OK - seems like a pragmatic way to deal with a huge issue in the short term - but in that case we need:
- A lot more (independently run and well distributed) boundary nodes.
- Incentives for BNs to have a process for checking whether takedown requests are legitimate and legally challenging egregious ones not just censor everything so as to minimise legal risk or even to extort application developers.
Long term work on this question for example:
- On SEV / plausible deniability for node operators.
- Replacing boundary nodes as censors with DNS as censors.DNS as Censor (variation on Boundary Nodes as Censors)
- Censorship resistant messaging as an alternative to accessing the IC over HTTP via boundary nodes. (Idea is to ensure that Candid interfaces can be accessed via a slow and expensive way so that censors cannot freeze funds but only censor content. This would allow us to claim that the IC is at least as censorship resistant as existing chains with respect to DeFi type applications. Also a Waku/Hopr/Nym like P2P messaging layer would be great for other applications.)