of the overall pie. These people would have normally gotten a piece of that pie even under the new weightingâs except their follower settings were changed without their consent.
These two changes, when looked at individually, seem innocent enough; but, they are now actually have a negative effect on people who donât even realize it
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I totally agree with you. Most people (me included) would be following a neuron.
Unfortunately, because of the way the system is setup, if one doesnât play, one does not win. In this case, if one doesnât follow the forum, one doesnât know that the rules have changed to follow some other neurons.
Secondly if one doesnât compound maturity, itâs a big loss at the end of 8 years.
Logically if one plays, hopefully one plays to win , though.
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I would agree with that if the rules hadnât changed.
There was no notice in the NNS that says âPassive stakeholders must check the forum or risk losing your rewards. Please consider before locking your funds for 8 YEARSâ
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