@bjoernek Thanks for your insightful feedback!
To respond to a few of your points
I would argue that this proposal does have long-term positives. Because voters receive a fixed amount of ICP (according to the inflation rate at the time) regardless of the number of proposals that are introduced on a given day, voters are not incentivized to approve proposals in order to allow proposal creators to submit more proposals without having to pay a reject cost (i.e. the whales that have been supporting ysyms’ proposals).
Also, unlike Proposal to covert from system based reward to voter based reward; to implement an accept quorum mechanism; and to return the reject cost to 1 ICP, this proposal ensures that the inflation rate of ICP stays on schedule according to the tokenomics parameters specified, allowing for a predictable inflation rate.
This proposal is a standalone solution for removing the financial or “rewards skew” incentives tied to creating spam proposal. I recommend that this proposal be passed in tandem with one of the other proposals that remove the advertisement/visibilitiy or “bad content” incentives for submitting spam proposals:
- Multi-stage Governance Proposals, Starting w/ Stage 0 and Stage 1
- [Proposal] Introduce an incubation period and minimum support threshold for governance proposals
- Proposal to restrict rewards qualification to a threshold
Great question!
In the spirit of changing as little variables as possible at a time, I chose 75% as it was the original intention behind the change to governance proposal weights introduced earlier this year via Proposal: 34485 - ICP Dashboard. This change was accompanied by a 30 day campaign to incentivize voter participation in which @wpb submitted 1 proposal per day to the NNS. Having 1 governance proposal per day submitted to the NNS (in total) meant that in a given day roughly 75% of staked rewards came from governance proposals.
This rewards percentage was provably shown to increase voter participation in the NNS, and so I believe it makes for a good percentage constant starting place.
Due to the recent spamming by ysyms, voters are receiving ~86% of their voting rewards from governance, yet the overall voter participation has not noticeably changed since the end of @wpb’s proposal campaign.
This shows that there’s diminishing returns in terms of the how much voting power will increase as voter rewards increase. I therefore disagree with the feedback and assessment with respect to “Decentralized and Active” that this change will have any meaningful impact on voter participation.
In fact, I would argue that with fewer spam proposals to clutter things up, this will incentivize voters to take a more active role in their voting.